ABSTRACT

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR
MOVEMENT AND FRENCH POLITICS
1945 - 1952

Roy Simon Godson

The purposes of the dissertation are first to demonstrate that
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be significant actors in world
politics and second, to describe, explain and evaluate the role that one non-
governmental actor, the American Federation of Labor, played in the inter-
national labor movement and in French politics from 1945 - 1952.

First, the characteristics of NGOs are discussed and the ways in
which trade unions can play a role in world politics are outlined. Second,
the AFL's foreign policy-making process from 1945-1952 is analysed. The
analysis reveals that Mathew Woll, a senior AFL Vice-President, David
Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union,
and AFL President, William Green and Secretary-Treasurer, George
Meany, assisted by a few members of their staff (particularly, Jay Lovestone,
Irving Brown) constituted the policy-making elite. These men, it appears,
acted independently of both the U.S. government and industry, particularly
in the early post-war period.

The values, expectations and specific post-war perceptions of the
AFL policy makers are then described. These perspectives explain the
AFL leaders' decision to reject on one hand, isolationism, and on the other
hand, to reject working with the World Federation of Trade Unions and its communist and non-communist affiliates. In light of their perspectives, the AFL leaders believed they had to support those non-communist trade unionists who were struggling to build international and French labor bodies completely free from communist domination.

The AFL's efforts to provide moral, organizational and material support to these forces are described. In its statements and actions the AFL attempted to provide non-communists in many countries and particularly in France with encouragement and the satisfaction of knowing that they were not alone in what these American and European trade unionists regarded as a struggle to prevent communist dictatorship, or war between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The AFL also attempted to act as an organizational catalyst for these trade union forces, facilitating on the international level the Marshall Plan trade union conferences, the creation of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the International Transport Workers' Mediterranean Committee, and in France the creation of Force Cuvrierie. Material assistance in the form of food, equipment and money was also provided to support these efforts.

Finally, the dissertation assesses the impact of the AFL's policy on the international and French labor movements and on French politics. By demonstrating that the AFL, apparently acting independently of the U.S. government (particularly in the early post-war period), was able to influence developments abroad, the thesis demonstrates how one type of NGO was able to play a role in world politics.
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## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations</td>
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<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>BMCO</td>
<td>Bureau Central de la Main d'Oeuvre</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Confédération Francaise des Travailleurs Chrétien</td>
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<td>CGIL</td>
<td>Confederation Generale Italiana Lavoratori</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Communist Party</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPTT</td>
<td>Fédération des Postes, Téléphones et Télégraphie</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAM</td>
<td>International Association of Machinists</td>
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<td>ICFTU</td>
<td>International Confederation of Free Trades Unions</td>
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<td>IFTU</td>
<td>International Federation of Trades Unions</td>
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<td>ILGWU</td>
<td>International Ladies Garment Workers Union</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>ILRC</td>
<td>International Labor Relations Committee (of the AFL)</td>
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<td>IMWF</td>
<td>International Metal Workers Federation</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Transport Workers Federation</td>
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<td>ITS</td>
<td>International Trade Secretariats</td>
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<td>IWW</td>
<td>International Workers of the World</td>
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<td>JLC</td>
<td>Jewish Labor Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVV</td>
<td>Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
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<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trades Union Congress (Great Britain)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUAC</td>
<td>Trades Union Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>UD</td>
<td>Union Departmentale</td>
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<td>UMWA</td>
<td>United Mineworkers of America</td>
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<td>WFTU</td>
<td>World Federation of Trades Unions</td>
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

For many non-Marxist scholars, contemporary world politics is "politics among nations."\(^1\) For them, the only important actor in the international arena is the nation-state. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) they believe, are not actors, but part of the "scenery or props" and, on occasion, instruments in the hands of the real actors on the world "stage."\(^2\) If we wish to understand world politics, it appears we must focus our attention on the key actors and not divert our effort by attempting to understand the role and workings of the "props." Moreover, if we wish to alter aspects or the course of world politics, it appears that we must focus our attention on governments and not on non-governmental actors, or, what is sometimes referred to in the United States as the private sector.

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\(^1\) Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: 1948). This book has had four revisions, the latest in 1968.

Recently, however, a number of scholars have referred to the role that NGOs play in international and domestic politics and to the linkages that exist between domestic and international politics. Indeed, James Rosenau, Stanley Hoffmann and others have suggested that an understanding of the activities of NGOs may help explain aspects of international political behavior.\(^1\) For example, explanations of historical systems, Hoffmann suggests, require the examination of the policies and perspectives of NGOs. Those groups, he observes, are "linked" to national systems and through national systems to international systems. By analyzing the policies and perspectives of major non-governmental elites, it should become possible to develop hypotheses to assist in the explanation of a country's international behavior. So far, however, there has been little if any systematic research to determine in what ways and under what conditions NGOs are significant and how they are linked to national and international systems.\(^2\)

A major purpose of this dissertation is to help demonstrate that major NGOs have been and can be important actors in their own right (as well as "props" or "instruments" in the hands of other actors) and to illustrate some types of linkages they have with both the national and international systems. Specifically, an attempt will be made to demonstrate


several of the ways in which trade unions play an important role in domestic and international politics. If this hypothesis is correct, it would appear that an understanding of world politics requires an understanding of labor organizations and the role they play in both domestic and international affairs. In this sense, this NGO may be conceived of as an analytical concept or--if you will--part of 'theory as a 'set of questions' or theory as a guide to research."

1 The application of the concept may help explain a variety of specific international and domestic political events as well as facilitate the development of theory as a set of answers which explain politics.

By implication, an understanding of the role organized labor plays in domestic and international politics and the linkage between them may also be a guide to action. By focusing attention only on governments and their military and economic instrumentali-
ties, scholars have tended to ignore the role labor unions and other NGOs may play either as independent actors or as instruments in the hands of other actors. This study is designed to correct that imbalance where it has occurred.

Unfortunately, the few scholars who have pointed to the significance of NGOs for the purpose of policy making and theory building have not precisely defined the term. Indeed, a precise definition of

1Hoffmann, pp. 27-8, "Theory" in this sense is not being used in the formal way that many believe the term is employed in the natural sciences, viz, highly general and deductively interde-
pendent propositions. The term is used here to mean a body of concepts and interrelated propositions that can be used to order and explain data.
the term may not be useful at this time, given the paucity of information on the subject. For purposes of clarity in this dissertation and as a contribution to the development of an analytical concept, it is useful, tentatively at least, to define some of the parameters of the concept.

Most definitions of the term appear to be too broad, too narrow, or too vague. Article 71 of the United Nations Charter conceives of an NGO as "any international organization which is not established by inter governmental agreement." One problem with this definition is that it focuses attention only on international NGOs (INGOs) and excludes private organizations whose members are nationals of only one state, i.e., national non-governmental organizations, NNGO. As this study will attempt to demonstrate, NNGOs can also be significant international actors in their own right, as well as when they are affiliated with an INGO. A second problem with this definition is that although an INGO or an NNGO may not be created by a government, it may later fall under the control of a government and in fact, become a government organization in all but name. Indeed, as is indicated in this study, many American and European labor leaders believed that the World Federation of Free Trades Unions (WFTU) was an INGO when it was created but became an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Thus, not only does the definition in Article 71 exclude a significant type of an NGO, it also provides no criteria to help us determine if an NGO continues to remain non-governmental.

A second definition is focused on "transnational interaction." By transnational interaction is meant "the movement of tangible or intangible items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government or intergovernmental organization."¹

Even if one relates "interactions" only to organizations which engage in interaction, this definition is too broad and too vague.

According to the conceptualization of Keohane and Nye, attention will be focused on all transnational interactions which have at least one non-governmental component in the overall set of interactions. No distinction is made between an interaction or an organization which is 95% dominated by governmental actors and organizations that are only 10% influenced by governments. Again, what seems to be lacking are specific objective criteria to help determine when an interaction or action is truly and significantly non-governmental.

As a step in this direction, three criteria may be useful if not exhaustive. First, the more an organization is financially independent of government agencies, the more it is non-governmental. If an organization can raise its own funds, it is much more autonomous than if it is dependent on government sources. Second, the greater the degree of voluntary association between the individuals and groups in the organization, the greater the autonomy of the organization. If the members of a given group are forced by a government to join an organization and are not permitted to join other organizations, the non-governmental status of the organization can be questioned. Third, if the leaders are responsible only to their members and not to government agencies, the organization will tend to be non-governmental. If the leaders can be selected or removed by governmental pressure, they cannot be expected to be completely non-governmental agents.

An organization is non-governmental to the extent that it is a free association of individuals, groups or institutions, independently financed whose leaders are selected by and responsible only to the members of the organization. The members can be comprised solely of individuals from one state, an NGO, or individuals and groups from
more than one state, INGO. The NNGO and INGO becomes an actor in world politics when it affects the interaction of tangible or intangible goods across state boundaries.

Before discussing the specific modes of action or ways in which organized labor may be involved in domestic and international political activities, it should be noted that by trade unions is meant the free association of workers in organizations designed to promote their common welfare and rights. Trade unions in this sense are independent organizations. They possess independently controlled funds and organizers and the leaders are responsible only to their members. Company unions or the labor organizations created by totalitarian and authoritarian governments are not, in this sense, trade unions. Their resources and leaders are controlled either by the sponsoring company or by the government. Although these labor organizations may play a role in political activity, particularly as instruments of government or company policy, they are much more likely to be props and not actors.

In many cases, however, the distinction between trade unions and political parties is rather blurred. In many countries unions have established close relationships with political parties. Sometimes, in one party states, (e.g., the Soviet Union) power and direction tend to flow from the Party to the unions. In other cases, the relationship is more complex. The British Labor Party and the Trades Union Congress (TUC), for example, are intimately related. Nevertheless, even when
the Labor Party has formed the British Government, the TUC has retained considerable autonomy, and fought the Government on a number of issues. ¹

There are several ways in which "free" trade unions can act politically, or if they are controlled by another actor, (e.g., a government) serve as instruments of political action. First, unions can act as political "pressure groups." In the short run, the unions can exercise considerable influence by employing their resources—organizers, money and members—on behalf of specific policies. The unions can also encourage their members to engage in strikes or other forms of disruptive activity to support their political goals. In a highly integrated economy where almost every sector is strategically significant for the economy, it is difficult to exaggerate the significance of this instrumentality.

Unions can exercise considerable influence by engaging in propaganda activities. This can take several forms. First, through their internal media, weekly and monthly newspapers, pamphlets, films and meetings, and the daily contact local leaders have with the membership, unions can educate their membership and develop favorable attitudes toward causes the unions are interested in supporting. Second, by joining together with other NGO's in ad hoc "front" organizations, the unions, particularly because of their mass membership, can make it appear that large numbers of people favor a given policy. If a number of important leaders join with other representatives from major organizations such as business, law, and the media in an ad hoc committee to support or protest United States "containment" policy, for example, it will probably appear to many at home and abroad that significant numbers of people adhere to the group's position. The doubts of many Americans about the wisdom of the policy will be reinforced, and abroad many will question the ability of the government to continue pursuing the policy in the face of apparent massive popular dissatisfaction.

Trade unions can also use their power not only to change policies, but also to change given individuals in a government, the whole government, and even the system of government. This can be done legally or illegally, or through a combination of both methods.
First, in the long run, unions can use their propaganda machinery to shape the attitude of their own members as well as the general public. Propaganda can be aimed at supporting given policies (supported by a specific party or group of individuals in a given party) or it can be aimed directly at building support for a given party or system of government.

Second, unions can frequently place preferred candidates in important positions in the executive branches of government. This is particularly true in advanced industrial economies, where the government must secure the cooperation of organized labor if the economy is to function smoothly. Frequently, in fact, government leaders will select men who have come directly from the labor movement or who have close relationships with union leaders for high posts dealing with industrial relations. In the United States, this may only involve one or two posts on a Cabinet level (e.g., Secretary of Labor and HEW), but in Western European countries and other countries with large public sectors (nationalized industries) a number of cabinet or sub-cabinet posts are filled with ex-union leaders or men who owe their positions to the support of union leaders.¹

¹In France, for example, immediately after World War II, the socialist trade union leaders Albert Gazier, Robert Lacost and Christian Pineau became Ministers; in England, Ernest Bevin, Walter Citrine and Jack Lawson also joined the Government.
Third, the unions can use their organizational muscle and resources to secure the election of preferred candidates. Indeed, in many countries, political parties rely on labor unions for a great deal, if not most, of their organizational and material resources. In the United Kingdom, for example, there is a very close relationship between the Labor Party and the trade unions. The unions have seats on important party committees and have enormous voting strength at the annual Party Conference. In addition, given unions "adopt" Labor parliamentary candidates and materially support their candidacy.\(^1\) In the United States, as will be discussed, the relationship between the unions and the Democratic Party is usually much less intimate. Nevertheless, the unions frequently play a major role in electoral politics.\(^2\)

Fourth, unions can play a decisive role in toppling a government, or system of government by disruption or by facilitating a coup d'etat, invasion, or revolution. By disrupting essential services and by encouraging civil strife (rioting, burning, and looting) unions can threaten to make the life of the government impossible. In some circumstances, the general public, especially in a stable polity, may side with the government and insist that the power of disruptive unions be curtailed.

\(^1\)On the relationship between the Labor Party and the unions, see McKenzie, British Political Parties, and Harrison, Trade Unions and the Labor Party since 1945.

\(^2\)See, for example, J. David Greenstone, Labor in American Politics (New York: 1969).
In other circumstances, if the unions seize on a popular issue, the government may find that an attempt to control the unions may lead to more disruption and civil strife.

Unions also may play a decisive role in a coup, invasion, or revolutionary seizure of power. By disrupting essential services the unions can prevent the government from using its control of the machinery of the state to prevent a coup. By paralyzing the transportation and communications industries, for example, the unions can prevent the government from mobilizing the masses or transporting police or soldiers.

It should be noted also that trade unions can play a role in preventing or inhibiting a coup, revolution or invasion. By refusing to become involved in these activities and encouraging their members to remain orderly and "on the job", union leaders can prevent or hinder any attempt to use organized labor to change a government.

Control of the unions in the aftermath of a coup or any seizure of power can also be decisively important. Trade unions represent concentrations of organized and material resources that are capable of mobilizing large numbers of people. To prevent a counter-coup or counter-revolution, the putschists or revolutionaries must neutralize, if not gain the support, of the organizations that are capable of toppling them from power.
In addition, unions can engage in a variety of paramilitary activities. First, they can participate in espionage. Especially in advanced industrial economies, labor organizations control workers in highly sensitive industries such as electronics. If a union wishes to help ensure that a foreign power has access to secret information about the production and performance of radars, bombsights, and missile systems, it need only arrange for "cooperative" workers to draw, photograph, or memorize the details of the secret machinery. Similarly, a small number of workers in key sections of the transport industry can play an important role in espionage. Railroad workers, seamen, and airline personnel frequently not only observe movements in ports, railroad yards, and airports, but they also travel across frontiers with minimum of supervision. Unions that wish to supply information about strategic centers have ample opportunity to place men in these centers and to transmit the information across frontiers.

Labor organizations in these sectors can also engage in sabotage and other paramilitary activities. By removing parts or installing defective parts in weapons systems or critical machinery such as electric generators, ship or aircraft engines, workers in these industries can play an important, if not necessarily dramatic role in military operations. By preparing material and organizational resources (e.g., money, trusted contacts, codes, safe houses) unions can also be an important ancillary to a guerrilla movement and either impede or support a revolution or an invasion.

Labor leaders can employ or threaten to employ, prevent or threaten to prevent their union from being used as an organizational
Because they are ostensibly serving the interests of large numbers of people, many of whom are employed in strategic sectors, and because of their organizational and material resources, trade union leaders can use or prevent their organizations from becoming powerful actors.

Unions can play an important role in both domestic and international politics by employing or refusing to employ political techniques available to them in their relationships or linkages with the following actors: domestic political groups, their own government, foreign political groups (most importantly foreign trade unions), foreign governments, and international organizations (most importantly international labor organizations). Unions in one country can encourage or discourage international labor organizations or foreign labor organizations from engaging in political activity. By financing foreign unions, for example, perhaps in the face of opposition on the part of other domestic groups and perhaps contrary to the wishes of their own government, they can affect the politics of another state. Alternatively, they can enlist support of both domestic and international forces, including governments and trade unions from using organized labor for these purposes.

Similarly, unions can become important instruments in the hands of other actors. This is true especially if it appears that the unions are independent actors when in fact they are not. If the American

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1 An organization which is used for political purposes other than those for which it ostensibly exists to serve is an organizational weapon. See Philip Selznik, The Organizational Weapon, (New York: 1952).
or Russian governments can gain control of the unions in France or Italy, for example, or prevent any other governmental actor from gaining control of these organizations, they will possess a very useful instrument or prevent another actor from possessing this instrument.

The first purpose of this dissertation is to study the American Federation of Labor's (AFL) involvement in the international labor movement, and French and American politics from 1945-1952, in order to demonstrate several of the major ways unions can become actors as well as props on the world stage. If this thesis is correct, organized labor may be conceived of as an "analytical concept", as well as an institution that can play a role in contemporary international affairs. An analysis of post-war AFL relations with French trade unions and the international labor movement, for example, may help explain aspects of French and international politics that have not as yet received scholarly treatment. At various times, French and American labor leaders, scholars and government officials have maintained that the AFL played a direct role in French politics by "organizing" a rival union structure in France, the "CGT-Force Ouvrière" (FO), and by helping to ensure the implementation of the Marshall Plan.¹ The AFL and its staff may also have played an even more important role in post-war politics. André Lafond, one of the key FO and ITF leaders, for example, maintained that "In the history of European labor, (Irving) Brown will be more important than all the diplomats put together."²

¹See for example, Thomas W. Braden, "I'm Glad the CIA Is 'Immoral'," Saturday Evening Post, May 20, 1967; p. 14. Braden was a senior CIA official who maintains he was familiar with post-war European politics.

²Time, March 17, 1952; Irving Brown was the key AFL representative in Europe from 1945-1952.
An understanding of the policy and perspectives of the AFL may also help facilitate the development of theory that explains American politics and foreign policy. Explanations of U.S. foreign policy, for example, are based sometimes on extrapolations from what is purported to be the American "national character." Henry Kissinger and others at one time asserted that foremost among the attitudes affecting U.S. foreign policy is "American empiricism and its quest for methodological certainty." This makes for vulnerability to Soviet maneuvers in that "every Soviet change of line is taken at least in part at face value, for we cannot be certain that the Soviets may not 'mean' it this time until they have proved they do not . . . ."¹ These hypotheses could be tested against the perspectives and policies of major American non-governmental groups, such as the AFL. If, for example, the AFL's perspectives and behavior appeared to differ markedly from the policies and perspectives of the American government, the hypothesis would seem to be an inadequate explanation of behavior as presumably AFL policy makers are also strongly influenced by the national character.

Indeed, as this study reveals, the AFL leaders and many of the most important American policy makers did not always share similar assumptions. During the war and in the early post-war period,

for example, union leaders and many of the most senior government policy makers differed in their perception of Soviet behavior. AFL leaders consistently believed the Soviets were always interested in world revolution as well as expanding their control of Eastern and Western Europe and that they would seize every conceivable opportunity to achieve these objectives. American policy makers in the early post-war period were, for the most part, much more optimistic about Soviet objectives and saw little need to remain deeply involved in European politics. Roosevelt, Hull and Stettinius, and in the early post-war period, Truman and Byrnes, seemed to believe that the Russians would not attempt to impose their hegemony on East Central Europe let alone Western Europe. They appeared to believe that the defeat of the Nazis and the Japanese meant that the major disturbers of world order had been destroyed and that world peace could be maintained through an institution such as the United Nations. As Herbert Feis, one of the few historians who has had access to the classified government files of the period concluded:

Nothing that Roosevelt ever wrote more clearly marked than this last message to Stalin the determined optimism with which he confronted the business of managing our relations with the Soviet government. He was going to continue to act on the supposition that by patience, proof of good will and fair purpose, the mistrust of Soviet authorities
could be subdued and they could be converted into good partners for the benefit of all mankind. ¹

In 1945, Truman, Feis concluded, "made up his mind that he would not depart from Roosevelt's course or renounce his ways—until and unless they should definitely be proved futile."²

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. was another historian who believed that although there were several exceptions in high policy making circles at the end of World War II, most senior American policy makers believed that the "spheres of influence" approach to world politics should be abandoned and that the Soviets would not seek to impose their hegemony on Eastern Europe. American policy makers held that a "universalistic" approach embodied in the United Nations could maintain world peace, and this policy was adopted.³

Philip Mosely, an advisor to Byrnes at the end of the war concluded, "As late as 1946 American policy making assumed that having defeated the aggressors, the United States would be free once again to limit drastically its commitment in other countries leaving the United Nations to take care of what minor troubles and conflicts

might arise."\(^1\) Mosely's conclusion seems borne out by Truman when in January 1946 he wrote to Byrnes, "I do not think we should play compromise any longer . . . . I'm tired of babying the Russians."\(^2\)

Indeed, even major revisionist historians such as Gar Alperovitz and Martin Herz, who conclude that American hostility to the Soviet Union at the end of World War II was in large part responsible for the cold war, do not suggest that the major American policy makers of the period (with several exceptions such as Forrestal and Harriman) believed that the Russians were bent on controlling Western Europe, tipping the balance of power against the U.S. and fomenting world revolution. Alperovitz believes Truman was more suspicious of the Russians than Roosevelt, and in the summer of 1945 wanted to use the atomic bomb against the Japanese to demonstrate U.S. power to the Russians. But Alperovitz concluded that Truman, let alone Roosevelt, was not concerned with a Soviet military or political threat to Western Europe. This view, he maintains, prevailed in the U.S. government until late 1946.\(^3\) Martin Herz

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has also concluded that American leaders as late as 1945 were not much worried about the expansion of communism into Western Europe. 1

It should be noted, however, that Gabriel Kolko maintains that American policy makers, concerned about keeping the world "open" for the American economy, were beginning to worry about Soviet "subversion" in Western Europe as early as the middle of 1945. 2

The AFL policy makers, on the other hand, had been concerned about what they believed to be the Russians' worldwide ambitions and their uses of indigenous allies, local communist parties, ever since the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917 and the American Communist Party tried to take over the American Labor Movement in the 1920s. 3 David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) and one of the key AFL foreign policy makers, had fought a major battle with the Communists for control of his Union in the 1920s and the 1930s. 4 Indeed, Dubinsky in the late 1920's allied

1Martin F. Herz, Beginnings of the Cold War, (Bloomington: 1966).


himself with Jay Lovestone, who had been the leader of the American Communist Party, until he was expelled in 1928. Lovestone, whose Marxist-Leninist opposition party, the "Lovestonites," played a major role in preventing the communists from gaining control of the ILGWU, also remained in contact with communist party opposition groups throughout Europe. By the late 1930s Dubinsky and Lovestone were also beginning to work closely on foreign policy issues with Matthew Woll, a key AFL Vice-President, the young Secretary-Treasurer of the organization, George Meany, and AFL President William Green.

As will be discussed, these five men, and a young AFL organizer who had been associated with Lovestone, Irving Brown, became the key AFL policy makers. Even before America entered the war, they were concerned with both Nazi and Soviet domination of Europe. They feared that if the Nazis were successful in eliminating most of Europe's non-communist political and labor leadership it would be almost impossible to restore democratic government in Europe even if the Nazis were eventually defeated. The Russians and the communist underground they feared would become the new rulers on the continent. With this in mind, the AFL leadership in 1940 assisted the ILGWU supported Jewish Labor Committee's efforts to rescue hundreds of democratic labor leaders, politicians and intellectuals from the Nazis in occupied Europe. During the war, many of the
exiles acted as a liaison group between the American Labor movement and the underground organizations in Occupied Europe. Working ties with the Allied governments were established to enable relief aid and supplies to be dropped to the underground organizations. But, as D Day approached, the exiles and the American Labor Leaders began to discuss ways of assisting the Europeans after the Nazis had been defeated and the western Allies began to disengage themselves from the underground groups.

In the fall of 1944, the AFL leaders, concerned about Soviet objectives in Western Europe, Asia and Latin America, and Russian willingness to use communist parties to gain control of national and international labor organizations, asked the AFL convention to pass a resolution creating a fund to support non-communist and democratic elements throughout the world. At the convention Luigi Antonini, an ILGWU Vice-President, reported on his recent trip to the liberated parts of Italy. He noted that labor elements were reviving after the breakdown of Fascism, but he urged that moral and material support be given to these groups, "For while it is being reported at the moment that a truce prevails between the democratic and totalitarian groups in the central labor party of Italian labor, it is certain that this truce may last only until the communists find it opportune
to make a bid for domination and the overpowering of all democratic opposition.\textsuperscript{1} Woll and several of his associates at the International Photo Engravers Union introduced a resolution to create a one million dollar "Free Trade Union Fund" and a "Free Trade Union Committee" to assure assistance for the organization of "free democratic unions" in Europe, Asia and Central and South America. The resolution, which was passed without opposition, noted that liberation from Nazi Germany and Japan did not offer "automatic assurance that freedom and democracy will be restored, or that the workers in each country will regain or be secure in their rights as freemen and free workers.

Thus, it appears that AFL leaders well before America entered World War II, believed the Russians would attempt to destroy democracy throughout the world. They did not oppose allying with the Soviet Union during the war, but unlike American government policy makers, they did not believe that the worldwide struggle between democratic elements and Russian controlled Communists would cease once the war began to wind down. The AFL leaders believed the Russians would attempt to gain control of Western and


\textsuperscript{2}Proceedings, 1944, pp. 556-557.
Eastern Europe as well as other parts of the world as soon as this was feasible for them, and that the trade unions in these areas would be their major targets.

Most senior U.S. officials were much more sanguine about Soviet intentions. As Mosely, Feis and Schlesinger, argued they did not believe the Soviets intended to dominate Eastern, let alone Western Europe. Major revisionist historians who believe that U.S. government officials were very suspicious of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe confirm that American officials, with some exceptions, were not worried about Soviet goals in Western Europe or the potential roles of trades unions in Soviet ambitions. Finally, as Sidney Lens, a radical critic of both the AFL and the U.S. government's foreign policies, has pointed out, the AFL concern with the Russians and the American labor leaders' attempt to prevent increasing Communist strength in Western Europe antedated the U.S. government's "cold war" by several years.¹ In sum, it appears that Kissinger's hypothesis that "American empiricism and its quest for methodological certainty" make Americans vulnerable to Soviet maneuvers, may be wrong or may need serious qualification. Perhaps only the

the groups or sections of the public from which American foreign policy makers traditionally have been drawn share this "empiricism" and "quest for methodological certainty." Perhaps other groups with different perspectives do not suffer from what appears to be a "vulnerability to Soviet maneuvers."

The divergent perspectives and actions also illustrate the linkages between NGOs and the government in the United States. The absence of linkage, or the divergent perspectives and policy, particularly in the early post-war period, lends support to the pluralistic model of United States policy making.\(^1\) It is true of course, as this study will illustrate, that by 1948 with the implementation of the Marshall Plan, United States government and the AFL policy and perspectives much more closely paralleled each other, especially in France. Indeed, on occasion the links between the AFL and the United States government became so close it was difficult to disentangle them. These links, however do not appear to support the monistic thesis of communication and command flowing from the government or ruling class down to the mass based

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organization, for it was the American government which changed its policy, not the AFL.

Until the classified papers of the American government are available for public scrutiny it will be difficult if not impossible to establish with complete certainty the precise "links" between the AFL and U.S. foreign policy. From the data currently available, however, it does not appear that the American government imposed its policy on the AFL or that the AFL was required by necessity to support U.S. policy. Ronald Radosh, an American neo-Marxist scholar, for example, maintains that "all post-war administrations have received unswerving loyalty from the leadership of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations."\(^1\) Since the days of the revolutionary Industrial Workers of the World, he observes, "there has been no independent union movement controlled by its own rank-and-file and not tied to the machinery of the state."\(^2\) Radosh explains this by the existence of what he calls a "corporate unionism" and "corporation capitalism." The Unions are forced to support American foreign policy (which is designed to promote the interests of American capitalism) so that the

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\(^2\) Radosh, p. 29.
corporations will have sufficient profits to pay labor adequate and sometimes high wages. While this may be a plausible hypothesis, the information currently available on the post-war period does not tend to support Radosh's conclusion.

First, as this study of post-war AFL policy will reveal, in the early post-war years AFL and American foreign policy diverged. Basic aims were similar; the AFL and the U.S. government wanted an economically resurgent Europe free from Soviet domination. The AFL and American government, however, differed in their expectations of the Communist threat and the steps to be taken to secure their common objectives.

Second, although all the relevant information is not available the data in the AFL's files, which was corroborated by interviews with AFL and former U.S. government officials supports the conclusion that at least in the early post-war period the AFL acted independently of the government. Although it is clear that the AFL was in contact with State Department officials, available data and material gathered through interviews indicates that AFL leaders tried to pressure the U. S. government to follow the AFL's policy. Some U.S. officials such as Forestal and Jefferson Caffery, the U. S. Ambassador to France,

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1 Radosh, p. 29.
were sympathetic to the AFL leadership but until at least 1947, they did not, the AFL leaders believed, take positive action to support the measures suggested by the AFL. Nor did U. S. officials make any policy recommendations which were considered by the AFL leadership.

It is also fairly certain that during these years the AFL did not expect, or as far as it has been possible to determine, receive financial assistance from the U.S. government. The AFL files indicate that the Federation's leadership was able to raise only a small part of the money it wanted to make available to foreign trade unionists and that it was difficult to raise even those amounts. There was no discussion or record of any governmental financial support during this period. Interviews with U. S. government officials also confirm this conclusion. In addition, Thomas Braden, former CIA official also maintains that in the early post-war period the AFL "organized Force Ouvrière" with its own funds but that in 1950 the CIA became heavily involved in supporting non-communist unions.

Thus, at least until the onset of the Marshall Plan in late 1947, the AFL appears to have acted completely independently.

1 See Appendix for list of those interviewed.

2 Braden, I'm glad the CIA is Immoral.
The AFL was not isolated from the U. S. government. AFL leaders did meet with U. S. officials but, as will be discussed, there is no concrete evidence that in the early post-war years senior officials even made a major effort to influence the AFL let alone actually succeeded in doing so. After the onset of the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO, however, the relationship between the unions and the Government appears to have become more complex. Several former U.S. officials ambiguously indicated in interviews that the relationship with the AFL may have changed after 1947-48 and Braden asserts that the CIA did give the AFL funds beginning in 1950 but that the AFL leadership was reluctant to explain to the CIA how this money had been expended.\(^1\) The AFL files indicate that there were discussions with U.S. officials about Marshall Plan support to European unions. Until the classified government files of the period are available, however, it is impossible to establish precisely who influenced whom and on what issues after 1947-1948.

That the AFL acted independently of the U. S. government, particularly at the end of the war and during the early post-war period, may be considered surprising. In many countries, as was pointed out, governments and political parties are able to exert strong influence on trade unions, and the unions are often unable or reluctant to differ with their government or the parties with whom they are

\(^1\) Braden, I'm Glad the CIA is Immoral.
closely linked. The American labor movement, however, has had a tradition of independence. Ever since the AFL's creation, the organization's leadership has been wary of attempts by political parties to gain control of their Federation. Samuel Gompers, the AFL's first President and William Green, his successor had witnessed attempts by the IWW, the Socialists, and the Communists to gain control of American unions. 1

Although the AFL began to develop close ties with the Democratic Party during the 1930's, the AFL never became as closely involved as did, for example, the British TUC and the Labor Party. 2 Indeed, even as the ties between the AFL (and the AFL-CIO) have increased, the AFL and the Democratic Party have not based their relationship on an alliance over foreign policy issues. In this connection, it is highly significant that the AFL and the AFL-CIO have never rated political candidates according to their views and votes of foreign policy. Voting records and work on behalf of labor's domestic program are the decisive factors in labor's assistance to a politician. Needless to say, over domestic issues there is an


important mutually dependent relationship between organized labor and the Democratic Party. On foreign policy, however, this relationship appears to have little significance.

Finally, it should be pointed out that ever since its creation the AFL has on occasion vociferously criticized American foreign policy even if the Federation supported a given President's domestic record. Gompers, for example, opposed the annexation of the Philippines and the use of American troops and pressure to support American business interest in Mexico. The AFL fought Roosevelt on the recognition of the Soviet Union and favored boycotting the Nazi government of Germany as early as 1933.\(^1\) Thus, it was not even unusual for American labor leaders to maintain a mutually convenient relationship with the U. S. government and the Democratic Party, and at the same time act independently of them both, as the AFL appears to have done in the closing years of World War II and in the early post-war period.

\(^1\)For the AFL opposition to McKinley, T. Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson and F. Roosevelt, see the previously cited two volumes by Philip Taft and Taft's forthcoming In Defense of Freedom: American Labor and Foreign Affairs.
The second purpose of this dissertation is to explain the post-war policy of the AFL. To do this, an attempt will be made to explain why and how the AFL acted in the international labor movement, in France, and in the United States, for a short but crucial period, from 1945-1952.

World War II marked a watershed in the American Federation of Labor's outlook on and involvement in world affairs. Although, Samuel Gompers, the first President of the AFL, had been a leading internationalist, the Federation, during the interwar period, had largely concerned itself with American and inter-American problems. American trade unions were reluctant to participate in the ideological struggles of the European trade unionists and the overwhelming economic difficulties in the U. S. soon occupied their full attention. In the late 1930's, however, the growing strength of the Nazi and Fascist powers, American entry into the International Labor Organization and the possibility that the CIO might begin to represent American labor abroad, renewed the Federation's interest in international involvement.

This movement was spearheaded by New York based union leaders. In 1933, David Dubinsky, President of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) secured the adoption of an AFL resolution which declared an economic boycott against the increasingly totalitarian German state. In 1934, the AFL began sending delegates to the ILO's annual conference, and in 1937, Matthew Woll, a leading AFL Vice President, was sent to an International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) meeting to negotiate American re-entry into the IFTU.
Although the Federation urged the American government to pursue a policy of strict neutrality and peace, the 1941 Convention called upon the government to extend all "help and assistance possible" to the allies. The AFL also created the "Federation Committee for National Defense" to provide an organized channel through which unions might aid the national defense. After American entry into the war, the AFL and its leaders became increasingly involved in the defense program. AFL leaders sat on the National War Labor Board and union officials and staff members joined numerous government agencies including the War Production Board, the Office of Strategic Services, and the manpower divisions of what became the American occupation forces in Germany, Austria, and Japan.

Throughout the war the AFL also remained in contact with the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) and established close links with many of the exile representatives of organized labor in the Nazi-occupied countries. In cooperation with the U. S. government and private groups, the Federation raised millions of dollars to aid the underground and the victims of Nazism in these countries.

At the end of the war the AFL was again confronted with major foreign policy options. The first was a return to isolationism. Indeed, important leaders such as Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters and W. Hutcheson of the Carpenters urged the Federation to adopt such a course. They argued that the AFL had supported the war effort, but that it was time to "reorder the Federation's priorities." The AFL's attention and resources, they maintained, should be devoted to the CIO's challenge to the AFL and to securing post-war economic and social progress.

The second choice was to secure AFL values by joining the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) which, in 1945, had replaced the IFTU as the major international trade
union center, and to work with both the WFTU's communist and non-communist affiliates. This policy was followed by the CIO until it withdrew from the WFTU in 1948.

The third option was to promote AFL values by boycotting and attempting to weaken the WFTU and its communist affiliates and to work through the International Trade Secretariats (ITS) and groups of non-communist trade unions in France and other countries to create international and national labor organizations free from communist domination. Most of the major Secretariats, e.g., the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) were resisting the requests of the WFTU for closer cooperation and some of their affiliates in France and other countries were also engaged in local power struggles with communist-controlled labor organizations. The third choice involved promoting AFL values by strengthening the Secretariats, their affiliates and non-communist trade union groups in France and other countries and ultimately creating new national and international labor organizations.

This dissertation will explain how and why the AFL adopted this third choice. An attempt will be made to explain the AFL's objectives and strategy in the international labor movement as illustrated in the case study of one of the most important European countries, post-war France. This explanation is not only interesting
in itself but an understanding of the Federation's policy from 1945-1952 may shed considerable light on contemporary American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) policy. Post-war AFL policy appears to have remained consistent.\(^1\) Similarly, the CIO's basic foreign policy orientation after 1948 appears to have remained unaltered. Indeed, after the CIO withdrew from the WFTU in 1948, it joined with the AFL in helping to create and sustain non-communist national and international labor centers. In 1955 the CIO merged with the AFL and, although one major ex-CIO union (the United Auto Workers) has withdrawn from the AFL-CIO, the ex-CIO unions in the Federation have not altered their policy. Many of the same factors operative at the time the AFL and the CIO adopted their basic foreign policy orientations appear to be influential today, and therefore an analysis of these factors may help explain past as well as present policy.\(^2\)


\(^2\) Even if present AFL policy was inconsistent with past policy, an analysis of previously influential factors could prove helpful since present policy may have been adopted as a reaction against previously influential factors and past policy failures.
To accomplish the major purposes of this dissertation, an attempt will be made first, to describe the constraints that determined the AFL's policy; second, to describe the AFL's policy; and third, to assess the significance of the AFL's involvement in French and American politics. In Chapter II the AFL foreign policy making process will be analyzed. Who made AFL foreign policy and what constraints did the decision makers perceive the decision process placed on their behavior? Second, what were the political perspectives of the policy makers? What were their goal values? What were their underlying expectations and "theories" of domestic and international politics? What role did they believe trade unions played in these processes?

To answer these questions, in Chapter III, heavy reliance will be placed on the statements, actions and experiences of the AFL policy-makers as well as on the tradition of the Federation. To avoid repetition, the statements of only one or two policy makers will be quoted. AFL leaders had similar goal values and expectations. As will be shown, one can interchange the statements and actions of the AFL leaders, although they did not all share common ethnic, religious, and educational backgrounds.

Moreover, an examination of overt behavior and internal memoranda and letters found in the AFL archives reveals few if any
differences in the perspectives of individual AFL leaders. It is also
difficult to determine precisely who wrote the speeches and other
published statements of the AFL leaders. Examination of the archives
reveals that speeches and articles were frequently drafted by the
staff and, on occasion, amended by the ostensible author or speaker.
Indeed in a personal interview, Jay Lovestone, formerly Executive
Secretary of the AFL's Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), one of
the key AFL policy making institutions, maintained that he frequently
prepared speeches and articles for two of the most important decision
makers, Matthew Woll and David Dubinsky.¹

In Chapters IV and V, the perceptions of the AFL leaders will
be examined. What were their views of the various tendencies in the
French and international labor movement? What were their percep-
tions of the strengths and strategies of these groupings? How did they
believe the groups related to one another? Needless to say, it is
impractical and unnecessary to describe all the perceptions of the AFL
leaders. Instead their most significant and illustrative views will be
described.

Chapter VI is devoted to a brief summary of the perspectives
and perceptions that explain the AFL policy choice. This is followed by
a description of the AFL's behavior in the international labor movement
and French politics from 1945 to 1952. The description of the AFL's

¹Interview, Lovestone. See the Appendix for the date and
place of this interview.
involvement in the international labor movement is intended to supplement John P. Windmuller's *American Labor and the International Labor Movement* - 1940-1953, and Louis Lorwin's *The International Labor Movement*. Windmuller's and Lorwin's account appears to suffer from two deficiencies. First, writing almost immediately (1953) after many of the politically sensitive events they were describing, they did not have access to various sources, including the AFL's recorded private discussions and decisions. Second, their focus is on the international labor movement. On the whole they deal only in passing with the AFL's involvement in specific countries. Of necessity this leads to a distortion; AFL policy in the international labor movement was intimately related to AFL policy in various countries. To some extent, a reading of the second volume of Philip Taft's *semi-official history of the American Federation of Labor* helps to correct this imbalance. Taft, however, devotes only a few pages to AFL involvement in the politics of each of several countries. The description of AFL policy in this dissertation is designed to supplement and interrelate Taft, Lorwin and Windmuller's writings. Chapter VII is an assessment of the direct and indirect effects of AFL policy on France, the international labor movement and the AFL itself.

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1Windmuller, *op. cit.*


3Philip Taft, *The AFL From the Death of Gompers to the Merger.*
Given this approach, there are several limitations on achieving the objectives of the dissertation. To begin with, the methods adopted do not provide a tight, causal explanation of AFL policy. Rather, it is assumed that AFL leaders were guided in their decision making by their perceptions of the policy making process and of domestic and international politics. An attempt could have been made to establish closer causal links between perspectives and perceptions and actions. For example, the major decision to adopt the third, previously outlined, policy alternative could have been broken down into the incremental policy making process. By clearly delineating specific limited perspectives and perceptions at a given time and the ensuing marginal action the AFL decided to take, it would presumably have been possible to produce a tighter causal explanation for the specific, limited AFL action. By treating a limited number of decisions in this way, it should be possible to "prove" AFL policy was "caused" by the decision makers' perspectives and perceptions. It was not possible, however, to adopt this method for reasons directly related to two other limitations on achieving the stated objectives of the dissertation.

First, the study is limited to the AFL's perceptions and actions in only one country, France. No attempt is made to relate AFL policy in France to AFL actions in other countries and the international labor movement. It is difficult, however, to completely understand the evolution of AFL decision makers' perspectives and policy without a detailed understanding of their perceptions and actions in a number of countries, including Germany and Italy, and of the way in which they believed developments in these countries related to France and the international labor movement. Unfortunately, there are no studies of AFL policy in specific countries. Indeed, with the exception of the previously cited works of Taft, Lorwin and Windmuller,
most scholarly writers on international and national labor politics only mention AFL foreign policy in passing. Thus, it is difficult to include in this study all the relevant inputs that appear to have affected AFL behavior in France and in the international labor movement between 1945 and 1952.

The second limitation is that not all the relevant information necessary to achieve the objectives of this study is available. The papers of one of the key policy makers, Matthew Woll, for example, are lost and, as far as it is possible to determine, have been destroyed. William Green's papers and the files of one of the most important policy making institutions, the International Labor Relations Committee (ILRC), are incomplete. (Fortunately, the FTUC files are almost complete and many of the records of the AFL's European Office are either in the United States or France.)

Other relevant expectations, perceptions, etc., were never committed to paper. The politically sensitive nature of the relationship between the AFL, French trade unions and the American and French governments probably resulted in reliance on oral discussion and commitments. This, of course, makes it difficult to establish precise links between various governments and the AFL. Even if the complete records of the governments were available, it would be very difficult to avoid this limitation. Nevertheless, close analysis of the AFL's files and other sources, enable one, in many
cases, to infer in a general way the nature of contacts between the various actors. In this connection, it appears that the AFL, although in contact with U.S. officials in the early-post-war period, received few if any policy recommendations from the U.S. government. As has been discussed, the AFL records indicate that they did not receive any. In the late 1940's, the AFL's files and other sources indicate that there were discussions about financial support. These references in the AFL files, however, are extremely vague. They serve only to show that the AFL's files can be used to suggest a possible change in the relationship.

Finally, this writer has been unable to obtain access to several types of written records. Access to the minutes of the AFL's Executive Council was denied. (Those who have seen the minutes, however, maintain they are too summary in form to be of great assistance.) More importantly, it was impossible to obtain access to the classified records of the American and French governments. In that these two institutions were intimately involved in the developments of labor politics in France, this is a serious unavoidable limitation.

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1 See Appendix for a list of the dates and places of each interview.
To overcome this, personal interviews have been used to supplement written records and to overcome the limitation of relying on the AFL's records. Between 1967 and 1969, over sixty personal interviews were conducted in the United States, France, England and Italy with many of the major participants in the events and with those who for one reason or another possessed a special knowledge of these events.\(^1\) In this connection, French communist, Catholic, socialist and independent trade union leaders who were active from 1945-1952 were interviewed in an attempt to obtain various perspectives. Several former French ministers and other government officials who were familiar with the role of the trade unions during the period also were interviewed. Former American officials including the Ambassador to France and the leading Marshall Plan administrators gave the writer their impressions of the period and the relationship they had with the AFL. Finally, interviews were also conducted with former trade union leaders from a number of Western European countries and the American CIO in an attempt to obtain various national as well as trade union perspectives on the role of the AFL in the international labor movement and French politics.

All the interviews were flexibly structured to facilitate accurate recall of expectations and motivations. Although those interviewed

\(^1\)See Appendix for a list of the dates and places of each interview.
usually allowed the interviewer to take notes, they frequently asked not to be quoted on various matters. Whenever possible, as will become apparent, information obtained from an interview was cross checked with information obtained from other interviews and the written record. Given the purposes, methods and limitations of the dissertation, the interviews were invaluable in determining expectations and motivations, and in evaluating the significance of AFL behavior.
Chapter II
THE AFL POLICY MAKING PROCESS

To help explain the AFL's behavior an attempt will be made in this chapter to describe the AFL's foreign policy making process. In order to determine how AFL policy was made from 1945-1952, key policy makers and institutions will be identified. In addition, an attempt will be made to examine the constraints which the policy makers believed the decision process placed on their behavior.

As will be illustrated, the AFL decision making process appears to have operated independently of both the U.S. government and industry, particularly in the early post-war period. Although several AFL officials had held minor positions in the U.S. government during the war, and the AFL did exchange information with U.S. officials in the post-war period, there is no evidence to indicate that the U.S. government played a significant role in the AFL policy making process. As has already been shown, the AFL, unlike the British TUC and other national trade union actors, had a tradition of independence and did not maintain interlocking institutions with a
political party. Moreover, as will be discussed, the AFL created its own information gathering system and built up its own financial resources. Indeed, in the early post-war years, the AFL leaders' conviction that the U.S. government was not sufficiently sensitive to the communist threat in Western Europe and other parts of the world, propelled the AFL to create special foreign policy making machinery. Perhaps when the classified files of the U.S. government become available this conclusion will have to be altered. From the information currently available, however, AFL policy making was independent of both the government and business.

In this chapter, first, the structure of the decision making process will be described. The AFL constitution, which remained basically unaltered from 1945-1952, established the broad structure of parameters within which the decision-making process took place. Second, within this structure, the role of four institutions and seven individuals will be analyzed to demonstrate how decisions were made. It will be shown that the major institutions were the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC), the International Labor Relations Committee (ILRC) and the Federation's Executive Council and the Convention.
The Decision-Making Structure

The AFL constitution stipulated that the annual convention was the Federation's major policy making body. The constitution's preamble stated that the "every Trade and Labor Organization in America" should united "in convention assembled, to adopt such measures and disseminate such principles . . . as will permanently unite them to secure the recognition of rights to which they are justly entitled."¹

The chief policy making functions of the convention as defined by the constitution and its order and rules of business were to (i) review the preceding year's policies and administration of the Federation's officers, (ii) determine the next year's policies, and (iii) elect the officers—a president, 13 vice presidents and a secretary-treasurer, all of whom would constitute the Federation's Executive Council.

First, the reports of the Executive Council and the Secretary-Treasurer were presented to the convention. The reports were reviewed

¹Proceedings, 1944, p. xxxi. The following analysis will be drawn from the AFL Constitution which is to be found at the beginning of each annual convention report. (With the exception of 1945, the AFL held an annual convention in the autumn of each year covered by this dissertation) Examination of the convention reports reveals that there were no basic changes in the constitution that affected foreign policy making during this period. Similarly, the order and rules of business remained basically unaltered during the period.
by relevant committees appointed by the President. Finally, the
collection discussed and voted on the committee's recommendations.
The Federation used a similar process in adopting new legislation.
Resolutions, which normally had to be received by the Secretary
Treasurer at least 30 days before the convention, were assigned either
to the Resolutions Committee or another relevant committee. After
the committees' reports, the full convention voted on the resolutions.
The final task of the convention, the election of officers, was straight-
forward. The officers were nominated and quickly elected on the last
day of the convention.

Although the constitution gave the convention the power to review
and set the AFL's policy, it also left major policy-making power in the
hands of the Federation's officers. The President was to preside over
the convention and appoint the members and chairmen of the convention's
legislative committees. Second, he was to preside over and call into
session the Executive Council. Third, he was to supervise the activities
of the Federation and report to the convention through the Executive
Council Report. The Secretary Treasurer's duties primarily concern-
ed collecting and disbursing the Federation's funds and helping admin-
ister the convention. He was also a member of the Executive Council.

The Executive Council was to execute the mandates of the
Convention and "to initiate, whenever necessary, such legislative action
as the convention may direct." The Council was "to authorize the
sending out of Trade Union speakers from place to place in the interests
of the Federation." Finally, the Council was "to take further actions
and render such further decisions during the interim of conventions as
may become necessary to safeguard and promote the best interests of
the Federation and of all its affiliated unions."
Within this structure, the FTUC was one of the most important institutions in the making of foreign policy. Its origins are to be found in the Jewish Labor Committee, the Labor League for Human Rights, and the Wartime Committee of emigré trade union leaders who resided in New York. As was pointed out, many of these emigré leaders had been rescued from the Nazis and brought to the U.S. early in the war by the Jewish Labor Committee. During the war, the exiles, acting as liaison between the Labor League for Human Rights and underground organizations in occupied Europe, helped direct the Labor League's relief and aid program in Europe and parts of Asia. In early 1944, Woll and Dubinsky, in particular, realized that the non-communist trade unionists throughout the world would have difficulty reorganizing due to their lack of material resources. The Labor League decided to ask the AFL convention to approve the creation of a "Free Trade Union Fund" and "Free Trade Union Committee" to assist the Europeans. Although several important AFL leaders, such as Daniel Tobin of the Teamsters, favored the AFL's withdrawal from international involvement, Woll and Dubinsky, were able to secure the 1944 convention's approval of the Labor League's proposals.¹ After the Labor League was disbanded in 1946, the Committee continued its work until the AFL's merger with the CIO in 1955.

¹Interview, Irving Bluestein, former Executive Director of the Labor League for Human Rights and the first Executive Secretary of the FTUC.
The Committee's purpose was to secure the assistance of American trade unions in rebuilding "free and democratic trade unions" in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. The Committee was a new, distinct entity in the AFL policy making process. Its scope was limited in that it was responsible only for building "free" trade unions. Officially, it was not to be concerned with other international labor affairs.\(^1\) Moreover, it was to some extent, separated from the traditional policy making machinery. Although the FTUC was to report on financial matters to "a committee nominated by the President" of the AFL,\(^2\) the FTUC was not obligated to present all its activities to the AFL Executive Council for review. It was understood that the FTUC was to some undefined extent an independent organization, albeit sponsored by the AFL.

**Obtaining and Disseminating Information**

In the AFL foreign policy-making process, the FTUC fulfilled two major functions. First, it was the primary information-gathering

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\(^1\)Matters relating to the International Labor Organization and the exchange of fraternal delegates were generally considered beyond the purview of the FTUC.

\(^2\)Proceedings, 1944, p. 557.
body. Although AFL leaders received official communications from other labor organizations, and occasionally the mass media reported on international labor affairs, the AFL leaders did not feel they were sufficiently well informed about detailed developments abroad and concluded that they needed their own, independent information-gathering apparatus. At considerable expense to the Federation, they hired a number of former trade unionists, several of whom had been serving in the armed forces or in minor government posts during the war, who prepared detailed reports on various countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America. The reports prepared by the FTUC, circulated on a selective basis, were the AFL's primary source of information on labor developments abroad.

The FTUC's role in information-gathering, especially on developments in France, was greatly strengthened when Irving Brown was appointed by the AFL as the FTUC representative in Europe. ¹

In the fall of 1945, Brown, who had been an AFL organizer in the 1930's, a minor official in the War Production Board and a participant in the planning of the U.S. government's labor policy in the occupied areas was asked by the FTUC to go to Europe for six months.

¹Interviews, David Dubinsky, George Harrison, Charles Zimmerman, Jay Lovestone and Proceedings, 1946, p. 73
Although he had studied the major European cultures in college, he had never been abroad before and spoke only a little German. During the war, however, he had had some contacts with several of the exiled European labor leaders and he had read reports on European developments during his last few months in government service. His specific FTUC assignment was to gather detailed information on the extent of communist control of the international and European trade union movements and to formulate alternative suggestions for rebuilding democratic trade unionism.¹

Brown arrived in Europe in October, 1945 and travelled throughout the Scandinavian countries and France with ILGWU Vice President Charles Zimmerman. Zimmerman, a former communist, had been one of Dubinsky's and Lovestone's close associates in the movement to secure AFL involvement in international affairs. He had been involved in the work of the JLC and the Labor League for Human Rights and he had been selected by the JLC to travel through Europe to receive the formal recognition and thanks of the European labor movement for the JLC's wartime assistance. Travelling with Zimmerman helped identify Brown as an intimate associate of the leading AFL leaders concerned with international affairs. Indeed,

¹Interviews, Irving Bluestein and Irving Brown.
Zimmerman and Brown were received and honored by leading trade unionists (several of whom had been rescued from the Nazis by the JLC) and by high government officials (many of whom had been former trade unionists), as well as by high-ranking American military officials and diplomats.

In France, Brown was immediately introduced to the Socialist leader Léon Blum and Daniel Mayer. He also met the top leaders in the French trade union movement as well as Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador, and the labor attaché, Richard Eldridge. ¹ Although he visited other European countries during the following months, Brown concentrated most of his attention on France. Richard Eldridge introduced him to communist and non-communist trade union leaders. Jay Lovestone, then Director of International Affairs for the ILWGU, had provided him with contacts to several well-placed former communists, and, of course, Brown received the cooperation of the JLC. He travelled throughout France meeting and addressing militant trade unionists and gradually learned French. ² Throughout

¹Eldridge was unusually well informed. He had been a volunteer in the French army during World War I and had lived in France for several years during the interwar period. In 1944, he was with the first group of Americans who reopened the American Embassy in Paris.

²Interview, Brown.
this period, he reported occasionally by letter to Matthew Woll and often sent blind carbon copies of his reports to Lovestone at the ILGWU.\(^1\)

In the spring of 1946, the FTUC decided to retain Brown as its representative in Europe. In October, he returned to the United States for consultation, addressed the AFL convention and returned to Europe. At the end of the year, when the AFL decided to continue its efforts in Europe,\(^2\) the AFL leaders decided to open a European office. As French communists made it clear that an office in Paris was unwelcome and Brown would be physically harassed,\(^3\) Brussels was chosen as its location. Mrs. Brown, Lovestone's former secretary, and a linguist, now joined her husband as his administrative assistant. At about the same time Lovestone took over as Executive Secretary of the FTUC. With Lovestone in New York and Mrs. Brown in Brussels, reports to the FTUC were more frequent and comprehensive.

\(^{1}\)Free Trade Union Committee Archives, hereafter referred to as FTUC Archives. From 1967-70, these records were kept in a warehouse in New York City. Other AFL records were available in the AFL Archives, at the AFL-CIO Headquarters in Washington, D.C. These are not systematically filed although they are usually classified according to date. In future references, these sources will be referred to only as FTUC or AFL-CIO Archives.

\(^{2}\)The AFL calculations at this point will be discussed in the following chapters.

\(^{3}\)Minutes of the International Relations Committee Meeting, November 13, 1946.
During the following years Brown travelled throughout Europe and frequently returned to the United States. In Europe he knew almost every important non-communist trade union leader. He met frequently with Cabinet ministers and Socialist Party leaders of most of the Western European countries and with the exiled leaders of Eastern Europe. He had access to Generals Clay and Eisenhower and every Marshall Plan administrator and American Ambassador in Europe. Indeed, if it was necessary, he appeared to be able to meet with anyone west of the Iron Curtain.

The FTUC also received information on the international labor movement and general economic and political conditions from the AFL International Representative, Robert Watt, who had had a great deal of experience in foreign labor affairs and was well known in Europe. After his death in 1947, Watt's place was filled by Frank Fenton, who, on his death in 1949, was succeeded in turn, by George Delaney. These men attended international labor conferences, ILO meetings, but with rare exception did not possess detailed information on the labor movements of specific countries.

Another source of FTUC information was through contacts in the U.S. government. During the war, a number of former trade union leaders and employees worked for the government in one capacity or another (mostly they were members of the armed forces).
For some months after the war, several remained in government service and one or two chose government service as a career.

The end of the war, for example, found Major Henry Rutz, a former member of the International Typographical Union stationed in Germany as the Executive Officer of the United States Army Manpower Division. Joseph Keenen, a Secretary of the Chicago Federation of Labor, spent two years as Labor Advisor to General Clay, the Military Governor of Germany. James Killen of the Pulp and Sulphite Workers was an advisor to General Douglas MacArthur's Headquarters in Japan.

Serafino Romualdi, a former Italian Socialist, who became an ILGWU organizer, worked during the war for the State Department in Latin America and for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in liberated Italy. Arnold Steinbach, a former Austrian socialist, worked with the military authorities in post-war Austria. Moreover, soon after they left government service, Rutz and Romualdi, and also Richard Deverall, who had served with MacArthur in Japan, were engaged by the AFL, Rutz to work in Germany, Romualdi in Latin America, and Deverall in Asia. Although these men did not provide the AFL leaders with specific information on France, they did supply related information on the movements in other countries and on political and economic conditions throughout the world.¹

The FTUC was also in contact with the State Department Bureau EUR-the small Bureau charged with studying the international Communist movement. Ray Murphy, the Director, corresponded and exchanged information with Lovestone.\(^1\) Moreover, one of Murphy's research assistants, Benjamin Mandel, had corresponded with Lovestone since their days together in the Communist Party in the 1920's.

After the Marshall Plan was underway, a number of AFL union leaders and staff became Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) officials. For example, Boris Shishkin, who had been the AFL Research Director, became head of the ECA Labor Division. William Green's files and the FTUC Archives are studded with information exchanged with these and other contacts in the U.S. government.

There are no indications in the AFL's files, however, that the AFL was dependent on the U.S. government for information. Frequently, the correspondence concerned small pieces of information that served to confirm and expand on an AFL conviction about a given labor leader, organization or program. On occasion, the AFL leaders attempted to draw sympathetic U.S. officials' attention to a problem, organization or official.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) FTUC Archives.

\(^2\) AFL-CIO Archives and FTUC Archives.
Another source of information was through the visits of American labor leaders to Europe and of Europeans to the United States. ILGWU leaders, for examples, frequently visited Europe. ILGWU Vice-President Luigi Antonini, made several trips between 1945 and 1952. Vice-President Zimmerman's trip has already been mentioned. Beginning in 1948, Dubinsky himself travelled through Europe several times. George Harrison and other leaders of the transport unions made several visits to attend meetings of the ITF. And in 1949, of course, Green, Woll, Meany, and Dubinsky and Lovestone journeyed to Europe to attend the founding conferences of the ICFTU.

Key European trade unionists and Socialist Party leaders also visited the United States and consulted extensively with members of the FTUC. For example, Léon Jouhaux and Louis Saillant made several visits in relation to their role in the WFTU and the ILO. Léon Blum made a lengthy visit to the United States in the spring of 1946. In the following years, many other prominent labor leaders and politicians visited the United States, frequently as guests of the AFL.¹

¹See, for example, speech by Kurt Schumacher, Proceedings, 1947.
Finally, the FTUC obtained information from European exiles, mainly from Eastern Europe and Russia, and from wartime refugees from Germany, Austria and Italy who resided in New York. Many of these exiles and refugees still maintained direct or indirect contacts with their native homelands and conveyed this information to Dubinsky and Lovestone among others.¹

From interviews with members of the FTUC and examination of archival material, it is possible to discern the processes by which members of the FTUC assimilated the information they received and engaged in policy formulation and implementation. A predominant pattern was established, particularly after Jay Lovestone had succeeded Irving Bluestein as Executive Secretary of the FTUC. Lovestone possessed an "encyclopedic" knowledge of labor movements and politics abroad. As a former National Secretary of the American Communist Party in the 1920's and leader of a Communist opposition group, he had travelled extensively in Europe in the 1920's and 1930's

¹ Interviews H. Lang, Brown and Lovestone. The JLC, for example, continued to maintain contact with its wartime representatives in both Western and Eastern Europe. Many of the prominent intellectuals, social democrats and trade unionists it rescued from the Nazis and Russians also maintained contact with their homelands and passed information to the JLC, the ILGWU and the FTUC.
and had well-placed contacts in almost every European country. After the Nazis came to power, he was instrumental in setting up Anti-Nazi Leagues and the International Rescue Committee to save social democratic leaders, intellectuals, and other potential victims of Nazism in Germany, and later, in other parts of Europe. Anti-communist and anti-Nazi activities drew Lovestone to David Dubinsky. During the 1930's and during the war, they worked together on a number of projects and in 1944, Dubinsky appointed Lovestone to handle the ILGWU's international affairs. Matthew Woll, the AFL's senior Vice President and director of the Labor League for Human Rights, soon began to share Dubinsky's confidence in Lovestone, and in the spring of 1946, Lovestone was engaged to administer the FTUC's activities from the ILGWU headquarters.

Reports from the FTUC's representatives and contacts in Europe, Asia, Latin America and the American government were collated and circulated to FTUC members by Lovestone. With rare exceptions, however, the only detailed information on developments in France came from Brown's reports and Lovestone's comments on them. Lovestone and Brown, who had known each other since the mid-1930's usually agreed in their interpretations of events in Europe. When they did not, Lovestone would circulate Brown's report and attach a memorandum stating his own views on the subject.¹ Thus, with the exception

¹See, for example, memorandum from Lovestone to Dubinsky, July 5, 1946, FTUC Files. Memoranda and letters between AFL leaders hereafter will be cited simply by reference to the last names of the correspondents. Unless otherwise specified, all correspondence between AFL leaders is in the FTUC Archives.
of occasional visits of French trade union and political leaders to the United States and the occasional visits of AFL leaders to Europe, the FTUC's information on events in France in particular came from the oral and written reports of Brown and Lovestone.

The major recipients of the information were the members of the FTUC and especially the Chairman, Matthew Woll and Vice Chairman David Dubinsky.¹ The Committee's Honorary Chairman, AFL President William Green, and the Honorary Secretary, AFL Secretary-Treasurer George Meany, also received regular reports or excerpts from reports from the Committee's representatives and contacts.² Members of the AFL's International Labor Relations Committee were occasionally sent FTUC reports, and occasionally confidential reports were sent to members of the Executive Council and other leaders of national and international unions.³ In addition, excerpts from these reports were published in the form of signed articles in the AFL's monthly magazine, the American Federationist⁴ as well as in the

¹Interview, Lovestone and FTUC Archives.

²See William Green's files, AFL-CIO Archives.

³See, for example, "Confidential Reports to All International Presidents of the American Federation of Labor," Nos. 1-20, 1949-1950, AFL-CIO Archives.

⁴The articles in the American Federationist, are one of the best sources on the AFL's information and interpretation of postwar international politics. See, for example, Matthew Woll's "The Communists Move In On French Labor," American Federationist, July, 1946, pp. 5-7, which was based on excerpts from Irving Brown's detailed report on the April, 1946 CGT Convention.
FTUC's monthly International Free Trade Union News. Finally, the FTUC's representatives and many of its contacts in the American government and abroad attended and spoke at the AFL's annual conventions.

Decision Making

The second major function of the FTUC was decision making. Woll and Dubinsky appear to have been the primary decision makers. Woll, to begin with, was highly respected by the AFL leadership. He was President of the Union Labor Life Insurance Company and Vice President of the Photo-Engravers Union of North America, a small craft union, but one with members in almost every city in the United States. The son of Belgian Catholic immigrants, he had risen to the top level of the Executive Council and in 1925 had been expected to succeed Gompers as President of the AFL. Although he had been interested in international affairs for many years, Woll began to devote more attention to the subject after the United Mine Workers had prevented him from assuming the AFL leadership.¹ In the 1930's, Woll was active in organizing the AFL's anti-Nazi boycotts. In 1937, he was dispatched to Europe to ensure the AFL's readmission into the International Federation of Trade Unions. In 1938, he was chosen to head the Labor League for Human Rights and throughout the war he coordinated organized labor's role in multi-million dollar relief activities. By the end of the war, Woll was highly respected in leading labor circles as a capable administrator, knowledgeable in international affairs.

David Dubinsky's interest in and knowledge of international affairs also gave him a pre-eminent role in FTUC and AFL policy making. Dubinsky had maintained contact with the European socialist and trade union movement since his youth in Tsarist Russia. In the 1930's, he was a member of the AFL's first delegation to the ILO and while in Europe met with a number of leading trade unionists and social democrats. After Hitler's rise to power, he was instrumental in organizing anti-Nazi boycotts and in founding organizations, including the Jewish Labor Committee, which had contacts in almost every European country.

Unlike Woll, however, Dubinsky did not possess the confidence of most AFL leaders. First, as was mentioned, he came from a socialist tradition and the other AFL leaders were suspicious of his contacts with European socialists as well as his association with Lovestone. Second, he was not a long-time intimate of the AFL's

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2 See, for example, Epstein, passim.

3 Interviews, Meany and Lovestone.
leaders. Throughout the 1930's, the ILGWU and the AFL's Executive Council did not always share the same perspectives, especially in regard to the fledgling CIO.¹ Third, Dubinsky and many of his associates were Jewish. This was not an advantage in the AFL's inner circle and Dubinsky himself recalls overhearing the unfavorable remarks of other AFL leaders about his ethnic origin, coupled with his identification with socialist circles.²

Dubinsky, however, had an important independent base of support in the ILGWU. The presidency of a large, well-organized and powerful union gave him power both within and outside the AFL hierarchy. The ILGWU had its own financial base and Dubinsky could commit the union's funds to the FTUC's programs. An examination of ILGWU convention proceedings and interviews with senior ILGWU leaders and several of their staff indicate that Dubinsky faced little serious opposition in his 34 years of office. Although there were occasional attempts at the Convention to change the course of the ILGWU's foreign policy position, these efforts never got off the ground.³

¹Taft, The AFL From The Death of Gompers to the Merger, pp. 140-203.

²Interview, Dubinsky.

Similarly, the General Executive Board almost always approved of Dubinsky's proposals and financial commitments. Dubinsky was thus in a position to play an important role in FTUC policy making.

President Green had been interested in foreign affairs since he travelled with Gompers to Paris in 1919, but, as a number of authors have pointed out, he was not a leader in AFL domestic and foreign policy making. Indeed, most of the AFL leaders and staff concerned with foreign policy-making recall that Green did not initiate policy and almost always accepted Woll's recommendations. Secretary-Treasurer Meany, as a result of his New York background and his association with Woll and Dubinsky, had become interested in international affairs in the mid 1930's. Meany, however, lived in Washington and, compared to Woll, the younger man did not at that time possess detailed knowledge of labor developments abroad.

The contrast between Woll and Dubinsky and most of the other AFL leaders was even more striking. For a variety of reasons, the

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1 Interviews, Dubinsky and Zimmerman.


3 Interviews, Meany, Harrison, Dubinsky, Bluestein, and Lovestone.

4 In an interview, Meany recalled that in 1935, Woll and Dubinsky had stimulated his interest by inviting him to attend a conference at the Aldine Club in New York to set up the non-sectarian Anti-Nazi League.
AFL leadership had become concerned enough with international environment to reenter the IFTU in 1937 and to participate in World War II relief activities; yet on the whole, the AFL leadership was little interested and ill-informed about international affairs. Indeed, Irving Bluestein recalls that, in a conversation with Woll at the 1944 Convention, Daniel Tobin, the Teamster President and a member of the AFL's inner circle of leadership, maintained that the AFL had done enough for the Europeans in the war and that the Labor League for Human Rights had enough to do without adding a FTUC. The AFL's first Vice-President, William Hutcheson of the Carpenters Union, and John L. Lewis of the Mineworkers also appeared to believe the AFL should return to its comfortable prewar isolationism.

1Interviews, Dubinsky, Zimmerman, Harrison, Bluestein, and Lovestone.

2Interview, Bluestein, Another indication of Tobin's lack of interest in or ignorance of international labor affairs can be found in his union magazine which was allowed to print an article suggesting the AFL adopt a foreign policy posture that the AFL Executive Council, including Tobin, had opposed. See the New Leader, September 1, 1945.

3Interviews, Dubinsky, Bluestein, and Harry Lang. A number of writers have also supported the view that Lewis was an "isolationist", e.g., John Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement 1940-1953, p. 29. It should be noted, however, that mainly as a result of his daughter's influence, Lewis secured a $50,000 contribution from the United Mine Workers for the FTUC and in 1947, he became a member of the ILRC. Interview, Lovestone.
A major exception to this general pattern, was George Harrison, President of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks. Harrison had become interested in international affairs in the 1930's, had travelled to the ILO meetings and had met many leading European trade unionists. During World War II, he kept himself informed of developments in Europe and made radio broadcasts to the occupied countries. In the immediate post war period, he occasionally attended meetings of the FTUC and received its reports.¹

Thus, with the exception of Green, Meany, Harrison and one or two others, AFL leaders were either uninterested in, or ill informed about developments abroad. Even those that were interested in international affairs did not have the knowledge and experience possessed by Woll and Dubinsky. The contrasts between the highly respected Woll and the independently powerful Dubinsky, on the one hand, and the other AFL leaders, on the other, gave the "New Yorkers" in the FTUC and the AFL a pre-eminent role in foreign policy making.

Another factor that explains Woll's and Dubinsky's ability to formulate the Federation's foreign policy, was the way in which they were able to avoid impinging on the values of other important AFL leaders. First, it should be noted that AFL leaders shared similar if not identical perspectives. In particular, there was a high degree of consensus among the FTUC members and staff. It should be pointed out, however, that over several decades, the entire AFL leadership appears to have shared several goal values as well as many common expectations. In particular, since its inception, the Federation had openly opposed systems of governent which prohibited the rights of workers to organize

¹Interviews, Harrison, Lovestone, and Bluestein.
unions and to strike. While these were considered relative rather than absolute rights in the democracies, the Federation from 1920 on condemned the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany for denying these rights and furnished limited assistance to forces opposed to both the Communists and Nazis.¹

After World War II, there was a basic consensus on the desirability of maintaining democratic pluralism and free trade unions. Although many top union leaders were not enthusiastic about continued involvement and did not wish to become intimately engaged in the formulation of objectives and strategies, Dubinsky and Woll, and the FTUC, operated in an essentially "friendly" environment. If, for example, the basic principle of free trade unionism had been questioned by important leaders, it is difficult to imagine that Dubinsky and Woll would have been able, as they were, to operate the AFL's foreign policy establishment with a minimum of supervision.

The FTUC leaders were well aware that most AFL leaders placed higher priorities on domestic affairs. They knew, first, that the AFL would be unwilling to weaken its domestic position to further the FTUC's leaders' international objectives. Fortunately for Woll and Dubinsky, however, foreign affairs were not tied intimately to domestic affairs.

Unlike the CIO, the AFL did not have a sizeable number of communists and others who sympathized with the Russian position on a number of issues which affected domestic politics such as support for the Marshall Plan and the Wallace candidacy. Indeed, the conflict on these issues within the CIO boiled over into an open struggle which effectively split the CIO in 1948. If the AFL had been presented with a similar conflict that threatened to split the Federation, it seems likely that Woll and Dubinsky would not have been able to work in a friendly environment with almost complete freedom.¹

The only major issue that might have led to major discussion was the question of whether or not to work openly with the CIO, especially if both organizations were awarded equal status in the same international labor organization. Once the AFL decided not to join the WFTU, the issue was not pressing. Occasional maverick Convention resolutions requesting official AFL and CIO international cooperation were promptly voted down.\(^1\) Only when a decision had to be made concerning the creation of a new international to rival the WFTU did foreign and domestic policy become intimately interrelated. By 1948-1949, however, the domestic situation had changed to such an extent that the issue did not become divisive.\(^2\) Thus, without too much difficulty, Woll and Dubinsky were able to accommodate themselves to the domestic political constraints.

**Mobilization of Resources**

Second, Woll and Dubinsky realized that to be effective the FTUC needed not only the AFL's mantle but also the financial support of the Federation and its international and national unions.\(^3\) They knew, however, that, although the AFL leadership was willing (under Woll's prodding) to sanction the creation of the FTUC, it was reluctant, if not completely unwilling, to divert the AFL's financial resources to

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\(^1\) *Proceedings, 1946, p. 540.*

\(^2\) See Windmuller, especially, pp. 151-156.

\(^3\) It was hoped, also that through the semi-autonomous FTUC, unions that were unaffiliated with the AFL (e.g., the International Association of Machinists) would contribute to the AFL's activities. Interviews, Lovestone and Bluestein.
international affairs. The 1944 Convention resolution creating the FTUC, for example, called for creation of a one million dollar Free Trade Union Fund."¹ Although the Labor League for Human Rights was able to raise money for relief activities, which was later administered by the FTUC, it was never able to raise these large sums needed to directly build free trade unions. Indeed, in a 1948 ILRC report to the Executive Council, Woll noted that the AFL had provided "scores of thousands of dollars" for relief, but that the FTUC's shoestring budget was completely worn out and that a recent appeal to various international presidents for support had raised only a few thousand dollars. Woll then asked the Executive Council for financial assistance.² Thus, although Woll and Dubinsky could formulate FTUC policy, effective implementation required the cooperation of other AFL leaders. While these men did not prevent Woll from using the AFL mantle to foster free trade unionism abroad, their lack of enthusiasm for international involvement

¹Proceedings, 1944, pp. 556-557.

²International Labor Relations Department, "Report to the Executive Council," undated (but subject matters indicate spring, 1948).
imposed a major constraint on FTUC policy makers. Woll and Dubinsky were careful not to disregard this constraint. As will be discussed, only after the FTUC had been functioning for several years, and the situation abroad had become critical, did they request large appropriations from the Executive Council.

It should be noted, however, that there were no indications in the AFL's archives or in interviews with U.S. officials that the U.S. government offered the AFL financial assistance, or that the AFL accepted U.S. government money during the early post-war period. In the late 1940's and early '50's, there are ambiguous references to discussions with U.S. officials about the need for U.S. government support to the labor sector in Europe. There is no indication that the U.S. government requested AFL support. As Braden, a former CIA official has noted, if anything, the AFL requested support from the U.S. government in the late 1940's. ¹

Although many decisions were made by Woll and Dubinsky informally, the FTUC officially met approximately once a month.

¹ Braden, I'm Glad the CIA is "Immoral."
The agenda was usually drawn up by Woll and the Executive Secretary and both were almost always in attendance. Green and Meany occasionally attended the meetings as did several other prominent labor leaders. At the meetings, Woll and Dubinsky were usually in agreement and decisions usually were unanimous. The minutes of the meeting were then circulated to those who had been unable to attend. 1

To secure the cooperation of the other AFL leaders and preserve the AFL mantle over FTUC activities, FTUC reports and decisions were taken to the International Labor Relations Committee (ILRC). The ILRC's jurisdiction extended over all the AFL's international affairs. Its functions in the policy making field consisted of recommending policy to the Executive Council and formulating policy between sessions of the Executive Council.

The sixteen member Committee, a Secretary, the ILRC international representative, and on occasion the Secretary of the FTUC met every few months, frequently at the quarterly meetings of the Executive Council. Like those of the FTUC, many of the ILRC decisions were made prior to the Committee's meetings. The agenda usually consisted of topics dealing with the ILO and other international labor affairs. There was usually little disagreement on major issues. The ILRC's minutes

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1Interviews, Dubinsky, Lovestone, Bluestein, and Minutes of the Free Trade Union Committee, FTUC Archives.
reveal that FTUC's decisions were frequently put in the form of motions and were adopted with only minor alterations. Resolutions and reports of the Committee were then forwarded periodically to the full Executive Council.  

The consensus within the Committee and its adoption of the FTUC's policy recommendations were primarily a function of the permanent membership of four committee members and their dual membership in the ILRC and the FTUC. Woll was the Chairman of both committees from 1945 to 1952. Woll, Dubinsky, Green and Meany were also "permanent" members of both committees during this period. The other members of the ILRC were, of course, interested in international affairs and with rare exceptions they did not oppose views of the permanent membership. Their information on the complex and ambiguous issues of post-war international politics came from the mass media and the FTUC. Moreover, with the exception of Harrison, they were not well informed and their short tenure on the committee did not lead to the development of expertise. Finally, the permanent membership carefully refrained from imposing too many potentially controversial decisions on the committee. After all, these decisions would have to undergo the scrutiny of the Executive Council and obtain the support of the AFL's international and national union presidents.

1The complete set of ILRC minutes appear to have been lost, destroyed or misplaced. Some are available in the AFL-CIO Archives. Others can be found in the FTUC Archives. Interviews with Lovestone, Dubinsky, Meany and Harrison lead to the conclusion that the process above remained basically unaltered throughout the period under consideration.
In many ways, foreign policy making in the Executive Council reportedly was similar to the process of the ILRC.\(^1\) Throughout the period under consideration, the Council discussed resolutions and reports presented by the ILRC which had first been discussed in the FTUC. Usually, there was little disagreement and little discussion. The few motions that were formulated were usually carried unanimously.

Throughout the period under consideration, Green was the AFL President and Meany was Secretary-Treasurer. Matthew Woll and George Harrison served continuously as members of the Council and in 1946 Dubinsky was elected to membership. Thus, five of the fifteen members of the Council were "internationalists," well informed and well placed in the AFL leadership. The other members of the Council, sharing the value of free trade unionism but less interested and less informed on international affairs, were naturally inclined to follow the leadership of the five as long as it did not conflict with domestic concerns and did not involve major commitments. The "internationalists," in the early post-war years were careful not to request large financial allocations immediately for international activities. As the Council became more familiar with international affairs, and as the need for support appeared more urgent, however, the internationalists gradually stepped up their requests. In 1947, for example, the Executive Council donated $6,200 to FTUC,\(^2\) but in 1948 the Council allocated $24,965,\(^3\) and in

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\(^1\) This account of Executive Council foreign policy making is based on interviews with Harrison, Dubinsky and Meany and Lovestone. This writer was denied access to the Executive Council minutes.


1949 $32,400.\textsuperscript{1}

The functions of the convention, as was pointed out, were to review and formulate AFL policy and to elect the Federation's officers. As the President, Secretary-Treasurer and the key foreign policy makers of the Executive Council were almost all elected prior to 1945 and continued to serve in these capacities for the period of this study, attention will be focused on the Convention's legislative process.\textsuperscript{2}

At the beginning of the Convention the Executive Council and Secretary-Treasurer's reports as well as the previously submitted resolutions were divided into sections and assigned to either the Resolutions or the International Labor Relations Committees by President Green.\textsuperscript{3} In the the Committees there was usually little dissension. Green determined their composition and selected the committee chairmen. During the period under consideration, Woll

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\textsuperscript{1}Proceedings, 1949, p. 79. At the same time, the FTUC received additional financial support from individual unions, such as the ILGWU.

\textsuperscript{2}The only exception was Dubinsky who was elected to Executive Council in 1946.

\textsuperscript{3}This account of the Convention's policy making process is derived from an examination of Proceedings, 1945-1952 passim and interviews with Dubinsky, Harrison, Zimmerman and Harry Lang, a former editor of the Jewish Daily Forward. Lang, a confidant of Dubinsky and Green, attended most AFL conventions during this period and occasionally sat in on the closed meetings of the International Labor Relations Committee.
was always Chairman of the Resolutions Committee and Charles Zimmerman and twenty-five high ranking union leaders were members of the Committee. The International Labor Relations Committee was continuously chaired by William McSorley, who was a regular member of the ILRC for several years between 1945 and 1952. Woll, Green and Meany were also "permanent" members of this Committee. The remaining fifteen to twenty members were usually international presidents who had been fraternal delegates at the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) as it was assumed they were relatively interested and knowledgeable about international affairs. At the same time, Green added one or two men to the committee who had had no previous contact with international affairs in the hope of stimulating their interest in and support for the Federation's foreign policies.

The members of the FTUC, ILRC and Executive Council assured their colleagues that the newest resolutions were only logical extensions of previous policies. With rare exceptions, the "establishment" did not ask for more than general approval of its actions. Although the Executive Council reports revealed the Federation was financing some of the FTUC and ILRC's activities, the resolutions always left the international presidents and the Executive Council free to limit their commitments the following year. Usually, the Committees unanimously recommended non-concurrence with the few resolutions that were inconsistent with establishment policy. ¹

From 1945 to 1952, there were no fights over foreign policy on the convention floor. Once again, the foreign policy elite was able to secure the adoption of its choices by a combination of its knowledge, political skills and the consensus within the Federation. Reference has

¹See, for example, Proceedings, 1946, p. 540.
already been made to the longstanding support the Federation and rank and file leaders and members had given to free trade-unionism. Nevertheless, it appears that most rank and file, middle and upper level union leaders were frequently uninterested and ill-informed about international affairs, especially international labor affairs. An examination of international unions confirms this conclusion. Even the Convention Proceedings and labor press of the ILGWU, one of the most internationally minded unions, contain little discussion of foreign policy alternatives. Although the ILGWU "establishment" was occasionally challenged, its resolutions were carried with only two or three dissenting votes. The delegates approved general resolutions and financial reports indicating the union was spending thousands of dollars each year on foreign policy with only the most cursory knowledge of how this money was used and what effect it had in the recipient countries.\(^1\) Compared to other international unions, however, the ILGWU was exceptional. Most unions rarely donated more than token amounts ($500 - $1000 per year) to the FTUC,\(^2\) and foreign policy was rarely discussed in the trade union press\(^3\) and national union

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\(^2\)Files of the FTUC 1945-1952.

conventions. Indeed, the only major sources of information on foreign labor questions available to most AFL leaders were the outlets of the AFL foreign policy establishment, the articles in the American Federationist, the International Free Trade Union News, and the short speeches of the Federation's international representatives at the AFL conventions.

The absence of an opposition elite who felt the Federation's foreign policy impinged on other values they held, also helps explain the apparent lack of direct involvement of most of the Convention delegates. The convention speakers who addressed themselves to foreign affairs were usually either FTUC and AFL representatives or foreign trade union leaders and politicians brought to the convention by the establishment. In the absence of knowledgeable leaders defining alternatives and organizing opposition coalitions, it would have been fruitless for less powerful delegates to oppose the foreign policy elite even if they had wanted to do so.¹

In sum, on the basis of this analysis, it appears that a handful of AFL leaders, assisted by two members of their staff, constituted the AFL policymaking elite. Woll and Dubinsky with the cooperation of Green and Meany, and the assistance of Brown and Lovestone (and Romualdi on Latin American Affairs) gathered the requisite information and defined the Federation's alternatives.

¹Throughout the AFL's history, there were few floor fights over foreign policy. Even when a dispute was brought to the convention floor, the views of the foreign policy establishment prevailed. See Proceedings, 1922, pp. 420-437 and 457-465.
These policymakers were completely independent of both government and industry. They were aware, however, that they were acting in an environment constricted by the AFL's constitutional structure and the need to win the support of important AFL leaders. Because of their political skill, the separation of domestic and foreign policy, the shared value consensus within the Federation and the relative lack of interest in and knowledge about foreign affairs of most AFL leaders, the policymaking group was able to secure the moral and material support of the Federation for their policies.

The policymakers constituted a heterogeneous group. Individuals in the group had different national and ethnic origins, and different family, educational, labor, and political backgrounds. Yet, when this group came together during World War II, they shared many dominant goal value orientations and within a short period of time, common expectations or theories about the power and values of the other actors on the world stage.
Chapter III

PERSPECTIVES OF THE POLICYMAKING ELITE

An understanding of policymakers' perspectives, or their values and major expectations about world affairs can be used to help explain their behavior. In the following chapters, the specific post-war theories of the AFL elite about the international and French labor movements will be described. In this chapter, however, attention will be focused on the goal values and the underlying theories of domestic and international politics of the AFL elite. First, the goal value orientations of the AFL leaders will be described. Second, several of the leadership's key theories of domestic politics will be identified. In particular, their perception of the role and perspectives of totalitarian groups, especially communists, will be discussed. The final part of the chapter will focus on the AFL theories about the major actors and perspectives of the leading communist power, the Soviet Union.

Goal Value Orientations

The AFL policymaking elite appears to have shared, at least three interrelated goal values. One might be called democratic
pluralism. By democratic is meant, a belief in the value of the political system most closely associated with the concept of the "open society," i.e., that people ought to possess the freedoms and opportunities necessary to change their rulers, both governmental and non-governmental, through the electoral process. Woll, Dubinsky, Meany, Green, Lovestone, and Brown shared this value of democracy in the post-war period.

Since the turn of the century, as was pointed out in the last chapter, the AFL leadership frequently went on record supporting universal freedom and civil liberties for individuals and institutions. Democracy was not only a means to attain other values; the AFL leadership considered it an end in itself. As William Green wrote in 1939:

We want to see an end of starvation on this earth—whether starvation for food or for the opportunity to have a good life. This is our special interest. Democracy is not confined to the political and economic fields; it is a way of living applied to the whole of existence. It implies principles of freedom that must be continuously applied to human relationships under changing conditions.¹

In an address to the British Trades Union Congress in September, 1945, Meany summed up the AFL leadership's belief in this value when he stated:

¹William Green, Labor and Democracy (Princeton, N. J., 1939), p. 186; See also pp. 190-191.
However, I submit the most compelling force that has driven our movements even closer together through the years—something stronger than ties of blood and language—yes, even stronger than fighting together for preservation—has been the common devotion to the basic principles of human liberty. You and we have the same fundamental love for democracy as a way of life. You and we believe that every man and woman, irrespective of race or creed or of economic status, has a right to equal voice and vote with all others as to how and in what way we will be governed. You and we alike have a deep rooted hatred for tyranny. You and we both feel that it is a right—not a privilege—for the governed to speak out aloud in criticism of those chosen to govern whenever and wherever they so desire. It is in this spirit of common principles and idealism that I talk to you today. ¹

Several years later, Woll defended the democratic system as an end in itself and also as a means of obtaining other values,

¹George Meany, "Address to the British Trade Union Congress," Blackpool, England, September, 1945. For William Green's views, see Labor and Democracy, pp. 185-194. For Samuel Gompers' views, see Philip Taft, The AFL In The Time of Gompers, especially pp. 449-451. For an example of the application of this value to non-western people, David Dubinsky, "Answers to Questions asked by Elseviers Publications, the Netherlands," Archives of the FTUC.
"I know of no higher dividends than the dignity and freedom of the individual human being . . . .

Organized labor, the American free trade union movement is dedicated to the protection and promotion of this greater dividend of all as the first prerequisite for the safety of all other dividends. "

It should be noted that with the possible exception of David Dubinsky, the AFL leaders (unlike many socialist European labor leaders) were democratic pluralists. AFL leaders believed in what George Meany once called a "total system of free enterprise." They believed all segments of the society should be allowed "freedom of enterprise." The major actors in the system, the owners of the means of production, the workers represented by labor organizations, and the political parties should play only for limited stakes. They should agree to the continued existence of the other major actors in the system.

As Woll implied, democratic pluralism was not the only goal value of the AFL leadership. Peace and stability were also desired conditions. The AFL leaders, for example, were reluctant to fight for democratic rights in every dictatorship if it meant the United States would be required continuously to resort to the use of armed force. Indeed, only when it appeared that the United States


itself was in jeopardy, did they support war. This explains their reluctance to advocate American entry into World War II until Pearl Harbor, and their failure to advocate the use of force to overthrow the Soviet and other totalitarian and authoritarian regimes after World War II. While the AFL leaders supported American entry into World War I in 1917, World War II in 1941, the NATO alliance and the decision to defend Korea, they did not advocate earlier entry into these conflicts or greater military build-ups. They were not, in contemporary jargon, the "Hawks" of their day.

Indeed, this was hardly surprising. Instability and war, the labor leaders knew, meant that workers would be drafted, productivity would be limited, as in World War II, the rights of unions would have to be curtailed. As Dubinsky pointed out in arguing against pre-World War II "power politics" and "spheres of influence,"

An unstable world and an unstable Europe means that the working masses the world over will never be able to form stable organizations to defend their standards of living. An unstable world means the continuous breakdown of labor organization; it means misery and degradation for wage earners everywhere, including our own country.

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1 See, for example, Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 188.


A few years later, Woll, urging the Senate to ratify the NATO treaty declared:

There can be no real economic recovery and sound social and economic reconstruction as long as the spectre of war haunts the peoples of the world. No worker can give his best to production as long as he is harassed by the terrifying fear of war and the frustrating uncertainty of an unstable world.¹

Thus, although they were not pacifists, the AFL leaders in speeches and action, consistently demonstrated they desired peace and stability.

The economic and social well-being of workers was another goal value of the AFL policy makers. This, of course, was hardly surprising, given the origins and experience of this group. Since the early days of the Federation, this had been a dominant goal value and, notwithstanding occasional innuendos to the contrary,² remained a dominant value of the AFL leadership after World War II. As Green forcefully stated, since the time of Gompers, the AFL had believed:

Social security is indispensable to peace security. It means economic security to those who work. It means that every human being should be guaranteed, by the community of which he is a member, an income sufficient to sustain him, an income sufficient at least to meet the living requirements, the minimum requirements of

¹Matthew Woll, "Ratify the Atlantic Pact," Archives of the FTUC, 1948.
²See, for example, George Morris, The CIA and American Labor (New York: 1967), p. 48. Morris has been labor editor of the Daily Worker and the Worker since 1934.
decenty and health. This principle of social
security is one which should be and I am confi-
dent, will be universally applied ... 1

At the same time, AFL leaders were willing to sacrifice
limited amounts of material and social comfort to further peace and
domestic pluralism. Their support of the American war effort, for
example, did not derive from a desire to see American workers
employed by the "military-industrial" complex of the day. 2 They
realized American workers would have to bear a major share of the
burden of American entanglements. As Green told a Senate com-
mittee:

The American Federation of Labor understands
that the European Recovery Program requires
sacrifices and self-discipline on the part of the
United States citizens. We stand ready to make
these sacrifices and assume new responsibilities.
We cannot shut our eyes to the fear and hunger
that are the daily portion of those human beings
who are close to armed Soviet aggression. We
cannot stand by and watch the lights of freedom
go out in many of those countries from which
our forefathers came ... 3


2For the AFL's opposition to American manufacture of munitions in 1939, see Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 189.

Theories of Domestic Politics

As was discussed, the AFL leaders believed trade unions were inextricably linked to the democratic system. As William Green wrote:

A union is essentially a democratic agency founded on mutual interests and dependent on cooperation and good faith. Union organization is possible only when workers have civil rights and in proportion as equal opportunities for progress are provided by the extension of democratic ideals . . . ¹

In 1940, Woll observed, "the first thing which Hitler did when he came to power in Germany was to destroy the trade union movement. We know that it is impossible for a free trade union movement to exist in a dictatorship and that no dictatorship can exist so long as there is a free trade union movement."²

In a similar vein, Meany, referring to the government-controlled labor organization in the Soviet Union, told the British TUC:

We believe that only through free trade unions can the ideals, aspirations, and collective desires of workers anywhere on earth be implemented into constructive action for the improvement of the standards of labor. We believe in political freedom as well as economic freedom . . . . How can the representatives of a government controlled and dominated (trade union) movement speak for the workers? How can they know what workers are thinking about--what they

¹Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 20.
desire—just what ideals and principles they would have their representatives espouse and uphold? Where there is no freedom of the press, where there is no free speech—just how or by what method can the workers make known their ideals, aspirations and policies to the individuals who are supposed to speak for them?¹

Free trade unionism, not ownership of the major means of production was the most vital concern of the workers. As long as workers and other groups were free to organize and seek representation in all matters affecting their welfare, whether political or industrial, the AFL leadership believed social justice would prevail.²

Within democratic pluralistic systems, there were authoritarian and totalitarian groups who did not wish to play for the limited stakes. Since the Bolshevik Revolution, AFL leaders believed, Communists had attempted to win control of, and destroy the pluralistic system. AFL leaders believed Communists and other totalitarian movements such as the Nazis, Falangists and Fascists were small, militant, well-organized groups united by a common ideology and a hierarchical party structure. They operated in a pluralistic environment in which most workers, although opposed to totalitarianism, were disunited. The inability of some pluralistic societies to solve social and economic problems, or at least alleviate miserable social and economic conditions, facilitated totalitarian takeover. Most AFL foreign policy leaders believed to some extent in the "stomach theory" of authoritarian takeover. As Green succinctly told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1948,

¹George Meany, Address to the TUC, September, 1945.
²See Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 92. For Dubinsky's views see his previously cited answers to Eve Curie, 1947.
Communism thrives on poverty and distress. It gains strength at the lower levels because workers don't stop to think many times, what causes the distress and poverty from which they suffer and when there is some new method offered with a guarantee that "If you accept this method you will never go down to this position of poverty and distress again," they respond.  

The AFL leaders believed the post-war Communist movement was particularly threatening. As Dubinsky stated, "With the defeat of Nazi Germany, Moscow-directed communism has, however, become the main danger to democracy and world peace." Unlike any democratic political grouping, the AFL leaders believed the communist forces possessed disciplined, zealous leaders and militants and they had a unifying, all-encompassing ideology which sustained them in good as well as difficult times. Second, since the Bolshevik Revolution, AFL leaders maintained that communist parties throughout the world were intimately connected with the Soviet Communist Party. Communist party leaders and militants, they insisted, were trained and financed by the Soviets. The world-wide network of parties coordinated by and linked to a major power vastly increased communist power. Third, as Dubinsky stated:

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1 Statement of William Green, U.S. Senate Hearings, p. 837. For the pre-war views of the AFL see Green's Labor and Democracy, pp. 186-187. See also article by Irving Brown, New Leader, January 22, 1952.

Dubinsky, Harrison and Meany, in interviews, also expressed the view that miserable economic and social conditions lend themselves to totalitarian takeover.


3 See Lucy Robbins Lang, Tomorrow is Beautiful (New York: 1947), pp. 175-177; Interviews with Dubinsky, Meany, Lovestone and Brown.
It is much more difficult to combat Communism than it was to fight Nazism and Facism, since Communism pretends to be the champion of labor and poses as a higher form of democracy, to which it tirelessly pays homage. This is calculated hypocrisy, yet it is because of this pretense that the Communist fifth columns, with their numerous fronts, have so much more influence than the Nazi-Fascist outfits.  

Communist parties, seeking power in democratic countries operating under normal peacetime conditions had two available strategies. They could seek power openly by trying to win democratic elections or by attempting to bring about a violent revolution. Alternatively, they could camouflage their aims, infiltrate the major groups and institutions of the state, and maneuver themselves into power, either through the electoral process, or through what would appear to be non-communist violence. The AFL leaders believed communists usually adopted the second approach. They were too few in number and their aims were not sufficiently appealing to large numbers of people for the first approach.

The second approach, "boring from within," sometimes in conjunction with the first strategy, was designed to lead to control of the strategic institutions of democratic society. The well-coordinated minority would then be able to use these institutions to bring about the communist revolution.

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1Dubinsky, "World Labor's New Weapon."

2Interview, Lovestone. He maintained Lenin discovered this in the early 1920's.
AFL leaders had been conscious of this strategy since they discerned communist attempts to take over the American trade unions in the 1920's.

As Green wrote:

When the Communists launched their campaign to gain control of the American Federation of Labor we were not unfamiliar with such attempts. Impractical radicals and revolutionists made several attempts to capture the Federation. During the period when the International Workers of the World was active, that organization had made efforts to destroy or control established unions within the Federation... The Communists soon became a greater menace to the American Federation of Labor than the IWW had ever been, principally because of their tactics of entering unions and trying to gain control of them from within.¹

Similarly, Dubinsky, arguing against outlawing the Communist Party but defending the American government's program of loyalty tests, told a French interviewer,

At the same time we stress that our government is perfectly justified in defending itself--just as every other democratic institution is--against the penetration by communist and other totalitarian termites. When communists enter government employment, they are entering not for the sake of serving the government of the American people, but only for the sake of utilizing positions of confidence and trust in the interests of another--a foreign power.²

¹Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 91.

AFL leaders believed the communists would use trade unions for a variety of political purposes. They would be used first to incessantly disseminate communist propaganda and to secure the election of communist (or at least neutralize anti-communist) electoral candidates for national office. AFL leaders, particularly in view of their close association with the Democratic Party after the New Deal, realized that the organizational talent, muscle, and the financial resources of labor could be influential and even decisive in shaping the political attitudes of workers and in securing the election of favored candidates.¹

Unions could also be used to infiltrate the government of a modern industrial state. As a result of pre-war and war-time experience, AFL leaders knew that unions can be important participants in government industrial and economic commissions. The AFL leaders were aware that a labormovement could fill important posts with men loyal to its cause. A communist-controlled labor movement would, presumably, be able to exercise the same option.²

Unions could also be used to bring about political as opposed to economic strikes. Economic strikes are called to directly improve the wages and conditions of union members. Sometimes economic strikes have political as well as economic effects. An increase in wages for example, may lead to an inflationary spiral that may have political repercussions in that the government becomes more unpopular. An economic strike, however, is not called to create these political conditions. They are side-effects. Unions engaging in economic strikes will frequently try to reduce these unintended effects.

¹See, for example, Greenstone, Labor in American Politics, pp. 39-80.
²Indeed, Dubinsky, in his previously cited defense of government loyalty oaths, referred to the disastrous effects of the infiltration of Nazi sympathizers into the French government in 1939.
A political strike on the other hand, is called, not to directly improve the lot of the workers, but rather to create desired political conditions such as inflation, political and economic instability, or the removal of uncooperative officials. Improving the lot of union members, if this results from the political strike, is incidental. AFL leaders and particularly those who were more familiar with the history of the 1930's understood this use of trade-union power. (Dubinsky, Harrison, and Lovestone, for example, had visited Europe in the 1930's when this technique was frequently used). As will be discussed, the AFL staff was seriously concerned about the possibility of worldwide political strikes.¹

The use of trade unions to support candidates and causes as well as political strikes was a comparatively well-known technique. There were, however, other important political uses of trade unions. Lovestone, as a result of his experience in the 1920's and 1930's, was familiar with them. Brown as a result of his association with Lovestone, his wartime experience and his contact with Europeans, soon developed a detailed understanding of their importance. In contrast, at the end of World War II, the other AFL leaders had only a general knowledge of these techniques. However, as a result of Brown's reports and events during the latter half of the 1940's, they developed considerable expertise on these subjects.

While it was (and is) difficult to find detailed information on these techniques, it was clear that trade unions could be used for espionage, coups d' état and paramilitary organization. During the

¹See also the ILRC's pamphlet, "What Happened To the Trade Unions Behind the Iron Curtain," 1947, pp. 28-29.
1920's and 1930's AFL leaders had heard rumors about Russian attempts to use unions for these purposes. Defectors from communist parties substantiated these stories. One of the most influential was the German communist Richard Krebs, who settled in the U.S. in 1940, after twenty years as a communist organizer. In 1941, Krebs under the psuedonym of Jan Valtin, published a sensational and flamboyant autobiography which became a best-seller entitled Out of the Night.¹

In the book, Krebs described his travels as a paid communist organizer, his capture and torture by the Gestapo, and finally his escape from both the Gestapo and Russian G. P. U. Two thirds of the book, however, is devoted to describing how Krebs organized and was trained to organize trade unions for purposes of espionage, staging coups d'état and creating paramilitary organizations to serve Soviet foreign and military policy.

The experience of World War II was another reason why the AFL was sensitive to the use of trade unions for espionage and paramilitary operations. During the war, the European trade unions had played an important role in the resistance. While few trade unionists wrote about their experiences, many were involved in anti-Nazi espionage and sabotage. The head of the Belgian Seamen's Officers Union, Omer Becu, for example, worked for both British intelligence and the American OSS. His activities were extremely diversified. For example, he supplied the Allies with trusted contacts in occupied Europe, and on the basis of information supplied by other trade union leaders, he suggested improvements in allied military operations. Based in London, he frequently visited the U.S. to consult with the former CIO lawyer Arthur Goldberg, head of

¹Jan Valtin, Out of the Night (New York: 1941).
OSS' Labor Division. On these visits, he also made a point of meeting with Woll, Dubinsky, and Lovestone. Needless to say, these AFL leaders had more than a general idea of his work.

In addition, Dubinsky, Lovestone and Woll had their own contacts with the underground in Europe. The Jewish Labor Committee was in almost daily contact with the underground in Poland and other countries. The Labor League for Human Rights also raised money for trade-union victims of Nazism and reported on the exploits of their contacts in occupied Europe.

The importance of trade unions in a coup d'état was perhaps less well known to the AFL leadership. Out of the Night increased their appreciation of the potential role of the unions in a coup, but it was not really until the events of 1948 in Czechoslovakia that all of the AFL leaders were clearly aware of this. The Czech coup and contacts with exiled trade unions and socialist leaders supported the contentions of Brown and Lovestone that control of key industries could be decisive in a coup.

The key industries were transportation, communications, electricity and printing. They could be used in two ways. First, political strikes could be employed to secure the entry of communist ministers into a coalition government. The communists would then insist on responsibility for the police and armed forces. If their demands were denied, they could at least insist that determined anti-communists did not control these strategic ministries. Second, during the critical period of actual takeover, control of the key industries could be used to

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2 See, for example, Labor League News, I, No. 1 (June, 1945).
facilitate the "putschists" or impede the government's efforts to maintain itself. In some circumstances, for example, denying the government access to printing presses to mobilize the masses and transportation to mobilize the armed forces could be decisive.¹

The AFL leaders knew also that trade unions could be important for consolidating and maintaining power in the aftermath of a coup, revolution or invasion. The Nazis' failure to win control over the trade unions in 1934, led them to destroy the unions immediately.² On the other hand, communist control of the union structure was a method of consolidating communist power.³

The AFL leaders saw only two major methods of preventing the communists from seizing control of democratic institutions and governments "from within." First, the miserable environmental conditions which totalitarian groups exploited had to be alleviated. As Green maintained in discussing the depression of the 1930's, "Our insistence upon equal opportunity for labor has been a bulwark against the fascist or communist tendencies."⁴ In 1947, Dubinsky told his

¹See, for example, William Green, "The AFL and World Labor Unity," American Federationist, August 4, 1945, p. 1.


⁴Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 194.
French interviewer that in the U.S. the "increasingly progressive role of the (AFL) trade unionists is one of the main reasons for recent loss of ground by the communists,"¹ and in 1948 in the previously cited testimony, Green told a Senate Committee that the AFL supported the Marshall Plan because it would help destroy the miserable economic conditions that furthered totalitarianism.²

The second method of preventing the communists from gaining control of democratic institutions was to prevent them from joining or participating in the activities of the institutions. As Woll stated in 1948,

One fact deeply lodged in AFL experience and policy is that destruction follows every attempt to cooperate or even live alongside communists. They are 'fanatics.' To them the end justifies the means. Their code of living is the reverse of ours. These things we of the AFL learned years ago when we drove them out of our unions, which they were trying to wreck.³

Once the communists were in control of an institution and particularly a trade union, the AFL leaders believed it was almost impossible to dislodge them by democratic means. The human and material resources available to the communists are superior to those of the disunited democratic forces. Moreover, the communists used tactics such as terror and intimidation, that were "unavailable" to the democratic forces.

¹Dubinsky, Answer to Questions by Eve Curie.
²Statement by William Green, U. S. Senate, Hearings, p. 837.
³Woll, World Issues and the AFL, p. 11. See also, Green, Labor and Democracy, p. 93.
Democratic elements, therefore, could only try to prevent takeover by exposing and expelling active communists.\footnote{The AFL leaders in interviews all vigorously expressed these views. They repeatedly pointed to the inability of democratic forces to regain control of communist-dominated unions.}

Theories of International Politics

For the AFL, the major actors in the international system\footnote{This outline of expectations of the international system is derived in part from a series of analytical questions suggested by Stanley Hoffmann, in Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960), pp. 179-184, and illustrated in William Zimmerman's Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-1967 (Princeton, N. J.: 1969), passim.} were nation-states, international organizations, and national and international labor groupings. Nation-states were, of course, the basic units of the international system. The AFL, however, distinguished between the major or greater powers and the lesser powers. At the close of World War II, the AFL envisioned there would be four great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France.\footnote{See William Green's numerous editorials in the American Federationist, 1944 and 1945.}

The AFL also believed international organizations, with government as well as functional group representatives, were major actors. The AFL had hoped that the United Nations collective security
would replace "power politics," the "balance of power" and "spheres of influence."¹ By 1947, however, the AFL leaders no longer believed the U.N. would serve this purpose.² Nevertheless, the AFL leadership continued to believe the United Nations and other international organizations such as the ILO were important international actors. They believed, as was pointed out, that economic and social forces played an important role in domestic politics, totalitarian takeover and the likelihood of war. As Green observed, since the time of Gompers, the AFL had been interested in international organization because "without the attainment of economic justice for workers of all countries, there can be no true reciprocity in international trade and there can be no fair standard in international relations."³

AFL leaders believed international, and, on occasion, national labor organizations were international actors. International labor organizations engaged in many of the previously cited political activities open to national trade union centers. Although they could not usually contribute directly to the election of candidates for national office, they were a source of propaganda that could affect national elections.⁴ Second, while international labor organizations could not usually directly place labor leaders in the leading offices of other international organizations,

¹Editorials in American Federationist, 1944 and 1945.

²See, for example, the Executive Council Report, Proceedings, 1947, p. 177.

³Green, American Labor in World Affairs.

⁴Indeed, one reason why the AFL withdrew from the IFTU in the 1920's was because the Americans did not want to become involved in the political maneuvers of the European socialists. See Lorwin, The International Labor Movement, pp. 78-84.
AFL leaders believed they could play a lobbying role in these organizations. In fact, the AFL attempted to send representatives to the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 and later sought and gained admission to the United Nations Economic and Social Council.\(^1\) Third, international labor organizations could be used to bring pressure to bear upon national governments and trade union centers. Not only could they issue propaganda, but the AFL leaders knew they could organize international political strikes and boycotts and intervene in local trade union disputes.\(^2\) Finally, as the AFL knew from Communist defectors and the experience of World War II, international labor organizations could play an important role in espionage and paramilitary activities.\(^3\)

The "relationship of major tension,"\(^4\) the AFL leaders believed, was to be found in the struggle between totalitarian and democratic states and institutions. In the 1930's, the AFL believed this took the form of a struggle between the Nazis and their fascist allies on one side and the democratic states on the other.\(^5\) After World War II, the

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\(^1\)For elaboration, see the Executive Council Report, Proceedings, 1946, pp. 57-69.

\(^2\)AFL leaders were familiar with the use of these techniques in the 1930's. See Lorwin, The International Labor Movement, especially pp. 165-194.


\(^5\)Green, Labor and Democracy, especially pp. 185-194.
AFL saw the determining pattern of international interaction as a struggle between the Soviet Union and the democracies. As Woll told the Economic Club of Detroit, "the present acute 'world crisis' was not to be attributed to any conflict between different forms of property ownership or of economic systems." Nor was it due to the conflict over boundaries and territories between two nations or two blocs of nations. Rather the conflict was due to the Soviet Union's "reckless destruction of the critical spirit, the most systematic and thoroughgoing abuse and annihilation of all human rights. Russia of today is the model of twentieth century slavery. Forced labor has become an integral part and organized phase of the entire Soviet economy." Woll concluded that, "Clearly the roots of the present crisis are deeply embedded in the challenge of Soviet slavery to human freedom." "In this crisis," he said, "Communist totalitarianism has the initiative. It is the aggressor, just as Nazi totalitarianism had been before."¹

**AFL Perception of Soviet Perspectives**

AFL policymakers believed that Soviet leaders had one primary value: the establishment and maintenance of Communism throughout the world. The Soviets may have had other values such as nationalism and peace, but these were subordinate to the basic objective of the destruction of non-Communist actors and the furtherance of world revolution. In July 1946, Meany, for example wrote:

It is crystal clear by now that Soviet policy calls for the elimination of every non-Soviet government. While we in America can discover no radical difference, either in methods or purpose, between fascism and communism, the Russian line is to label all non-Soviet governments as fascist. In the final analysis, the Soviet idea for world peace seems to be the complete acceptance on the part of all the world of Soviet domination and control.¹

At the same time the Russians were interested in furthering communism throughout the world, the AFL believed the Soviets had decided to focus most of their attention on gaining control of Europe. Control of Europe would protect the Soviet government by acting as a buffer zone or cordon sanitaire. In 1946, for example, Green wrote:

The Communist regime representing 6,000,000 party members has been imposed on 190,000,000 Russians and on neighboring states. To make the Communist regime secure at home, secret agents organize communist cells in other countries, teach them to place their loyalty to Communism above their loyalty to their country, and set up secret channels by which party orders and directives can be transmitted . . .

Another procedure which has become familiar in countries bordering upon the U.S.S.R. is the infiltration of Communists to take residence and then, as citizens of those countries, to carry out USSR plans to establish "friendly" governments.²

The Russians, the AFL decided, also believed that control of the European industrial heartland would lead to preponderant Soviet power and thus, eventually, to world communism. The AFL leaders believed that the Soviets were correct in this analysis. In 1940, Woll had written:

For if Hitler can dominate all of Europe and Africa and can put under subjection all the work people of Europe and all the resources of the continent of Africa, how long do you suppose it will be possible for us in this country to compete against such a process of production.

It was hardly surprising that, when the Soviet Union, with its vast natural resources, had the capability of putting "under subjection all the work people of Europe," Woll and the other AFL leaders were deeply concerned. Indeed, Meany stated that:

If we permit the nations of Western Europe to fall, our new neighbor on the Atlantic will be Joseph Stalin's brutal fascist dictatorship. Stalin will be the master of all Europe. The Communist philosophy would then be dominant in the world and we here in America would find ourselves in a most uncomfortable position.

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1 Interviews: Brown, Lovestone, Meany, Dubinsky, Harrison.


The AFL leaders believed that Russian strategy was first to consolidate Soviet control over Eastern Europe. This would give the Russians time to rebuild their own war-torn economy. Furthermore, if the Soviets were to refrain from provocative actions in Western Europe, the United States would be unlikely to attack the Soviet Union or interfere with its consolidation in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the United States might even withdraw its forces from Western Europe.¹

Following the imposition of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, and a possible American troop withdrawal, Western Europe would be ready to fall under communist and Soviet pressure. The AFL leaders believed that the Soviets would not move to control Western Europe unless they were ready to risk armed conflict with the United States. Soviet short-range objectives in Western Europe, and in France in particular, were not to seize power, but to maintain political and economic instability. As Dubinsky wrote:

The Communist hope for the future lies in a collapse of the European economy. The hope of the people on the continent lies in the rebuilding and expansion of their economies. The prospects of totalitarian communist domination of Europe depend on a divided continent—with each nation undercutting the other, with one country at the throat of another. On the other hand, the prospects of a free and democratic Europe are bright only to the extent that its people can cooperate in a spirit of mutual aid, in continental endeavor, in helping one another so that all can be strong enough to repel and smash any attempt at imperialist domination and every attempt—from within or without—at strangulation of their democratic liberties.²

¹Interviews, Brown and Lovestone.

The AFL perception of Soviet objectives with regard to France was stated even more explicitly by Brown.

Communist objectives in France have always been geared not only to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but also to the thesis that power cannot be seized by the Russians either democratically, or legally, without the active intervention or possible intervention of Russian military force. Knowing this is impossible in France as long as America supports France economically, politically, with the inference or the implications of military support and eventually military aid, the Russians and the Communists have never fundamentally believed they could take power in France, at least within this time period, or at least within the period when they are not yet ready to give sufficient military support to such an operation. This meant that Russian and Communist policy in France has been to utilize their various forms of power, their various forms of organization, to prevent any kind of economic or political stability in France.¹

Moreover, in the immediate post-war period, Brown especially believed that for the Russians, according to their own statements and according to their actions, France was the key to the control of Europe. As early as March, 1946, in his reports to Woll and Lovestone, Brown stressed this view, declaring "France is the immediate key to the problem of Western European democracy (in the long run Germany will be the decisive question) and there can be no thought of achieving democratic objectives in Western Europe without changing the internal French situation."² Lovestone shared this view and wrote to Brown

¹Irving Brown, "The Fight Against Communism in Western European Countries," speech delivered at the State Department, November 9, 1948, p. 6.
²Brown to Woll, March 14, 1946.
a few days later "I believe France is the key to Russian's control of Western Europe. If Joe gets France he outflanks Germany and then he might allow us to go home or lend lease us the railroad fare." ¹

These views were accepted by the AFL leadership and incorporated into Brown's address to the 1946 convention. ²

The AFL policy makers believed that communist control of the international labor movement and the European and particularly the French trade unions was crucially important in the East-West struggle. ² As early as March, 1946, Brown reported that "France is the short run key to Europe and control of the CGT is a major key in the future of France." ³ This view was clearly expressed in the Executive Council Report on "Free Trade Unions in Europe and our Responsibility for Free Trade Unions," adopted at the 1946 Convention.

The key to the future in Europe (the Report stated), lies with the reconstructed and slowly reviving free labor movement. The extent to which this is recognized on truly democratic lines, will determine in large measure, which way Europe will go in terms of the basic struggle that is ensuing between democracy and Soviet totalitarianism. ³

¹ Lovestone to Brown, March 18, 1946.


³ Ibid., p. 433.
The AFL leadership, in other words, believed the Russian strategy would effectively serve Communist objectives. If the democratic forces did not respond, eventually Western Europe would be ready to fall under Communist control. The United States would then be forced either to surrender the continent and eventually face the perponderant power of the Communist camp or go to preventive war to avoid Soviet domination of Western Europe.

These elements of the AFL's leadership's perspectives influenced the Federation policy choice. Democratic pluralism, peace and stability, and economic and social well-being were the goal values, values desired as ends in themselves, which influenced the leaders' perception of threats and the selection of modes of action.

The AFL leadership believed the Communists and Communist unions were loyal to the Soviet Union and hostile to the AFL's values. Soviet strategy, the AFL leaders concluded, was first to consolidate their control of Eastern Europe. Second, the Soviets would attempt to establish their hegemony over Western Europe by keeping the continent politically and economically unstable until they were ready to risk a possible military confrontation with the western powers. The AFL leaders believed that this policy might very well lead to Soviet domination of the continent. France, they believed, was the key target of the Russians and organized labor, and might very well play a decisive role in the success or failure of Soviet policy. These theories heightened the AFL sensitivities to labor developments abroad.
Chapter IV

AFL PERCEPTION OF COMMUNIST DOMINATION
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL AND FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENTS

The AFL leaders' theories about developments in the French and international labor movements further narrowed the range of the Federation's policy choice. AFL policymakers believed that the major international labor organization, the WFTU, and several key centers such as the French CGT were communist dominated. Moreover, the AFL leaders believed the communists would use their control over these organizations and the reviving German labor movement. Communist control of national and international labor organizations, the American trade unionists were convinced, would be used to further Soviet political/military objectives in France and throughout the continent.

In this chapter, the AFL's perception of the character and significance of the WFTU will be described. As will be demonstrated, the AFL was sure it was Communist-controlled and an instrument of Soviet diplomacy. Second, the chapter will outline the AFL's perception of the extent and significance of communist control of the French labor movement. Primarily as a result of Brown's reporting, as will be demonstrated, the AFL leaders believed the communists controlled the
main labor organization, the CGT, as well as labor organizations in strategic sections such as mining, transportation, and communications. Continued control of these sectors and the CGT, the AFL leaders assumed, would give the Soviet Union an important instrument of policy that would prove decisive in French and ultimately world politics.

The International Labor Movement

The AFL had been suspicious of WFTU since the British and Russians suggested its creation in 1943.¹ The AFL had supported wartime planning to reconstruct the shattered European unions by working through the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU).² The CIO and the Russians on the other hand, saw the creation of a new organization as a way for them to acquire full stature in the international labor movement. The British apparently saw the new organization as a method of securing post war international cooperation of the Russians and the CIO.³

In 1945, the Federation refused to participate in the new organization. While there were several reasons for the AFL refusal, probably the most important was the participation of the Soviet "trade unions." As Green wrote to Citrine in December 1944, the AFL

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¹See, for example, Green's remarks at the 1944 Convention, Proceedings, 1944, pp. 454-455.

²The AFL had withdrawn from the IFTU shortly after World War I, but rejoined the organization, the main inter-war non-communist international labor organization in the late 1930's.

³Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, pp. 36-67.
 objected to the inclusion of "so-called organizations of labor that are in reality government-controlled and government-dominated."\textsuperscript{1} In refusing to be identified or associated with the Soviet "trade unions," the AFL was not initiating a new policy. Since the 1920's, the Federation had been one of the strongest opponents of Russian affiliation to international labor organizations.\textsuperscript{2} By 1946, the AFL was convinced it had adopted the right course and that the WFTU had fallen under the domination of communists completely subservient to the Soviet Union. This view can be found in almost every major pronouncement on international affairs of the AFL leaders. It was substantiated, the AFL policymakers felt, by studies of the WFTU's organization and policy.

A 46-page study in the FTUC's archives, for example, referring to the 1945 London conference creating the WFTU, maintained that "at no time in the development of the World Federation of Trade Unions was the preponderance of the Communist faction led by the Soviet Union in doubt." The control of this group, the study continued, was based on a number of factors.

\textsuperscript{1}Quoted by Meany in "American Federation of Labor's Position on the International Federation of Trade Unions," Address to Central Trade and Labor Council, New York City, April 5, 1945, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{2}The major reason for this was the belief that Soviet "trade unions" were not trade unions in the western democratic sense of the term. Instead they were instruments of state policy and an organ of the Soviet government. For an analysis of the AFL position, see John P. Windmuller's American Labor and the International Labor Movement, especially pp. 67-73.
First, the Soviet delegation claimed to represent twenty-seven and a half million workers out of a claimed total of all participating countries of seventy million workers. At the London conference, the Soviet delegation included fifty spokesmen and attachés in comparison with eight CIO delegates. The Russian delegation also carried with it the international prestige of the Soviet government.

Second, representatives from countries under direct Soviet influence could be counted on to support the Soviet delegation's position at the conference. The unions of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Finland, which had been destroyed during the Nazi occupation, were revived under close Soviet supervision. Hence, it was assumed that delegates from these "unions" were subservient to Soviet interests.

Third, in non-western areas, which had been poorly organized prior to World War II, the forces of the international communist movement were largely responsible for the organization of trade unions. These unions furnished a major share of the WFTU membership. The outstanding example of this type of organization was the Latin American Federation of Labor led by Vicente Lombardo Toldano.¹

The report listed the political tendency of each delegate. It concluded that there were 128 communists or pro-communists present. (Sixty-seven were complete supporters of communist causes). There were 101 conservative labor or right-wing socialist delegates. The sympathy of the remaining fifty-nine delegates was unknown.²

The report maintained that the fairest test of the strength of the forces making up the WFTU was embodied in the organization's decisions. Louis Saillant, who was elected Secretary General, the Federation's most important office, had a record of "close collaboration with the French Communist Party." The Executive Bureau, which consisted of the nine leading officers, included only three conservative labor leaders: the Federation's President, Sir Walter Citrine;\(^1\) Chu Hsueh Fon, of the Chinese Association of Labor; and Evert Kupers, of the Dutch Federation of Labor (NVV). The communist faction was represented by V.V. Kuznetsov (Soviet Union), Lombardo Toledano of the Mexican Federation of Labor, and G. Di Vittorio, General Secretary of the CGIL. Sidney Hillman of the CIO and the French CGT leader, Léon Jouhaux, were considered communist "collaborators."\(^2\) The communists had a similar majority in the WFTU General Council.\(^3\)

\(^1\)The Presidency of an international labor organization, however, is largely considered symbolic compared to the post of Secretary-General.

\(^2\)Jouhaux, it was believed, was forced to collaborate with the communists if he was to survive as leader of the CGT. After the old leader had returned from exile, he found that the CGT was predominantly controlled by the communists. Hillman, who had a long record of collaboration with the communists, was also surrounded by communist sympathizers such as John Abt.

\(^3\)Evaluation of the WFTU, pp. 26-28.
Finally, in order to counteract the possible opposition of non-communist delegates, the communist leaders of the WFTU energetically sought to impose strict discipline on the organization's affiliates. At a meeting in Oakland, California, in May, 1945, the Russians requested that the new Federation be given the power to direct world policy. At the insistence of the British and several other delegations, the Federation was not given all the mandatory powers proposed by the Soviet Union. The communists agreed to the compromise which carried with it significant compulsory implications in order to preserve the unity of the conference.  

The WFTU, the report concluded, would be useful to the Soviets in several ways. First, the affiliated "conservative" unions would be unable to prevent the organization from manufacturing anti-American and anti-British propaganda. Second, through the recognized WFTU representatives in the U.N.'s ECOSOC, Soviet policies would be enunciated and fostered. (The WFTU also would be a useful substitute if the Soviet government decided to withdraw from the U.N.)

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1Ibid., pp. 34-38. Each affiliate was morally bound to carry out the WFTU's decisions. A degree of flexibility and consultation was permitted in the method of executing the Federation's decisions, but there was no provision enabling an affiliate to refuse to carry out the collective decision. In addition, an affiliate could be expelled for failure to comply with the organization's policy.

2Indeed, in 1945, the report pointed out, the Russians and their allies in the WFTU launched a continuous barrage against the ILO to prevent its being taken over by the U.N. Evaluation of the WFTU, p. 9.
Third, the WFTU would be used to bring direct pressure to bear on non-communist governments and labor organizations. The organization could threaten and execute politically motivated strikes and boycotts. Indeed, the report on the WFTU maintained,

there is no doubt that with the present high degree of integration of the world economy, the WFTU has sufficient strength to cause serious dislocation... General strikes for political ends have already made their appearance on a minor scale in a number of countries including the United States, led by affiliates of the World Federation of Trade Unions. It may be expected that this trend will increase in intensity, scope and synchronization, within the near future.¹

Fourth, the WFTU would also be useful in solidifying communist control over national trade union centers such as the reviving German labor movement and thus further strengthening the WFTU and Soviet power.

Finally, as the only major international labor organization, the WFTU would serve as a rallying point for all non-communist unions.² The appeal of "unity" is a powerful one in trade union circles at any time. This was especially true after the common struggle against the Nazis and Fascists. The liquidation of the IFTU had left a vacuum that the AFL feared would be filled by the WFTU. Soviet and WFTU activities in Germany in 1946, Italy in 1947 and intervention in the internal affairs of the CIO in 1948, reinforced the fears that the AFL harbored in early 1946.³

¹Evaluation of the WFTU, p. 46.
²Proceedings, 1946, p. 72.
³For an elaboration of several WFTU maneuvers, see Windmuller, pp. 135-136.
The French Labor Movement

Communist control of the French unions would, of course, reinforce Soviet control of the WFTU. Control of the French trade unions would also directly further Soviet objectives in France. Even before Brown was dispatched to Europe, the AFL leaders feared that the major unions in a number of Western European countries, including France, were falling under communist domination. ¹ Lovestone in particular, was dismayed when Jouhaux, after his return from incarceration in Germany, accepted equal status with the newly elected General Secretary of the CGT, i.e., there were to be two Secretary Generals of the CGT, Jouhaux and Saillant. Convinced Saillant was a communist or communist supporter, Lovestone refused to meet with him when he passed through New York after the founding U.N. conference in 1945. ² Within a month after his arrival in France, Brown too, was convinced that the CGT was falling under communist domination. ³ By the summer of 1946, the AFL leadership believed the CGT was communist-controlled.

After attending the CGT convention in April, 1946, Brown in a nine-page report, maintained that the convention was a "completely dominated Communist Party affair." "It is almost safe to say," he

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¹William Green, "The AFL and World Labor Unity," The New Leader, August 4, 1945, p. 16.

²Interview, Lovestone.

³Interview, Brown.
continued, "that the C.G.T. no longer exists as a trade union. It has become so thoroughly a Stalinist organ that there are grave doubts about the possibility of internal reform."¹

Brown reported among other things that 1) The new CGT reorganization, as proposed by the Communist Party (CP) via (Henri) Raynaud, one of the Communist CGT Secretaries, was adopted by about 80% of those voting. Control of the CGT in the future would rest within the hands of six large federations (metal, building trade, mines, railroads, textiles and chemicals), which were all under Communist Party domination, and practically eliminated the power of the smaller unions, where the non-communists had strength; 2) Saillant's international report was a "strictly Stalinite affair in defense of the Russians, an attack against Churchill"; 3) resolutions, actions and the major speeches fitted into the Soviet pattern and interests; and 4) there was almost a complete absence of discussion of direct trade union problems, such as wages and working conditions, except in a very general way. Instead, politics was the central topic of discussion. Brown's report formed the basis for Woll's article in the July, 1946 American Federationist which concluded that:

France's great CGT of former years--one of the foremost trade unions in the world--exists no longer. The name is the same, but the CGT instead of being free and democratic has been captured by the communists and transformed by them into a direct instrument of Communist Party policy.²


Strategic Sectors

Coal mining and transportation, the AFL leaders believed, were the most important and immediate Communist targets. When the Communists entered the French government in 1945, they took over important managerial posts in these industries. If, in addition, the Communists controlled the unions in these sectors, as well perhaps as in electricity, communications and metal working, the AFL concluded they would achieve their objectives with respect to France, and as a result, with respect to non-Communist Europe.

These sectors, Brown knew, had several qualities in common. In the first place, each was a strategic industry and each played a vital role in the French economy. If any one of these industries were paralyzed, the French economy would be disrupted. Moreover, the workers in these sectors, particularly transport workers, are well placed for paramilitary activities. Second, many sectors of these industries, unlike many other sectors of the French economy, were virtually closed shops. Tradition and employment conditions made it extremely difficult to break the hold of the union over individual workers. If one of the strategic sectors within these industries could be closed down, the industry would grind to a standstill, e.g., if railroad engine drivers went on strike, the railroads would cease functioning. Finally, the Communists were well represented among the workers and unions in these sectors. The Party for many years, AFL leaders believed, had expended large resources, both human and material, to prevail in these industries. Thus, both the AFL and, apparently, the Communists believed the struggle for France might very well be won in the battle for control of the unions in these three sectors.
(a) Coal Mining

As early as January, 1947, Brown was sure that coal mining was one of the key industries in the economic and political stability of France and Europe.\(^1\) Northern France, the center of coal production, was the critical area. Without coal from this region, in particular, the French had no major source of fuel for industrial needs as well as private consumption. This was one of the major reasons why the Communists had concentrated their attention on controlling the mines, particularly those in the Pas de Calais and Nord Departments.

Brown maintained the Communists had concentrated their financial and organizational resources in the area and built up a political machine even before World War II. During and immediately after the liberation, this machine went into action with sufficient funds and personnel to carry out Communist objectives. Even before the war, the Party had eight organizers in the North. In 1948, Brown reported, it had forty-eight trade union specialists in the mines—that is separate and distinct from the trade union bureaucracy.

In the aftermath of the war, the Communists also gained control of the relief and welfare agencies, which were important in mining areas, as well as major sectors of the industry's management. High-ranking communists, such as Auguste Leceour, the Mayor of Lens and a member of the Party's Central Committee, were appointed to ministerial posts supervising the operations of the newly nationalized

\(^1\) Brown to Lovestone, January 27, 1947.
industry. Needless to say, the new Minister ensured others in the Ministry \(^1\) were compatible politically with him. Another method of gaining control of the mines and trade union apparatus was the "purge." This instrument was used not only to eliminate collaborators, but also to undermine any "element ready to conduct an open fight against Communist Party domination." \(^2\) The myth of unity and the fear of a split in the ranks of the workers also helped the Communists, as did the division and the lack of clearcut purposes among the non-Communists. Finally, the Communists' continual emphasis on the fact that many of the major CGT leaders such as René Belin and George Desmoulins, who were close to Jouhaux and the "reformist" tendency, had gone over to Pétain in 1940, was a factor of "considerable weight." \(^3\)

\(^{1}\) For a discussion of Communist influence in the nationalized industries, See Mario Einaudi, Maurice Bye, Ernesto Rossi, Nationalization in France and Italy (Ithaca, N. Y.: 1955), pp. 100-105.


\(^{3}\) A number of writers have described Communist techniques in passing. There are no published works, however, which systematically explain how the pre-war Communist minority was able to gain control of many of the national federations by the time the CGT Congress met in April, 1946. Among the authors touching on the subject are Alfred J. Rieber, Stalin and the French Communist Party 1941-1947 (New York: 1962), especially pp. 177-183; George Lefranc, Les Experiences Syndicales En France 1939 à 1950, (Paris: 1950); Seymour Chalfin, Causes Leading to the Communist Domination of the French Labor Movement, (Urbana, Ill.: 1944) and Peter Novick, The Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (New York: 1968), pp. 131-133. Novick, while agreeing that the Communists probably used the purge to remove non-Communist leaders, maintains, with little supporting evidence, that the trade union purge was probably only a very "subordinate factor in the takeover of the CGT." He explains
By calling strikes and keeping them going through a combination of economic and physical force, the Communists would be able to keep the mines closed down.

However, until 1947, the Communists did not use this weapon. They were members of the government. Instead of organizing strikes, they favored imposing additional sacrifices on the workers. Indeed, as prices rose, the Communists in the government endorsed wage controls, piecework, and speedups. When the communists were expelled from the government in mid 1947, they jettisoned this policy and change tactics.¹

Brown maintained that the strikes in late 1947 and in late 1948 were manifestations of the new Communist tactics. The strike in late 1948, he pointed out was given a legal cover by holding a strike vote phrased in such a way that Brown said he himself would have voted to strike.² The majority of workers, Brown believed, were in fact apathetic. Many were incensed by what they felt to be unjust economic conditions, but few wanted a long strike, especially in winter.³ The Communist militants could last through a long strike by living off Party

the takeover in terms of the levels of popularity the Communists attained prior to 1939 and the same post-war developments which led to Communist electoral ascendency over the Socialists.

¹For an analysis of Communist strategy and options from 1945 to 1947, see Rieber, passim.

²The Fight Against Communism in Western Europe, p. 19.

³Long strikes were rare in the French mines. Unlike American miners, the French did not have enormous strike funds to sustain them during a long strike. In the winter, lengthy strikes were even rarer, because the miners were unable to secure alternative employment. Moreover, they could not farm or live off the small plots of land they farmed to obtain vegetables and fruits, etc.
funds and the enormous sums contributed by Communist-controlled unions in other countries. (Brown reported to Lovestone that the front page of the CP newspaper L'Humanité revealed that Russian and Eastern European "unions" contributed 600 million francs to the French miners.)

After a week or two, many miners wanted to return to work. To prevent this, Communists in the management, social welfare organizations, and unions applied economic and physical pressure. First, economic pressure was applied. Recalcitrant miners were threatened with the loss of their jobs after the termination of the strike. They were told that if they returned to work their opportunities to receive dividends and food from the cooperatives controlled by the union would be jeopardized. If, in spite of these pressures, additional "incentives" were needed, the Communists applied physical force against the miners and their families. Many miners, Brown reported, were beaten. Thus, although the miners were not in favor of maintaining the strike, few attempted to break it.

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1Brown to Lovestone, January 2, 1949.

2The Fight Against Communism in Western Europe, p. 20. These descriptions probably strongly influenced William Green. In his partially autobiographical work, Labor and Democracy, Green described his early recollections of the mining company's power due to its control not only of the mines but also of local shops, housing, etc. He noted in the mining areas that the union was the only other center of real power and security. One can imagine his reaction to reports indicating the officials of the company and the unions were under the same political management. Labor and Democracy, pp. 1-10.
In the 1948 strike, the Communists also engaged in an action, Brown stated, which no trade union movement in the French coal industry has ever engaged in; that is, they started to withdraw the maintenance and repairmen from the security posts, from the pumps, from the operations which keep the mines in running order even when no work is going on. Even during the Nazi occupation he pointed out, when there had been a short strike in 1943-44, these services were maintained to ensure the mines against being flooded or filled with gas. By withdrawing these security men, Brown said, it was clear the Communists were not interested in economic redress. Instead, their orders and their policy were designed "to prevent the French mines from becoming a contributing part in the successful economic stability and reconstruction of France and of Western Europe."1

The strike of December, 1947, Brown reported, cost the French economy two million tons of coal.2 The 1948 strikes amounted to a loss almost equivalent to one-quarter of the entire Marshall Plan aid to France. France's reserves of coal were completely exhausted. If there was another strike in February, 1949, he told Lovestone, France would freeze and many industries would be forced to shut down. If on the other hand France requested additional coal from the United States to build up a reserve, then employment in other industries (e.g., textiles) would decrease since dollars needed to buy raw materials for other industries would have to be diverted to the purchase of coal.3

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1Fight Against Communism in Western Europe, p. 23.
2"Good News in France," p. 16.
(b) Transportation

The second necessary condition for the successful operation of the French economy and the Marshall Plan, was transportation. As a result of his background and wartime experience, Brown knew that transportation was essential for France's economic recovery, the war effort in Indo-China and, to a lesser extent, for western defense of France and Europe.

After the war, there were only two major means of transportation that could effectively serve France's economic and military needs. Mass transport by road and air were economically impractical. Given the primitive state of these industries at the time, they simply were unable to carry even a minor portion of the country's industrial and military traffic. This left overland transport by rail and marine shipping.

The docks were one of Brown's major concerns. Substantial numbers of dockworkers, particularly in the post-war period, were necessary to load and unload ships.\(^1\) If the dockers refused to engage in these tasks, an attempt could have been made to use the military as substitute labor force. Moreover, the army could have been used to protect dockers who did not wish to honor a strike. In addition to physical strength, however, loading and unloading a ship is a skilled task. The successful rapid operation of the cranes and interrelation between the crane operators and manual workers requires both confidence and know-how. The army and non-skilled workers hired for this task would probably have found it difficult, if not impossible,

\(^1\)By the 1960's the importance of dockers had been reduced by the increased mechanization of the docks. Large numbers of dockworkers are no longer needed for the successful loading and unloading of a ship.
to rapidly load and unload ships successfully. In addition, the military and those not honoring the strike would have been subject to harassment by the dockers and the sailors who would have regarded them as strikebreakers. Finally, the repeated use of the military for civilian tasks was obviously undesirable politically.

In the event of dock strikes, an alternative would have been to load and unload at the ports of another country. Even if this was economically and physically possible, transport workers, in general, are fairly internationally minded and well-organized. Most likely, ships circumventing strike-bound ports would encounter hostile labor and political reactions.

Dockers also could sabotage ships and engage in intelligence and paramilitary operations. Troops and war materials, for example, must pass through their hands. If a docker wants to know what is in a carefully guarded crate, it is relatively simple to arrange for it to be dropped so that it is smashed open. Similarly, it is possible to load and unload various types of contraband (e.g., arms) in secrecy if one has the cooperation of local dockers.

Finally, the AFL feared dock strikes and the destruction of American goods would have created an unfortunate political reaction in France and the United States. Indeed, in Congressional hearings on the European Recovery Program, several Senators had

\[1\text{Traditionally, politically motivated actions in port cities result in throwing goods and personnel into the sea.}\]
raised questions about strikes in recipient countries.\(^1\) If striking French workers refused to accept or utilize Marshall Plan goods, there was fear that Congress would become increasingly reluctant to fund the program.\(^2\)

From 1947 on, Brown was concerned about Communist control of this sector. He knew from Valtin and other sources that the main Communist thrusts in the inter-war period had been aimed at controlling the docks. In the post-war period, he feared they had almost achieved this goal. This was accomplished by gaining control of the dock workers union and securing the cooperation of the employers. Many of the same techniques employed in the mines were used to win control of the CGT's Fédération des Ports et Docks. In 1935, when Georges Piquemal became the head of the Federation, there was only one Communist in the Union's Executive Bureau. In 1944, there was a second and in 1946, the Communists gained sufficient strength at the Union's Congress to dismiss Piquemal and other non-Communists.

The Communists were able to secure the acquiescence of employers through blackmail. During the war, many employers had worked with both Vichy and the Nazis. After the war, the Communists,

\(^1\)See, for example, U.S. Senate, "U.S. Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1," January 8, 1948, p. 63.

\(^2\)Interview, Brown.
as a result of their position in local as well as national government, 
used police and other dossiers to blackmail compromised employers. 1

The Communists used their control of the union and of 
employers in at least four ways. First, they controlled the hiring 
of dockworkers. In France, (after 1947) dockworkers had to be 
certified (embauche) by a local manpower bureau (Bureau Central 
de la Main d'Œuvre, or BMCO) before they could be hired by one of 
the dozen or so companies in each port. Once a man was certified, 
he was entitled to the privileges of a professional docker. 2 The 
BMCOs were comprised of an equal number of representatives from 
the dockers' union and the employers as well as by the port director 
or another representative from the responsible Ministry in Paris. 
Thus, by controlling the union and securing the acquiescence of some 
employers, the Communists controlled the BMCO and the certifica-
tion of dockers.

1 In an interview with this writer, Georges Piquemal named 
two employers in Bordeaux, who were blackmailed by the Communists. 
For occasional reference to trade unionists, employers, etc., who 
"whitewashed" themselves in this fashion, see Peter Novick's The 
Resistance Versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated 

2 For a detailed explanation of the official method of 
hiring dockworkers in most French ports and particularly Marseilles, 
see Vernon H. Jensen, Hiring of Dockworkers and Employment 
This power, Brown believed, was used to ensure that Communist sympathizers or those amenable to Communist pressure received certification. Control of the union enabled the Communists to impede the employment of "uncooperative" workers. In February, 1950, for example, approximately 100 dockers in Marseilles were expelled from the CGT union for loading a boat bound for Indo-China.\(^1\)

A second technique the Communists used to prevent the loading and unloading of a ship was to pay the dockers not to work on the boat. This tactic was employed, for example, in Cherbourg in January, 1950. The CGT simply paid each worker 1000 francs not to unload an American ship.\(^2\)

The third technique was organizing a limited political strike. This was a subtle ploy involving both the collusion of the employer and the Communist Party. The employers, whose consent was usually obtained by blackmail, ensured that five members of a secret Communist cell were hired to work the same gang in a given ship's hull.\(^3\) The Communist gang would find some pretext (e.g., a grievance) to call a work stoppage. The other gangs, unaware, of course, of the true motivation and machinations of the Communists, would then follow suit. If one or two workers argued against the work stoppage, the Communists would have a difficult time organizing this


\(^3\)Dockers in the hulls work in gangs.
kind of strike. It was the job of the cell to ensure that uncooperative dockers were neutralized so that a strike would result. 1

If control of the BMCO, the unions, and bribery and work stoppages did not prevent dockers from loading and unloading a ship, the Communists used terror. Not only are dockers prone to use violence, but it was also easy to arrange for uncooperative dockers to have an "accident" on the docks or in the narrow streets surrounding the piers. Violence was used also to intimidate "occasional dockers," who, in the absence of a sufficient number of professionals, work in the ports. Needless to say, the injury or death of several men increased the reluctance of "occasionals" (and professionals) to work on the piers.

Brown was also concerned by Communist control of other sectors of the maritime industry. Ocean-going sailors, by refusing to work, could paralyze France's shipping. Although they would not have had an immediate impact on the Marshall Plan and the transport of NATO's military 2 equipment, it would have hurt France's war effort in Indo-China. Sailors were also in a position to sabotage ships, and, as has been pointed out, to engage in espionage and paramilitary operations.

1Even under normal working conditions, there is a high frequency of strikes among dockworkers. As V. L. Allen has pointed out, this can be explained by a variety of factors, including the casual nature of the work and the culture of the dockworkers. For a discussion of this point, see V. L. Allen, Trade Union Leadership (London: 1957), pp. 191-196.

2France, by sacrificing foreign currency, could have hired the services of friendly neutral ships to transport men and material to Indo-China, American ships transported most of the Marshall Plan and NATO materials.
French sailors belonged to two unions, the Fédération des Officiers de la Marine Marchande, and the Fédération des Syndicats Maritimes. Like mines and docks, these sectors, as Valtin described, had long been important Communist targets. The fact that several of the key non-Communist maritime leaders had either been killed or deported (e.g., Pierre Ferri Pisani) in the war, facilitated the increased Communist control in the post-war years.

Brown was also aware of the importance of barges as a means of transportation. In the early post-war period, inland waterways accounted for approximately 15% of France's total transportation. Most important, Brown knew that most of the canals and barges were located in the industrial north and east. Paralyzing the canals would have dislocated a major portion of France's coal, steel, and other heavy industries. Furthermore, as the canals crossed Europe's frontiers, the men who ran the barges to some extent had an opportunity to play a role in paramilitary and intelligence operations.

Although Brown considered inland transportation important, and knew that the Communists, as Valtin had pointed out, had devoted considerable attention to this sector, he did not believe they were in a position to close down the waterways. The approximately 10,000 inland transport workers differed considerably from other transport workers. For one thing, approximately 4,000 owned their own barges and lived on them with their families. The remaining workers were salaried and lived and worked on the barges. Neither the owners nor the salaried employees considered themselves manual workers. They viewed themselves as "artisans." They had to work hard to pay off the debts for their barges and they had little time for, or interest in, political affairs.
Another difference between inland and other transport workers was the nature of their "trade union." Their organization, the 'Secrétaire du Cartel Artisanal de la Batellerie," was an autonomous cartel. The cartel, representing various tendencies, Communist, Socialist, and Catholic, had been created in 1945, under the leadership of an ex-Communist, Roger Blanckaert. The CGT had objected to the creation of the independent cartel, maintaining that the Batellerie could be incorporated into the already existing CGT structure. To avoid CGT domination and at the same time maintain the strength of the Batellerie, Blanckaert rejected their arguments. Thus, although there were a few Communist militants among the barge owners, Brown did not believe the Party was in a position to close down the inland waterways.  

Not only was the successful operation of the railroads essential for France's economic life, but, as was suggested in the last chapter, the railroads could play an important role in a coup d'état and an invasion. A small number of railroad workers could also play an important role in intelligence operations and political warfare. Employees of the Wagon-lits (dining room and sleeping car workers), for example, were one of the few groups of men who frequently travelled across the frontiers of Europe. The Wagon-lits were part of an international company. When a train reached a frontier, frequently the engineers were changed and passengers would have to go through customs. It was scarcely practical, however, to completely search the dining room and sleeping cars. Employees in these sections could be watched, but it would be extremely difficult to prevent them from receiving

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1 Interviews, Brown and Blanckaert.
intelligence information from contacts in the railroad industry in another country or from smuggling money to finance these operations. The union which controlled the Wagon-lits and other sectors of the railroad industry would have a decided advantage in engaging in these operations and at the same time preventing others from engaging in them.

Brown was aware that the Communists controlled the major union, the Fédération des Cheminots. Like the mines, the railroads had been one of the primary Communist targets for a long time. They had expended considerable time, effort and money to implant themselves in a union whose members, because of the nature of their work, were difficult to organize into effective trade unions. ¹

He also believed that the Communist controlled the unions of the electrical and communication workers, the Fédération de l'Éclairage et Forces Motrices and the Fédération des P. T. T. They would thus be in a position to jeopardize electrical current and communications, which were, of course, vital for French industry. In addition, control over these industries at critical moments could be decisive in facilitating or inhibiting paramilitary and other activities that might lead to the toppling of a government. Turning off the electrical current, for example, after Communist newspapers were

¹Many workers in the railroad industry, like the maritime industry, rarely remain in one place for any length of time. They pose a problem for union or political organizers in that special ways of reaching them must be devised. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that railway workers have usually been well organized.
printed and demonstrators were organized at strategic urban centers would give the Communists a decided advantage in controlling the streets and important political centers. Similarly, if postal, telephone and telegraph workers went on strike, the French economy would be thrown into chaos. If they refused to process the communications of non-Communist parties at moments of political crisis, the Communists would receive decisive advantages. Brown was also convinced that workers in the metal, printing, and entertainment industries were all Communist dominated, and that continued Communist control would be decisive in determining the development of French politics.

After an initial post-war honeymoon period (1945-1946), which was used to infiltrate the French Government,¹ the Communists, Brown reported, utilized their control of organized labor to ensure economic and political instability and at the same time build disciplined organizations to engage in espionage, paramilitary activity and possibly a coup d'état. A few weeks after Ramadier had expelled the Communists from his government in May 1947, Brown told Lovestone that the C.P. had begun to engage in economic "blackmail." By suddenly claiming that the government was asking the workers to pay for post-war recovery, by demanding immediate wage increases without price increases, and by militating against wage ceilings geared

¹During 1946 and 1947, when leaders of the Communist Party were members of the French Cabinet, Brown and Lovestone believed the Communists were consolidating their control of the unions and improving their position in other sectors of the French economy. Interviews with Lovestone and Brown. Examples of Communist infiltration during this period can also be found in Rieber, Stalin and the French Communist Party, pp. 289-292.
to production, the Communists intensified the inflationary pressure on the government. At the same time, Brown reported, the Party told workers in the shops that the Socialists were responsible for failure to secure improved economic conditions.¹

After the announcement of the Marshall Plan, the founding Cominform meeting in the autumn of 1947, and the general strike in the winter of 1947-1948, Brown reported that the power which French Communists wielded through the trade union movement had been "the major contributing factor to the situation in France which can best be characterized as one of rising prices and falling governments."² The general strike of 1947, he continued, was part of the general effort to prevent the successful application of the Marshall Plan. If France remained unstable and went Communist, he said, the "whole Western European offensive for the Marshall Plan . . . will fall to the ground because there will be no successful reconstruction merely with the Benelux Trade Union Movement and the Benelux countries, the Scandinavians, etc."³

The strike, he maintained, cost France from 137 to 200 billion Francs (over one billion dollars). These production and material losses also contributed to an inflationary price rise by further aggravating the shortage of goods. The inflationary pressures, he

¹Brown to Lovestone, June 20, 1947.
²The Fight Against Communism in Western European Countries, p. 6.
³Ibid.
inferred, also provided the Communists with a legitimate pretext to strike at the economy again.\(^1\) The prolonged coal mining strike in the fall of 1948, he said, was not a strike for legitimate economic grievances. Rather it was a "strike organized by the militarized, totalitarianized Communist movement of France to destroy the French economy as the first step in an attempt to destroy the efforts of the European Recovery Program."\(^2\)

At the same time, he reported, the CP organized a "quasi-military organization based on trade union militants—what in Czechoslovakia they called 'action committees,' which had been the means whereby power was seized."\(^3\) Communist tactics in France, he said, were geared not only to Soviet foreign policy but also to the "Soviet military time-table." Since 1948, he told the 1950 AFL convention, Communist organizations in France had been "transformed in the main, into paramilitary cadres geared to obstruct Western economic reconstruction, sabotage the production and delivery of military weapons, and act as partisan forces in the time of armed invasion."\(^4\)

The Kremlin, AFL leaders believed, bent on controlling Europe, was in a position to use the international and French labor

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\(^1\)Irving Brown; "Good News in France," _American Federationist_, p. 17.

\(^2\)_Proceedings_, 1948, p. 271.

\(^3\)_The Fight Against Communism in Western European Countries_, p. 11.

\(^4\)_Proceedings_, 1950, p. 147.
movement to achieve its objectives. The Russians, they believed, controlled the dominant part of the main international labor organization, the WFTU. In addition, through French Communists, they dominated the main French trade union organizations as well as the unions in several strategic industries in France. Continued control of these international and French labor organizations, the AFL believed, would enable the Soviets to gain control of Western Europe and ultimately tip the balance of power against the U.S.

These perceptions narrowed the choices of the AFL leaders. No longer was complete disengagement from international affairs a desirable alternative. If the Federation, in addition to the U.S. government and other NGOs, did not involve itself in the politics of the continent, the resulting Soviet takeover would lead to a catastrophic decline of western democratic influence throughout the world. The question the AFL leaders faced was how to prevent the Soviet leaders from using their control of key labor organizations to establish their hegemony in Western Europe. To answer this question, they looked to developments among non-communist labor groups.
Chapter V

AFL PERCEPTION OF NON-COMMUNIST PERSPECTIVES
AND POWER
IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENTS

The AFL leaders' perception of developments and trends in non-Communist international and French labor groupings further narrowed the Federation's choices. They realized that there were sizeable non-Communist organizations and elements within Communist dominated organizations which might be capable of preventing the Kremlin using the labor movement as an instrument of its policy. They noted that these non-Communists were grouped into two factions or tendencies. The AFL leadership's perceptions of the perspectives and strengths and weaknesses of each group, were the final empirical expectations or theories which narrowed decisively the AFL's policy choice.

In this chapter, first, the American leaders' perception of strengths and weaknesses of the groupings that wished to work within Communist dominated international and French labor organizations will be described. As will be demonstrated, the AFL leaders believed it was impossible for the non-Communists to successfully prevent the Communists from maintaining their control over these organizations. The second half of the chapter describes the AFL analysis of the strength and weakness of the non-Communists who favored boycotting and attempting to weaken WFTU and its Communist affiliates. This grouping favored working through the international trade secretaries
and groups of non-Communist trade unionists in France and other countries to prevent Communists from using the trade unions for their political purposes. As will be demonstrated, the AFL leaders believed that this strategy was the best alternative. Nevertheless, the American leaders believed that without external assistance, the non-Communist trade unionists were faced with insuperable obstacles.

They knew, of course, that there were still sizeable non-Communist international and French labor groups. For the AFL, non-Communist unions and unions which were not government-controlled, were "bona fide" trade unions. Their primary objective was furthering the economic and social interests of their membership as opposed to the primarily political objectives of Communist and government-controlled unions.¹ A second objective, stemming from the first, was a desire to prevent national and international trade union organizations being used for Communist and Soviet political interests. AFL leaders knew that this objective was not equally shared by all non-Communist unions. But even the CIO, which the AFL leadership believed was Communist-infiltrated, attempted to prevent Communist use of the WFTU for Soviet objectives.²

¹For elaboration, see, for example, statement of the International Labor Relations Committee, March 16, 1945, or George Meany's address, "American Federation of Labor's Position on the International Federation of Trade Unions," Regular meeting of the Central Trades and Labor Council of Greater New York and Vicinity, April 5, 1945.

²Frequent reports from Brown noted the inability of the non-Communists in the WFTU to prevent Communist use of the labor organizations. In a letter to Woll, for example, Brown reported that (Frank) Rosenblum (Vice-President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and a CIO leader), was condemning the AFL for refusing to join the WFTU and throw its weight against the Russians and the Communists. Brown to Woll, December 23, 1946.
Two tendencies or groups were manifest in free trade union circles. One group consisted of non-Communist affiliates of the WFTU (e.g., the British T.U.C. and the Dutch N.V.V.) and non-Communist labor leaders in Communist-controlled WFTU affiliates (e.g., Léon Jouhaux of the French CGT and Giulio Pastore of the Italian CGIL). This group believed in forming or participating in organizations with Russian and Communist-controlled labor groups. Their strategy was to develop strong labor organizations. By ensuring that non-Communists were well represented in the leadership, they expected to prevent Communist use of the organizations.

The second group was opposed to participating in organizations with Communists and Communist-controlled unions. This group consisted of many of the younger non-Communist French and Italian leaders as well as the leadership of the International Trade Secretariats (ITS). The ITS were international associations of workers in a single trade or in several related trades or industries. During the interwar period, relations between the ITS and the IFTU, two different types of international trade union organizations, had not always been harmonious. For the most part, during the interwar period, the twenty-seven Secretariats with a membership of 13 million workers, remained autonomous in their internal affairs but coordinated their activities with the IFTU.1 The strategy of this group in the early postwar period was to maintain or build autonomous organizations as the best way of furthering trade union interests and preventing Communist control.

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1 For a more detailed explanation of the interwar organization and activities of the ITS and their relations with the IFTU, see Lorwin, The International Labor Movement, especially pp. 122-127 and Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, pp. 98-99.
Working with Communists

Clearly, many affiliates of the WFTU were not Communist-controlled. The AFL policymakers perceived two factions in these organizations. Although the dominant faction had adopted the first strategy, there were labor leaders and politicians in these WFTU affiliates who shared the AFL view that "unity" between democratic and totalitarian trade unions was mythical and that successful cooperation between these two camps would not endure for long. The AFL leadership, of course, believed that the WFTU's "conservatives" would be unable to exercise sufficient power to prevent the Federation from being used for Communist political purposes. Indeed, as Brown reported, this opinion was held even by important officials of the TUC, as well as by several of Foreign Minister Bevin's key assistants.²

In France, the AFL leadership perceived two major non-Communist factions in the Communist-dominated CGT. The dominant group, till December 1947 at least, consisted of the pre-war leaders of the "reformist" wing of the CGT. Jouhaux and CGT secretaries Robert Bothereau and Pierre Neumayer were the leaders of this faction. Like the non-Communist affiliates of the WFTU, this group believed in working together with Communists in the same organization. Like many Europeans, these older French leaders appeared to accept the "myth of unity," as Brown put it, and believed non-Communists and Communists could work together to strengthen the French labor movement.

¹For a partial explanation of the European attitude of working together with Communists in the same organization, see this writer's "The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and Spanish Politics," M.A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1967, pp. 31-33.

The "myth of unity," well-grounded in working class tradition, was particularly strong in the early post-war period. The French Communists' support for the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 had been forgotten due to their vigorous participation in the Resistance movement and the prestige that the Soviet Union, as one of the victors in World War II, enjoyed in the early post-war period. It was widely believed that Communists and non-Communists could continue to work together to ensure post-war peace and economic and social progress. Conversely, Jouhaux and his associates believed a split in the ranks of labor (they had witnessed two such fissures in their lifetimes) would weaken the movement's power.\(^1\) Scissions usually resulted in splitting the meager material and organizational resources of the unions. Moreover, after a scission, the Communists seemed to be stronger (at least initially) than when they originally joined together with non-Communists in the same organization. If the split also came at a time the Communists were relatively popular, as they were in early post-war France, this would further weaken the non-Communist forces.

The AFL leaders also realized that the old reformist leaders did not want to leave the moral and material assets of the CGT completely in the hands of the Communists. The name Confédération Générale du Travail had become embedded in the tradition of the French masses. (This was, of course, a major reason the Communists during the inter-war period, adopted the name CGT-Unitaire). The material assets of the organization, built up over a forty-year period included offices, furniture, mimeograph machines, etc., in every city

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\(^1\) Brown, Report on the CGT Convention, April, 1946.
and Department in France. Also, it was hardly surprising that the old CGT leaders were reluctant to relinquish their senior posts in the well-established organization they had spent most of their lives creating. Finally, Jouhaux and Bothereau did not believe it would be possible to create a new effective non-Communist confederation without material assistance from a source other than the dues of French workers. They were reluctant, Brown knew, to place themselves in the position of receiving this assistance.

The reformist leaders also believed that they would probably be able to regain control of the CGT. They believed that in this endeavor they had the support of a group known as Amis de Force Ouvrière. This group consisted of many trade unionists in all parts of France who had participated in Resistance Ouvrière, a non-Communist trade union grouping that had engaged in underground activities during World War II. The reformist leaders hoped they would be able to galvanize these non-Communists into a force capable of either retaking control of the CGT or preventing the organization from being used for Communist political purposes.

By the spring of 1946, the AFL leaders decided that the reformists were incapable of implementing this strategy. To begin with, they believed, it was almost impossible for democratic forces

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1Interviews, Brown and Lovestone.

2Interview, Brown.

3Ibid.
to gain control of a Communist-dominated organization. The French CGT was not an exception to this rule. True, the Americans believed the environment was suitable for a non-Communist resurgence in that "the vast percentage of the workers of France are anti-Communist or non-Communist"¹ and their dissatisfactions partially, at least, lent themselves to dynamic non-Communist representation. The AFL leaders, however, were not convinced that reformist leadership had the skill, drive or financial means to topple the Communist Party's "apparat." As Brown reported in April, 1946, the reformist leaders were not providing the non-Communist militants with clear central direction or a unifying program. Indeed, the workers were confused, Brown said, by the reformists' acceptance of "unity" with the Communists and by Communist participation in the government, and thus they were unable to take sides in the internal power struggle. Moreover, although the workers were disgruntled with the failure of the Communist leadership to press their economic demands, the reformists failed to provide a unifying dynamic program "to channelize dissatisfaction into constructive, progressive leadership."²

Boycotting Communists and Building an International Free Trade Union Movement

The second group of non-Communist labor organizations opted for autonomy. They either refused to become associated with


²Brown, Report on the CGT Convention, April, 1946, pp. 5-6.
organizations which admitted Communists or Communist-controlled unions or, if they were already participating in Communist-controlled organizations, they waited for a suitable opportunity to withdraw from them. The dominant faction in the ITS was one of the most important groupings that pursued this policy. Under the leadership of the ITF's General Secretary, J. H. Oldenbroek, the Secretariats feared that incorporation into the WFTU's Trade Departments would lead to the demise of the trade secretariats as international labor organizations.\(^1\) Moreover, there was a growing awareness within the Secretariats that the WFTU was Soviet-controlled. Incorporating the Secretariats into the WFTU's Trades Departments would thus increase Soviet control over key sectors such as transportation and coal mining. Finally, Oldenbroek believed autonomous Secretariats might provide the nucleus for a new non-Communist international labor organization.\(^2\) Indeed, in a confidential report, Brown wrote, "The International Trade Secretariats should be regarded as a major organizational instrument for the AFL to advance the cause of Free Trade Unionism, combat the WFTU and create the base of a future International Trade Union Federation."\(^3\)

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\(^1\)For a detailed explanation of the ITS and analysis of their relations and negotiations with the WFTU, see Windmuller, pp. 96-117; Joseph L. Harmon, The Public Services International, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., 1962, pp. 92-106; Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Miners' International Federation Congress, 1947.

\(^2\)Brown to Woll, December 23, 1946.

To remain autonomous, the leaders of the Secretariats had to command the support of their national affiliates. Many of these affiliates, however, were either Communist-controlled (e.g., the Italian transport workers) or they were joined to non-Communist national centers that were already participating in the WFTU (e.g., the British Transport and General Workers Unions affiliated with the TUC). Needless to say, in the early post-war years, the non-Communist WFTU affiliates and the Communists were interested in bringing the Secretariats into the WFTU. If these national centers and their unions could convince the smaller ITS affiliates that the Secretariats should be incorporated into the WFTU, the Secretariats would no longer remain autonomous.

To prevent this, leaders of the Secretariats and the AFL believed that American unions, which on the whole were not affiliated with the ITS, should join and take an active role in the politics of the Secretariats. The key Secretariat, the AFL leaders knew, was the ITF; the ITF had been, even before World War II, the strongest in terms of size, solidarity, and geographic distribution of its membership. The transport workers had been among the first to organize. Their work had brought various national groupings together in ports and international railroad crossings. They soon learned of each others' working conditions and believed that unless they cooperated, employers would play off the workers of one country against those of another.

The ITF had also been welded into a strong organization as a result of the dynamism of its first leader, Edo Fimmen. Fimmen, a Dutch socialist, had travelled throughout the world organizing the ITF and at the same time, attempting to prevent Commintern infiltration of the transport industry.¹ During the course of his work both he and his

¹See, for example, Valtin, p. 744.
young assistant, J. H. Oldenbroek, became acquainted with many of the world's labor leaders. When Fimmen died, Oldenbroek immediately stepped into his shoes as leader of the ITF.

The ITF was also one of the few Secretariats that had functioned throughout the war and the immediate post-war period. Indeed, it was one of the few Secretariats that was running smoothly when the question of affiliation with the WFTU was raised. In all probability if the ITF reversed its position, the AFL believed the other Secretariats would follow suit. If, on the other hand, the voice of the American transport workers could sustain Oldenbroek's policy, the ITF and the other Secretariats would probably remain autonomous. ¹

Boycotting Communists and Building Free Trade Unions in France

Within France the militants opposed to working with the Communists included many disparate elements. Some had been members of the CGT until World War II, and after the war had either been purged or had withdrawn from the organization. Others temporarily remained in the CGT but waited for a suitable opportunity to split the organization. There were also groups of anarcho-syndicalists, Trotskyists and Catholic trade unionists. Although the AFL was aware of these numerous tendencies, attention was focused primarily on two main groupings, Catholic trade unionists and non-Catholic unionists who had been, or continued to be, members of the CGT but wanted to build a new non-Communist union structure.

The non-Catholics were convinced that it was impossible to regain control of the CGT or to prevent the organization being used

¹See, for example, Lovestone to Dubinsky, July 8, 1946.
by the Communist Party. Some of them had been "purged" by the Communists. Others had lost their elected posts to Communists. Whatever their background, they believed the CGT as an organization would remain in Communist hands. Indeed, in April, 1946, Brown reported that "the opinion is gaining ground, which I am beginning to share, that the CGT as an organization cannot be reformed since its Stalinite nature makes it impervious to democratic change."  

This group also believed that unity and cooperation with the Communists would not necessarily increase the strength of the French labor movement or improve the lot of the French workers. Instead, as the AFL tended to believe, the interests of the French workers would be subjugated to the interest of the Communist Party. This view was reinforced by the refusal of the Communists, when they were members of the government, to sanction any major strikes. Indeed, from late 1945 until early 1947, Maurice Thorez and the Communist Party, far from attempting to bring about a major redistribution of income and taking other measures to improve the conditions of French workers, appealed to the workers for greater production, not increased remuneration. The ensuing wildcat strikes and the declining strength of the CGT in social security elections and membership, also helped convince many non-Communists that cooperation with the Communists was not in the economic interest of the French workers.  

Finally, the French Communists' sudden shift in

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1Brown, Report on the CGT Convention, April, 1946.

2These tactics caused considerable dissension within the CGT and the Communist Party, see Auguste Lecoeur, Le Partisan (Paris, 1963), pp. 213-222.

policy in the spring and summer of 1947 also convinced many that the CGT and the Communist Party were not operating in the interests of the French workers. The French Communists were apparently following the Soviet decision to oppose the Marshall Plan and to actively attempt to prevent the reconstruction of the European economies. In the late spring of 1947, the French Communists switched from exhorting the workers to sacrifice themselves in the interests of increased production, to demanding immediate and large inflationary wage increases and in the fall of 1947, they organized a general strike.¹

The belief that the CGT would remain Communist-controlled and that cooperation with the Communists would not necessarily benefit French workers led many non-Communist labor leaders, as well as the AFL, to the conclusion that a new union structure had to be created. Many militants, however, refused to actually leave the CGT until an auspicious moment arose. They knew they would be abandoning the moral and material assets of the organization. To reduce this disadvantage and to secure the largest possible following, these militants wanted to bring Jouhaux and the old reformist leaders along with them. If Jouhaux and the other leaders refused to leave the organization, this would leave many workers bewildered and uncertain and thus jeopardize the future of the incipient new union structure.

A New Union Structure?

Just how a new union structure was to be erected was far from clear. Indeed, the AFL, particularly in the early post-war years,

¹For a detailed analysis of Communist choices at this time, see Rieber, Stalin and the French Communist Party.
was not at all certain that a new organization could successfully compete with the well-entrenched CGT. \(^1\) Nevertheless, the Americans tended to believe the environment was not unsuitable for these efforts. As has been pointed out, the AFL was convinced most French workers were not Communists and, indeed, given a suitable opportunity, they would opt for representation by non-Communist unions. Moreover, the CGT, particularly in the early post-war years, did not appear to be fighting for the economic interests of its members. The ensuing economic grievances would provide a unifying program for a rival union structure. As Brown wrote in March, 1946, "I do not claim there is any certainty about what can be done nor do I deny that the Communists have and will continue to have control of the CGT. But no one can deny that there is a movement and a restlessness that can be utilized in the ranks. There is a fundamental desire to re-establish free trade unionism. There are groups all over France ready to act and be galvanized into a force for free trade unionism." \(^2\) The problem, as the AFL saw it, was how to "galvanize" the natural sympathies and the discontent of the workers.

As early as the spring of 1946, Brown reported that a strong nucleus of organizers existed throughout France. At the April CGT convention, he reported he met with practically every important opposition delegate and noted that the "ranks are beginning to produce new and qualified leaders." \(^3\) Although these emerging leaders were

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\(^1\) Lovestone in March, 1946 told Brown, for example, that the AFL leadership tended to believe "that the situation is lost and that anything put into the proposition in France today is a hopeless waste because the Communists have the thing sewed up." Lovestone to Brown, March 14, 1946.

\(^2\) Brown to Woll, March 14, 1946.
scattered throughout various economic sectors and geographic areas. Brown believed the leadership in three key sectors were especially important and promising.

As early as late 1945, the incipient non-Communist leadership of the PTT came to fore at the Communist-dominated PTT Congress at Limoges. In early 1946, the non-Communist leaders organized a "grèves de cotisations," a strike on dues paying to the national federation. In mid-summer, they organized one of the first major successful strikes since the liberation under the leadership of a three-man strike committee headed by a leading "resistant," Camille Mourguès. The strike was strongly supported by communication workers in Lille, Limoges, Bordeaux, and Clermont-Ferrand in spite of opposition of the union's Communist leadership. In October, a "Comité d' Action Syndicaliste des PTT" was formed. (This group carried the membership cards of Force Ouvrière with a special PTT stamp costing each member 1 franc per month.) Finally, in July, 1947, the Committee officially became an autonomous 15,000 Force Ouvrière organization under the leadership of Mourguès.¹

Another important sector was the mines. As early as December, 1945, Brown had visited the Northern mining regions. He met with the well-respected miners' leader "Père" Mailley and Secretary of Nord's Union Departmentale (UD),² Jules Carpentier. They introduced

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¹Brown, Report to the International Labor Relations Committee, November 11, 1947, p. 3.

²French trade unions have a horizontal as well as a vertical structure:

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him to numerous members of CGT who believed it was impossible to prevent the Communists from maintaining their hold over the CGT. Indeed, these miners, under the leadership of Mailley and Carpentier, by indicating that they intended to secede from the CGT, played a crucial role in forcing Jouhaux and the other non-Communist CGT leaders to formally lead the split of the CGT.  

Among the railroad workers, a clear cut de facto split developed in 1946 and early 1947. In 1946, the employees of Wagons Lits were the first to break away from the Communist-controlled railroad unions. Then, in mid-1947, other railroad workers under socialist leadership followed the PTT example and created a Comité d'Action Syndicaliste des Cheminots. A few months later, this organization and the autonomous Wagons Lits organization joined together to become an 8,000 member Fédération Syndicaliste des Cheminots, under the leadership of André Laffont. Brown's reports from late 1946 till late 1947 contained numerous references to these developments.


1George Lefranc, Les Experiences Syndicales en France de 1939 à 1950, p. 191. In an interview, Antoine Laval, the present Secretary of the F.O. Metalworkers Federation, maintained that the point of view expressed by Carpentier and the other miners must have weighed heavily on Jouhaux. The miners traditionally had been one of the staunchest supports of the CGT. It must have been difficult for Jouhaux to have considered remaining in the CGT if a key federation like the miners seceded.

2Brown, Report to the International Labor Relations Committee, November 11, 1947, p. 3.
The AFL realized, however that the leadership of these and other non-Communist splinter groups by themselves would probably not be able to successfully challenge the CGT's control over the labor movement. They were aware, first, that there was no central direction or unity on the part of the movement opposing Communist domination. In June, 1947, for example, Brown noted the growing likelihood of Lafont's split and the activities of the anarchô-syndicalists and the Trotskyists, but maintained that "The great weakness of the whole opposition movement is their disunity while the Communist Party, in spite of all reports about internal dissention, continues to act as a solid bloc." The opposition leaders, in other words, had organized small nuclei of non-Communist groups. To break the Communist Party's control of the labor movement, however, they needed central organization and coordination.

Another major problem, AFL leaders knew, was securing and holding the support of militant non-Communist trade unionists. Although, as Brown reported, there were strong nuclei of non-Communist leaders and most workers were non-Communist, there clearly was not a large number of local organizers interested in and capable of securing the support of workers in the local shops, factories, mines and docks. The AFL believed several factors accounted for the reluctance or inability of potentially militant local leaders to engage in organizational activity.

One was the "myth of unity." Many potential militants and workers feared that weakening the CGT would lead to chaos and the inability of organized labor to further the economic, social and political

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1 Brown to Lovestone, June 18, 1947.
interests of the workers. Unless these militants believed that a new union structure could effectively represent their interests, they would be reluctant to leave the traditional and established organization.

Another problem was morale. In France, this problem had two facets. One sprang from what AFL leaders considered to be a self-fulfilling prophesy, the fear that the Communist Party would come to power within a few years. Many non-Communist militants and workers were reluctant to oppose the Communists openly, not only because they feared immediate economic or physical terror, but because they believed either Russian or local Communists would soon control the French government and anyone who had openly opposed the Party would be subject to drastic sanctions. ¹ The second facet of the problem was the "loneliness" of anti-Communist militants. The Communists (till 1947 at least) had been embraced by the French government and the old, well-respected non-Communist trade union leadership. A militant opposing the general trend was subject to informal local pressure from skeptical non-Communists as well as Communists. Indeed, AFL leaders knew that, to be effective in the long run, the men who daily bore the brunt of the Communist propaganda barrage and organizational offensive would have to receive moral support and encouragement. ²

¹Interviews, Brown and Lovestone.

²For examples of the AFL's awareness of this problem, see Irving Brown's reports and speeches, specifically his "Report to the International Labor Relations Committee," November 11, 1947, p. 1 and his speech to the 1947 AFL Convention, Proceedings, 1947, p. 374.
It was difficult, however, to see how this could be done. The respected national non-Communist leadership, on the whole, did not support trade union organization outside the CGT structure. Who could provide the militants with central coordination? Who could provide them with the national and international news and analysis to counter the arguments of the Communist militants? Even if the new non-Communist leadership could obtain this information and degree of coordination, how would they communicate with their cadres on the local level? The trade union press was predominantly under CGT control, and the non-Communist leaders did not have financial resources to bring the cadres together for coordination and moral support. Central coordination and moral support, however, was essential.

Although AFL leaders did not make a systematic study of the financial requirements of a new French organization,\(^1\) they quickly realized that money or its absence was the third major problem jeopardizing the future success of the non-Communists. (French trade unions, traditionally, have had enormous difficulties financing their activities. Unlike their American and British counterparts, French workers historically have been reluctant to pay union dues.\(^2\)) In practice, this has meant external sources of support from one source or another). Prior to the creation of a new organization, AFL leaders knew that the minority faction in the CGT and those in the autonomes would not be able to secure financial support for their activities. The Communists and the majority faction largely controlled the meager CGT funds and workers could hardly be expected to be generous, given the economic conditions and the distribution of incomes in post-war France.

\(^1\)Examination of the Free Trade Union Committee's archives and interviews with Brown and Lovestone.

The AFL hoped, however, that after the new union structure was created and functioning smoothly, it would be able to finance much of its own activities. AFL leaders knew, for example, that, traditionally, local governments directly subsidized "union Locales" by providing them with office space in the Bourse de Travail or its equivalent. Furthermore, once a union was recognized as a bargaining agent, French law required the employers of more than ten workers to pay shop stewards for several hours a week of their time spent adjudicating grievances. If these hours were aggregated, the activities of a small number of full-time militants could be financed. Finally, unions in the public sector of the French economy, (e.g., communications, mines and railroads) expected to receive indirect subsides that would enable them to finance the more comprehensive activities of their organizers. In some public sectors, the state actually paid trade union functionaries. In other sectors, by ignoring regulations, (e.g., regulations limiting the number of days a worker can be absent from his post without loss of pay) the state indirectly financed some of the new union's activities. Nevertheless, even after the recognition of the new union structure, there would still be major financial difficulties inherent in running the large national federations, unions departementales, training schools, and international activities.

1Lorwin, pp. 153-154.

2Ibid., pp. 258-259.

3Interview, Brown. These indirect subsidies accrued to all unions in the public sector.
Although local employers, either indirectly, as a result of French law, or directly, through subsidies, had been providing limited financial support to local trade unions in France for years, the AFL believed it was neither feasible nor desirable to obtain funds from this source. To begin with, many employers were unwilling to finance the activities of the new leadership. Although a few local groups or individual employers were interested in reducing the CGT's power, the "Patronat" refused to engage in actions directly opposed to the CGT. Although there is no supporting documentation in the AFL archives, Brown maintains that Patronat officials, like some non-Communist CGT officials, feared that if the Communists came to power, they would be compromised. Hence, they preferred to hedge their bets and refused to commit themselves.1 Furthermore, the AFL was aware that if the new unions were successfully smeared with an employer or Patronat label, they would have a much more difficult time securing the support of militants and workers. Thus, it did not appear that the employers would be a useful source of funds.

Socialist politicians were able to aid the new leadership indirectly by supporting them in local governments throughout the country, in Parliamentary legal debates and in the administration of the Ministries they controlled.2 The latter was extremely important, especially in the

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1Interview, Brown. Possibly, some employers also feared that new unions, to be competitive with their rivals, would compete in demanding higher wages.

2Daniel Mayer was Minister of Labor and Jules Moch was Minister of the Interior in 1947 and 1948. The Ministry of Labor in 1948, ruled that 40 million francs (about $114,000) owed to French labor as a result of Vichyite labor policies, should be given to the new CGT-FO. See FO Congrès Constitutif 1948 Compte Rendu, pp. 16-17, 126-27.
public sectors of the economy administered by Socialist politicians. However, the Socialists, the AFL knew, did not have the resources to finance trade union activities. Although Lovestone hoped the Socialists would become involved with trade union organization, he and other AFL leaders knew that the Socialists themselves needed financial assistance. Indeed, since World War II, the Jewish Labor Committee and the ILGWU had sent money to the French Socialists for various purposes. Furthermore, even if the Socialists had been in a position to aid the unions, the new organization's leadership could scarcely have relied on the financial support of a political party when one of its central tenets was removal of another political party's influence from the trade union movement. Moreover, by closely allying themselves with the Socialists, the new leadership would have jeopardized the support of a large number of anarcho-syndicalistes, Trotskyists, and other independent trade unionists.

The French government also demonstrated a reluctance to finance the activities of the anti-Communist leadership. Apart from the undesirable political repercussions of receiving government money, the AFL knew the French government for various reasons of its own would not, with the aforementioned exception of 40 million francs, finance the new organization.

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1Lovestone to Leon Denenberg, July 9, 1946; Lovestone to Dubinsky, July 5, 1946.


3Interview, Brown.
The remaining sources of potential financial support were all foreign. The AFL believed national and international groupings might be persuaded to provide the emerging organization with badly needed funds. Various sectors which traditionally had demonstrated international solidarity (e.g., the transport workers, miners and metal-workers) appeared to be potential donors.\footnote{At the beginning of January, 1948, for example, the ITF sent a delegation to France which concluded that the chances of F.O.'s success "would be considerably enhanced if it were possible to supply the new unions with some office equipment, more particularly typewriters and paper," ITF, "Report on Trade Union Situation in France," February 4, 1948} This source, although suffering the minor disadvantage of being foreign, nevertheless would be far more desirable from the political point of view than French industry or the French government. The AFL soon realised, however, that the other European unions were either unwilling or unable (because of their own domestic problems) to provide the large sums that were needed.\footnote{From 1947-1950, various trade secretariats and national federations or confederations in Europe made small contributions to the new organization. The AFL did not believe that these sums were anywhere near enough to ensure the viability of the new organization. Interviews, Brown and Lovestone.}

In effect, this left only the American unions and the American government as potential donors. The AFL foreign policy leaders knew they had limited funds at this disposal given their interest in developments in a number of countries and given
the apathy of the majority of the other national AFL leaders. As was previously mentioned, it does not appear as if a careful estimate of the AFL's foreign policy needs or resources was ever made. The AFL leaders simply perceived they had and would be able to obtain limited resources that could be of enormous strategic importance at a time when the new organization's leadership in France was impoverished. As early as March, 1946, Brown wrote to Woll about the potential of the new leadership. He concluded:

We can be a great force for Democracy. There are all sorts of people in France and in our embassy who look to us as a source of aid and comfort for the democratic forces ... We cannot let down hundreds of people all over the CGT and France who with a little aid at this time (and not later) can become prepared for the future showdown fight.¹

AFL leaders, in other words, believed they could make a major contribution to the future of the new organization. Just how much assistance this would require was never clearly ascertained. Nor did the AFL policymakers ascertain how much the AFL would be willing to donate.

Prior to the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the American government, AFL leaders believed, demonstrated little understanding of the enormous importance of the trade union situation in France. Although a few State and Defense Department officials shared some of the AFL's perceptions, Washington, as a whole was not encouraging.² With the onset of the Soviet offensive against the

¹Brown to Woll, March 14, 1946.

²Brown's reference to "people in our embassy" in the quote from his letter to Woll referred primarily to Ambassador Jefferson Caffrey and Labor Attaché Richard Eldridge.
Marshall Plan in late 1947, however, the American government became increasingly interested in the trade union situation in France and other countries. American officials realized that their plans could very well be derailed if the Soviets used organized labor to disrupt the Marshall Plan and Atlantic defense arrangements. Moreover, if it appeared that masses of European workers were opposed to the American initiative and aid, isolationist or opportunist politicians in Washington would have a strong argument to buttress their opposition to involvement in European affairs.

From the political standpoint, of course, American government financial support was not desirable. On the other hand, alternative sources of supplementary funds were not available. Moreover, the American government was already aiding French business and other sectors through the Marshall Plan. Thus, the AFL believed that if Washington really understood the trade union situation and knew how to aid the new union structure, the American government could become an important source of financial support.

From the preceding analysis, it is clear that the AFL was far from certain that the militants opposed to working within the CGT structure would be able to prevent the Communists from dominating the French labor movement. The AFL was more certain that, in the absence of increased unity and central coordination, additional morale support and external sources of material assistance, the chances of success of the non-Communist leaders would be greatly reduced.

Christian Trade Unions in France

The Catholic trade unions, organized in the CFTC, were another non-Communist grouping that refused to work within the CGT
structure. The AFL knew that shortly after the liberation the Catholics had rejected the CGT's blandishments and had built up an independent organization of considerable size and strength in various economic sectors and geographic regions in France. ¹

For two reasons, however, the Americans did not believe the French Catholics, in the long run, could succeed in wresting control of the labor movement from the Communists. First, they were denomi-
national. This meant that they could attract support in areas where the Church was strong (e.g., in the Northeast coal and steel communi-
ties), but they would alienate non-Christian workers and militants in other areas (e.g., the Socialist Nord and Pas de Calais Departments and in Southern France). Indeed, Brown believed that many French workers and militants were anti-Christian and that the CFTC as an independent organization would be unable to challenge the power of non-Christian unions. ² Furthermore, to many AFL leaders, the CFTC appeared to be a dual union and the AFL, particularly in the early post-
war years, was hardly well-disposed toward dual unions. ³

¹For an analysis of CFTC policy during these years, see Gérard Adam, La C. F. T. C., 1940-1958 (Paris: 1964), especially pp. 41-92.

²Interview, Brown.

³Indeed, Irving Bluestein, the first secretary of the Free Trade Union Committee maintains that in late 1945 and early 1946, the AFL leaders were opposed to the CFTC primarily because they consid-
ered it a dual union. Given the struggle between the AFL and the CIO at the time, he points out, the AFL could hardly have been friendly to the CFTC. Interview, Bluestein.
Second, the AFL believed that the Christian leadership, by adopting a strategy of competing with the Communists in their radical economic demands would sooner or later undermine non-Communist trade union forces. Some AFL leaders believed the Catholic economic demagoguery and competition with the Communists was sheer opportunism. Others maintained the CFTC's stress on economic demands was attributable to the Catholic belief in the theory of "stomach Communism." Whatever the origin or motivation of the Christians, the AFL leadership was united in its opposition to the tactics. The AFL believed that this approach would tend to undermine the economy and sooner or later would lead to united action and even united fronts with the Communists.\(^1\)

Finally, the AFL believed the Christians would find it easier than the new non-Christian leadership to remain in existence without external coordination, morale support and material assistance. First, the CFTC already was recognized as a trade union organization. As was previously mentioned, once a trade union structure was recognized, it received various material subsidies. Second, the AFL (and others) believed the CFTC received financial and morale support from the Catholic Church. Although most of this aid was given in areas where the Church was strong, it was extremely important in blighted post-war France.\(^2\) Third, the AFL believed the force of the Church and

\(^1\)Interview, Brown, Lovestone, Meany and Dubinsky.

\(^2\)The AFL and French Communist and non-Communist trade unionists calculated that CFTC could not possibly afford to pay the large number or organizers on its staff from dues alone. Interviews with AFL staff and Communist and non-Communist trade unionists in Lens, Nantes, Marseilles, Metz, and Paris.
the Christian religion provided the CFTC leaders and militants with an important unifying force. Although there would continue to be major policy and personal conflicts within the organization, the Christians would not suffer from the bitter conflicts that often paralyzed the non-Christians such as the anarcho-syndicalists, Trotskyists, and Socialists. Christianity, the AFL perceived, was an ideology that in some ways could function as a Marxist substitute for large numbers of French workers.

Fourth, the Christians to some extent were organized internationally. Representatives from Catholic unions in six countries participated in the Christian International. ¹ The AFL believed that the International would furnish the French with morale support and political standing that the new non-Communist leadership, acting alone, would not share. The Americans were convinced, however, that the small denominational international acting alone could never compete with the WFTU and the support it gave to the Communist cause in France. ²

Possibly, the Christians might be brought together with other non-Communist trade unionists in France and in other countries. If the strength and solidarity of the Christians was fused with the other non-Communist strains, the disadvantages of a purely Christian trade union and Christian international would be considerably reduced. In fact, as most European workers were either Christians or Socialists, a unified organization, AFL leaders believed, would probably be appealing throughout non-Communist Europe. A merger of Christian and Socialist militants and material resources would also add a dimension of strength to the non-Communist trade unions forces. The major problem, as the

¹See Adam, pp. 117-119.
²Interviews, Brown and Lovestone
AFL saw it, was how to bring about such a fusion.\textsuperscript{1}

The perceptions outlined in this chapter set the stage for the final determination of the Federation's policy choice. The AFL leaders believed that there were sizeable non-Communist organizations and elements within Communist-dominated organizations which were struggling to avoid Communist control. The groups and organizations that favored working within organizations controlled by the Communists, the AFL leaders concluded, would be unable to prevent the Russians using organized labor for their political purposes. Instead, the AFL leaders came to believe that if the non-Communists who favored boycotting the Communists and building free international and French labor organizations received moral and material support, they might be able to prevent the Russians from consolidating their hold on the French labor and the international labor movement.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.
Chapter VI

AFL FOREIGN POLICY

A major contention of this dissertation is that a non-governmental organization in one country can influence political developments in other countries. In this chapter, AFL policy in the international labor movement and in France will be described. As will be shown, the AFL through a variety of channels provided moral and material support for non-Communists who were resisting the blandishments and pressures of Communist-dominated labor organizations. First, the AFL's attempts to demonstrate that resistance was necessary and that the Europeans were not alone in their efforts to prevent Communist domination will be described. Second, attention will be focused on the AFL's efforts to provide organizational leadership in France and in the international labor movement. Finally, the chapter will focus on the major steps the AFL leaders took to materially aid the non-Communists who wanted to build independent unions. In the next chapter, an evaluation of the effectiveness of this policy will be undertaken to assess the nature and modes of the AFL's influence from 1945-52.
AFL Policy Choices

The first policy choice open to the Federation was disengagement from world affairs. Shortly after World War I, the Federation had adopted this policy and after World War II, as was pointed out, several powerful labor leaders favored the pursuit of a similar course of action. Continuous involvement, they felt, would require the diversion of large sums of money to international affairs.

Green, Meany, Woll, Dubinsky, and Harrison, however, believed that disengagement would not lead to the attainment of their goal values. The AFL had been mobilized to prevent the Nazis from securing control of Europe. The Federation's leaders, given their perspectives, could not sit by and watch another totalitarian power establish its hegemony over the continent.

Given their perception of Soviet goals, strategy, and growing control of the international and French labor movements, AFL leaders believed the key European nations acting alone would remain
politically and economically unstable. Ultimately, they would be unable to resist Soviet takeover. This would force the United States to intervene militarily or ultimately face what the AFL believed would be preponderant Soviet power.

To avoid this dilemma, AFL leaders believed strong non-Communist European unions were necessary. Strong non-Communist unions would ensure decent economic and social conditions for European workers. This was not only just, but would reduce unfair European economic competition with well-paid Americans. Moreover, the AFL leaders believed that the improvement of economic and social conditions of European workers would decrease the appeals of Communism in Europe.

As was pointed out, all the AFL leaders to some extent believed in the "stomach theory" of Communism. Brown and Lovestone, however, believed that other factors such as the activities of skilled Communist trade union organizers were perhaps more significant in explaining the "appeals" of Communism. Communist organizers, for example, were able to sustain Communist voting strength by explaining the "good times" and "bad times" in terms of the crises of Capitalism and the strength of the proletariat. The good times, they would point out, resulted from the pressures of the workers and the Communist Party; the "bad times," from the inherent contradictions of Capitalism and its exploitation of the workers. ¹

¹Richard Hamilton also comes to a similar conclusion. Communist voting strength in post-war France, he points out, has remained stable in spite of the growing affluence of French workers. This can be explained, he suggests, by the activities of Communist trade union organizers who provide French workers with their political perspectives or "frames of reference." Richard F. Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic, (Princeton, N.J.: 1967), passim.
Strong non-Communist unions, Brown and Lovestone believed, would not only reduce the appeals of Communism by improving the economic and social conditions of the European workers, but they would also reduce the effectiveness of Communist cadres and propaganda.\footnote{Interviews, Brown and Lovestone.} Finally, AFL leaders believed strong non-Communist unions would also prevent the labor movement being used to support other Soviet political and military objectives.

Early in the post-war period, the AFL rejected the strategy of attempting to gain control of the Communist-dominated organizations or even of organizations in which Communists participated. The AFL leaders believed the Communists only cooperated with non-Communists to increase their strength at the expense of the non-Communists and that they joined strategic non-Communist organizations so that they could use the organization for Party purposes.

Communists, the American labor leaders believed, were able to gain control of non-Communist organizations by using a variety of covert and overt techniques. First, they unscrupulously used terror and intimidation. Recalcitrant workers in the mines and ports were physically intimidated, and employers were blackmailed. The AFL leaders also held the view that at the end of the war the Communists financed their activities with Soviet funds and with money stolen from banks and other institutions, and in addition, they had the advantage of superior organization and central direction. The disunited democratic elements were almost helpless in the face of skilled, well-organized and centrally directed Communist cadre. The AFL leaders were
convinced that Communist elements sooner or later would gain control of key positions in almost every labor organization in which they participated and once they secured these posts, it was almost impossible to unseat them.

Finally, the AFL rejected the strategy of working together with Communists, because this would tend to confuse non-Communist workers. At the end of the war, the American trade unionists believed many workers saw little reason to oppose the Communists. The Soviets and French Communists, as participants in the World War II victory, enjoyed enormous prestige. British and French trade unionists were encouraging cooperation with the Communists in the WFTU and other international organizations. The AFL leaders reasoned that if trade union leaders accepted and cooperated with the Communists, the workers, confused, would see little reason not to accept, elect and appoint Communists to positions of power.

The British TUC and the reformist CGT leaders believed that the non-Communists, by working together with the Soviets and French Communists, etc., would strengthen the labor movement and that the non-Communists would be able to prevent the Soviets from using organized labor for their political and military purposes. The AFL rejected this line of reasoning. The Americans believed the integration of the ITS into the WFTU's Trade Departments and the strengthening of the non-Communist militants in the CGT would not prevent the Communists from maintaining their control over these organizations. Indeed, this strategy, they believed, would confuse non-Communists, strengthen Communist control, and ultimately lead to war or Soviet domination.
The remaining AFL alternative was first to weaken or at least prevent the Communist-controlled organizations from increasing and using their strength. The second element of this choice was to strengthen national non-Communist organizations, encourage the creation of new non-Communist centers and integrate all these organizations into a strong non-Communist international.

Even before the end of the war, the AFL leaders had favored this strategy. The AFL leaders, concerned about rebuilding "democratic" unions in the face of what they considered to be an implacable foe—the Russians and local communist parties, believed that they would have to remain heavily involved in European as well as Asian and Latin American politics. At a time when most senior U.S. government officials believed that the U.S. would no longer have to be concerned with world-wide disruptive powers, and that major conflicts would be resolved by the cooperation of the major powers in the United Nations, the AFL believed it was necessary to create a million dollar "Free Trade Union Fund" and "Free Trade Union Committee" to fight the Russians and rebuild "democratic" trade unions. Moreover, they believed they would have to "educate"
American officials about what they, the AFL leaders, believed were the realities of Russian imperialism and the inability of the U.S. to prevent war or preponderant Russian power if nothing was done to help "democratic" trade union forces, particularly in Europe.

The specifics of AFL policy evolved slowly in the early post-war period. The AFL leaders were not sure that even if they could provide non-communist European labor leaders with suitable encouragement, organization and material resources, the non-communists could impede or prevent organized labor being used to support Russian objectives.

By the late spring of 1946, however, the AFL policy in France had begun to take shape. The FTUC in the U.S. concluded that Brown was correct and that Jouhaux would not be able to regain control of the CGT. In March Brown had implored the AFL leaders to make a decisive commitment to aid the non-communists in their struggle to create free trade unions. In a letter to Woll he wrote:
I do not claim there is any certainty about what can be done nor do I deny that the Communists have and will continue to control the CGT. But no one can deny that there is movement and restlessness that can be utilized in the ranks. There is a fundamental desire to re-establish trade unionism. There are coming events that will dramatize the great struggle that lies just beneath the surface. If and when the open fight comes or the split (which everyone mentions and looks forward to in the CGT) there will be more chance of success and victory if at the present the opposition forces are well constituted, organized and a cohesive force. There is little value in merely writing about this situation and not being able to help.¹

Brown went on to state that he saw little value in his remaining in France if he could not provide material assistance to the non-Communists. In a scribbled note on a carbon copy of his March 14 letter to Woll, he told Lovestone that he needed $100,000 but that he could make do with $10,000 to prepare for the April CGT convention. If he did not receive this support, he said he was "thinking seriously of resigning."

By June, however, it appears as if a decision had been made. The minutes of the FTUC meeting of June 5, 1946 state first:

It was decided to cable Brother Brown that his budget is acceptable as sound in principle and that it will be supported provided definite arrangements are made that the American support be accompanied by broad material support from French labor itself."²

¹Brown to Woll, March 14, 1946.
²Minutes of the FTUC, June 5, 1946.
After recording the Committee's decisions on policy with respect to Germany, Spain, and the U. N. Economic and Social Council, the Minutes concluded with a report on "Brown's Status."

... It was further decided to inform Brother Brown that we looked on his work with satisfaction and desire his resuming the same in Europe after his report (at the AFL Convention) here. 1

Thus, by the summer of 1946, it appears as if the policy first advocated by Brown in the early spring of 1946 had been adopted by the FTUC. 2 It was not clear, however, just how much moral and material assistance the AFL would provide the non-Communists attempting to create new trade union structures.

Moral and Psychological Support

One of the major concerns of the AFL was bolstering the morale of European anti-Communist trade unionists and particularly encouraging them not to accept the "myth of unity." In the honeymoon period, the latter was an especially difficult task. The former became increasingly difficult in 1947 and 1948, as it appeared the Communists would take power and those that opposed them would later suffer drastic sanctions.

To encourage resistance to the Communists, the AFL engaged in a number of activities. Continuous streams of policy resolutions and statements were issued. 3

1Ibid.
2Brown in an interview also maintained that by mid 1946, the FTUC had decided to support this option.
At the 1946 Convention, for example, the AFL unanimously adopted a Special Report on Communism prepared by the Committee on Resolutions. The Report stated:

It is not Communist theory or deviation from it by those controlling the Russian people which concerns us. Whatever may be the effect of the Communist dictatorship on the people of Russia and their opportunities to expand free institutions and advance their own standards of living, is their problem and not ours.

What does concern us and concern us vitally is the efforts of Moscow to actively and systematically interfere in the internal affairs of Americans; their form of government, and their institutions and internationally to use the Communist dictators' influence to prevent the development and expansion of free institutions in other countries. . . 1

The Federation also stressed the tyrannical nature of Communism and the fate that befell workers under Communist domination. In the introduction to a pamphlet describing the fate of trade unions that fell under Communist domination in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Woll pointed out:

... it is no accident that reactionaries of every ilk, that despots of every hue and stripe, that totalitarian movements of every brand have singled out the basic organization of labor—the free trade unions—as their first target. To capture and control or to dissolve and destroy the trade unions is the first aim of all totalitarian tyranny . . . 2

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1*Proceedings, 1946*, p. 554.

The AFL also pointed out that the Russians had established a system of forced labor in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 1949, the Federation published a book which included the affidavits of former inmates of Soviet labor camps and descriptions of Soviet attempts to extend the forced labor system to Eastern Europe. The volume documented the AFL's campaign against forced labor—a campaign which eventually resulted in a decision by the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council to adopt the AFL's proposal to conduct an international survey of forced labor and measures for its abolition.¹

The AFL also continued to explain its refusal to become associated with the WFTU and analyzed the dangers of Communist infiltration and control of trade unions in Western European and other countries. At the 1947 Convention, the delegates approved the Executive Council report stating:

It is only natural that the AFL, as the strongest body of free trade unions in the world should come into head-on collision with the WFTU. Everything that has happened since this caricature of a world federation of unions was set up has confirmed our evaluation of it as a camouflaged and delicately controlled instrument of Soviet imperialist interests and foreign policy. It has dismally failed to defend the interests of workers on the economic field. As an international body it has thrown its weight behind government coordinated unions in Czechoslovakia and has put the stamp of approval on the so-called trade unions in all the other Russian satellite countries . . .

¹Slave Labor in Russia, the Case Presented by the American Federation of Labor to the United Nations, 1949.
A growing uneasy feeling now pervades the ranks of the WFTU affiliates west of the Iron Curtain. The rank and file is realizing more and more that there is something fundamentally wrong with an international trade union organization which dare not even discuss the problem of reconstruction, let alone try to help the rebuilding of war-wrecked economies and to foster the protection and promotion of the rights, liberties, and interests of the working people. In fact, many affiliates of the WFTU are now part of the Russian Fifth Column which is frantically seeking to sabotage post-war reconstruction and doom the toiling people to poverty, misery and chaos.¹

The AFL also supported the Marshall Plan. To prevent the Soviets from using organized labor to obstruct the Plan, the AFL organized trade union support for the ERP. The 1947 Convention endorsed the idea of the AFL "taking the initiative in calling a conference of the free trade union organizations in all the cooperating countries."² The AFL proposed (prior to the American government's decision to create NATO) the establishment of a military commitment to Europe.

We believe that economic recovery within Europe must be buttressed by an increasing degree of cooperation covering Western European countries similar to the Inter-American Defense Treaty. Such agreements are provided for in the United Nations Charter and afford practical channels for organizing the necessary military protection.³

¹Proceedings, 1947, pp. 470-471
²Ibid., p. 474.
These statements and repeated declarations of support for the Marshall Plan, and later the NATO treaty and the Korean War effort were disseminated throughout the world.

In 1946, the FTUC began publishing the monthly *International Free Trade Union News* in English, French, German and Italian. Soon, almost every anti-Communist trade union militant in France (and other European countries) received the publication. In addition to featuring AFL resolutions and policy statements, the publication carried analyses and details of the suppression of free trade union rights in Communist and non-Communist dictatorships such as Spain. The *International Free Trade Union News* also condemned the efforts of colonial powers to suppress non-Communist national liberation movements and on occasion, supplied details of the AFL’s actions to assist these movements. The FTUC also published, translated and distributed anti-Communist pamphlets. Dubinsky, Woll, Green, Meany and Brown were frequent contributors to journals and periodicals.

Members of the Executive Council and AFL representatives and delegates repeatedly visited most of the European countries and gave numerous speeches. The AFL also brought a number of

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1In June, 1947, Brown reported he was sending Lovestone a list of 12,000 French names and addresses, Brown to Lovestone, June 18, 1947. Total worldwide circulation was approximately 30,000. *Proceedings*, 1947, p. 187.

2In 1947, for example, the AFL’s representatives in Europe, Brown and Rutz, made numerous appearances in France, Germany and Italy, Austria, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, England, and Denmark. *Proceedings*, 1947, pp. 186-189.
European labor leaders to the U.S. in the late 1940's. All these efforts were, of course, magnified by coverage in the mass media. The AFL issued press releases and fed information to selected journalists both in the United States and abroad. Both the European and American press carried stories on the AFL's views and activities.

Another type of assistance was providing non-communist trade unions with food packages. In war-ravaged Germany these packages amounted to a program of material assistance. In France, however, they were another demonstration of the AFL's support for the democratic elements, especially in the mining regions where Communist militants received assistance from the CP.

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1 The F. O. leader Pierre Feri-Pisani, the Chairman of the German Zonal Trade Union Council, Marcus Schleicher, and the German Social Democratic leader, Kurt Schumacher were invited to the U.S. to address AFL conventions. Proceedings, 1947, 1948, 1950.

2 For example, the previously cited Dubinsky's answer to questions by French and Dutch journalists.

3 Among numerous examples, see the London Times, November 26, 1947; Humanité, January 4, 1948; London Times, August 2, 1948; Le Figaro, December 30, 1948; Humanité, September 22, 1950; Le Figaro, January 15, 1951; Business Week, March 17, 1951; Time, March 17, 1952.

4 Approximately 500 CARE packages were sent monthly to Germany. Only a few packages were sent to France each month except in the late 1948 when over 1000 packages were sent to the F. O. miners. FTUC Archives, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949.
Thus, through a variety of channels, the Federation repeatedly attempted to provide moral and psychological support for the trade union forces that were resisting powerful Communist pressures. The AFL attempted to demonstrate that resistance was necessary and that the Europeans were not alone in their efforts to prevent Communist domination.

Organizational Leadership

Another major thrust of AFL policy was organizational leadership. The non-Communist trade unionists in most of the European countries were too occupied with their internal and national problems to organize on a continental or worldwide scale. The AFL, on the other hand, was not "locked in." Unlike the CIO, the AFL was relatively free of internal disputes and there was no pressing domestic crises. Thus, during the post-war years, the AFL was able to engage in interrelated organizational initiatives in a number of countries and in the international labor movement. Indeed, in a sense, the AFL became the organizational catalyst for Europeans who favored weakening Communist-controlled labor organizations and strengthening and building non-Communist organizations.

Internationally, the AFL's first effort was to prevent the integration of the ITS into the WFTU's trade departments. In the summer of 1946, the AFL undertook a series of initiatives designed to strengthen the Oldenbroek faction in the ITS. The AFL strategy was to secure sufficient American power in the Secretariats to counteract the influence of those Europeans, and especially the powerful British unions, which for one reason or another, favored the integration of the ITS into the WFTU's Trade Departments. If American unions, which were not usually active in the ITS, could be persuaded to affiliate and
participate in ITS politics, the AFL would have had an opportunity
to maneuver inside the Secretariats. The AFL could use the "carrot"
of American trade union strength, economic production, and financial
dues, and the "stick" of disaffiliation to ensure that the Secretariats
remained autonomous.

First, the AFL encouraged American unions already affiliated
with a Secretariat, the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), for
example, to increase their participation in the politics of the Secretar-
iat. The UMWA, which frequently did not send representatives to the
meetings of the Secretariat's leadership, for example, was encouraged
to attend and make the position of the Americans clear to the Europeans.

Second, the AFL attempted to secure increased American
affiliation in the ITS. In the summer of 1946, for example, AFL
policymakers approached the leaders of the American transport unions
informing them of the urgency of involvement. The FTUC also loaned
the ITF $3,000 so a delegation could be sent to the U.S. to secure
American affiliation. In early February, the AFL Executive Council
strongly urged the transport workers to affiliate with the ITF,¹ and
on February 26 The New York Times announced the affiliation of the
700,000 member Railway Labor Executives Association with the
Secretariat.² In 1948, the 50,000 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America also
became affiliated with the ITF.³

¹Lovestone to Brown, February 10, 1947, Archives of the FTUC,
1947.
American affiliation to the ITF allowed the AFL to participate in the politics of the most important Secretariat and greatly strengthened the hand of the Oldenbroek leadership. American representatives attended the ITF's conference in April 1948 which was designed to bring transport unions together to discuss methods of trade union participation in the Marshall Plan. This was the first international trade union meeting to support the Plan and it was significant symbolically in both Europe and the U.S. George Harrison and other American transport workers' leaders also attended the crucial ITF congress later in 1948. At this conference, Harrison argued decisively against ITF (and consequently ITS) affiliation to the WFTU, and contributed to the vote which supported the Oldenbroek leadership.\(^1\)

The AFL also attempted to secure the affiliation of other American unions to their respective Secretariats. In the winter of 1946 and in January, 1947, Brown encouraged the International Association of Machinists (IAM), which at that time was not associated with the AFL, to become affiliated with another important Secretariat, the International Metal Workers Federation (IMWF).\(^2\) Brown's appeal was followed up by Woll on January 23,\(^3\) A few days later the IAM decided to affiliate with the IMWF\(^4\) and a few months later the Machinists


\(^2\)Letter from Irving Brown to Harvey Brown, President of the IAM, January 13, 1947, FTUC Archives, 1947.

\(^3\)Woll to Brown, January 23, 1947, Archives of the FTUC, 1947.

asked the IMWF to hold its next Executive Committee meeting in the United States.\(^1\) Irving Brown, as an IAM representative, was also elected to the IMWF's Executive Committee.\(^2\) The AFL leaders also attempted to secure more extensive American affiliation and relationships with other Secretariats, including the miners, public service workers, white collar workers, actors and artists and clothing workers.\(^3\)

Another international initiative was the organization of a series of Marshall Plan trade union conferences that were catalytic in the processes that split the WFTU. The AFL, of course, had immediately supported the European Recovery Program (ERP). Meaney agreed to become a member of the ERP Planning Commission that became known as the Harriman Committee, and several AFL staffers accepted positions in the ERP's administration. Many of the WFTU's affiliates, however, including the CIO and the TUC, were hesitant. After the Russian decision opposing the Plan, these organizations as a group were also reluctant to endorse the Plan openly as they feared this would precipitate a WFTU scission.\(^4\)


\(^2\)Proceedings, 1948, p. 76.

\(^3\)Minutes of the FTUC, January 22, 1947, Brown to Lovestone, January 27, 1947; Woll to Emil Rieve, President of the Textile Workers Union of America, May 31, 1947; Proceedings, 1948, p. 77.

The initiative for the ERP Conferences appears to have come initially from Irving Brown.\(^1\) By mid-October, a Convention resolution endorsed AFL initiatives calling a conference of trade union representatives from the sixteen countries cooperating on a continental scale to rebuild the European economies.\(^2\)

To secure the TUC's support, Brown visited England at the end of November, 1947. The AFL leaders believed the TUC's support was essential for the conference's success. Without the British, the non-Communist Europeans, most of whom were affiliated to the WFTU, would be unlikely to participate in a conference that would probably exacerbate the conflict over the Marshall Plan in the WFTU. Also, the absence of the TUC, one of the most important trade union centers and the strongest non-Communist European labor organization, would emasculate a Marshall Plan Conference.

Brown had concluded that the TUC would be reluctant to support the conference and even before he went to England the AFL's leadership had agreed he should seek the assistance of Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary.\(^3\) (Bevin, an ardent supporter of the Marshall Plan, was a former General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union and still maintained close links with TUC leaders.) The AFL hoped that Bevin would bring pressure to bear on the TUC.

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\(^1\)Brown to Woll, July 25, 1947.


\(^3\)Brown, Confidential Report to the ILRC, November 11, 1947.
Although he did not see Bevin in November, Brown passed along the AFL's views to Christopher Mayhew who had been asked by Bevin to see him. In the latter half of December, Brown returned to England and conferred with Bevin. By January 3, 1948 he felt confident enough of the TUC's support of the conference to announce that the meeting would probably be held in March.

In the following months, Brown conferred with representatives of at least fourteen trade union Federations and on March 9, a conference of fifty representatives from fifteen countries convened in London. Léon Jouhaux represented the F.O. and Gaston Tessier, the CFTC. From the delegates' speeches, it was clear that they believed that the Marshall Plan was in the interests of the working classes of Europe and North America and that the Plan deserved the support of organized labor. Moreover, the delegates decided to elect a committee to maintain a continuing liaison with the ERP administration. The committee, to be known as the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), was to conduct the work of the Conference between its meetings, convene future conferences, secure the maximum unified action among constituent organizations, and seek contact with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) so as to assure maximum representation and cooperation. The AFL supported these moves, believing they were steps in the direction of creating a dual international organization.

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1 Brown to Lovestone, November 29, 1947.


At a TUAC meeting in June, an Emergency Commitee was created to maintain contact and conduct negotiations with the OEEC. Jouhaux and Vincent Tewson, with the TUC's Donald Bowers acting as an economic assistant, were appointed to the Commitee.

In July, another major ERP trade union conference was held in London. Top labor leaders from twenty-six organizations in sixteen countries attended the conference. The French were represented by Jouhaux, Botherau and R. Rous of the F. O. and three CFTC leaders. The Italian non-Communist groups in the Communist-dominated CGIL sent a delegation headed by Giulio Pastore, who was soon to preside over the formation of a new non-Communist federation in Italy. The AFL was represented by Brown and Dubinsky. The CIO, which after some initial hesitation, has decided to support the Marshall Plan, was represented by James Carey, David MacDonald, Michael Ross and Elmer Cope.

Averell Harriman and former AFL staff members occupying important positions in the ERP administration, addressed the conference. The Marshall Plan administrators told the delegates that they hoped labor would play a leading role in the ERP, and pointed to specific ways in which American aid could be used to improve the lot of the European workers; health and housing programmes and social security systems.

The conference decided that the TUAC should appoint a permanent representative in Paris to keep in close contact with OEEC. His duties would also include informing affiliated national centers of OEEC activities in the field of manpower and trade union problems. It was agreed that Jouhaux should serve as the TUAC representative until a permanent appointment was made. The conference concluded by
adopting a resolution reaffirming its pledge of support for the ERP "upon whose success depended the continued efforts of millions of workers in the countries concerned and which implied effective representation and participation of organized labor." 1

As John P. Windmuller observed, the conferenced had important "symbolic" effects. It gave the stamp of trade union approval to the Marshall Plan. Second, it officially established a permanent administrative organization to ensure organized labor a role in the execution of the ERP. Finally, it marked the first time that the AFL and the CIO participated in an international meeting of trade union organizations.

This change in AFL policy, which eventually culminated in the AFL and the CIO's joint participation in a new international trade union organization, came about as a result of several factors. First, AFL leaders believed that the survival of democracy in Europe required the coordinated efforts of both the AFL and the CIO as well as the European unions to support a large-scale reconstruction program. As Windmuller noted, "A similar policy had prevailed throughout most of the war period when joint AFL-CIO participation in the defense effort and in such agencies as the War Labor Board had led to temporary retreat from the earlier attitude of intransigence toward the CIO." 2

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2 Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, p. 133.
As the CIO was recognized by both the American government and by many Europeans as the spokesman of some segments of organized labor in the U.S., the AFL could not insist on excluding the CIO without damaging the cause of non-Communist unity in support of the Marshall Plan.

Second, by the late 1940s the CIO was in the process of expelling Communists within its ranks. The AFL wanted to encourage these activities and believed that in the future it would be easier to work with the CIO's non-Communist leadership.  

By the winter of 1948, on the eve of the formal split of the WFTU, the AFL had begun lining up support for the creation of a new international labor organization. In early January, the FTUC and ILRC engaged in extensive planning for a new international. The subject was also discussed privately at the fourth ERP TUAC meeting on January 22, 1949.

Shortly after the British withdrawal from the WFTU in early 1949, the ITS held a conference in England. With the exception of the Miners' International, all the major Secretariats were represented. The delegates, representing seventeen international organizations and over twenty million workers, unanimously agreed to reject any and all relationships with the WFTU. The conference also took the first important international step, since the WFTU split, in turning away

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1 Interview, Lovestone. For additional analysis see Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, pp. 131-132.

2 Minutes of the ILRC, January 31, 1949, Archives of the FTUC, 1949.

from the WFTU and towards the creation of a new international in which the trade secretariats would play their due and proper role. The conference agreed to create a coordinating committee which would represent the collective and common interests of the ITS. Brown as an IMWF delegate participated in the conference and became an alternate in the newly created Coordinating Committee. ¹

In the spring, the AFL and the CIO reached an agreement for joint participation in the new international. An international planning conference took place in June and in November-December, 1949, 261 delegates from unions in 59 countries attended the "Free World Labor Conference" which officially created the ICFTU. The Americans attempted to bring the Christian unions into the new organization, but this was blocked by the Europeans. ² In the following months, cooperative arrangements between the ICFTU and the ITS were concluded by the new ICFTU General Secretary, J. H. Oldenbroek. ³

Activities in France

In addition to working with the international labor movement, the AFL also engaged in a number of activities in the major European countries. The AFL leaders believed France was the key to control of


²See Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement, especially, pp. 151-170.

Western Europe. In the long run Germany would be more important, but in the early post-war years Germany was prostrate. Italy was important but Italy was a defeated power that did not geographically flank Germany. The AFL leaders believed that developments in France would be decisive in the rest of Europe. If the Communists gained control of France they would split Western Europe and ultimately gain control of both Germany and Italy.

It is difficult to determine the extent of direct AFL organizational involvement in French and European politics. It is clear, nevertheless, that Irving Brown's talent and the AFL's financial resources were interrelated in a number of organizational initiatives. Although he travelled extensively throughout Europe, and occasionally made trips to the United States and Asia, Brown concentrated his efforts on France. He was convinced France was in the short run the "key" to the future of democratic pluralism on the continent. Moreover, he liked the country, its people and their life style. Originally, he wanted to set up the AFL office in Paris, but he was dissuaded from doing so by threats of Communist terror. ¹

Brown was a dynamic organizer. He had learned the rudiments of the trade working for the AFL in the 1930's. His lifestyle was well suited to his strategy of welding together small groups of militants. He enjoyed extensive and continuous travelling. Moreover, he was willing to work eighteen hours a day, six days a week. His life was a constant round of travelling and meeting with militants in every conceivable place at every conceivable time. All of this, of course, was necessary, if he was to build, maintain and coordinate the dynamic groups of militants. ²

¹Minutes of the ILRC, November 13, 1946.
²See Time article describing his daily routine and style, March 17, 1952.
The AFL also was able to weld and keep groups together with material resources, first, from contributions to the FTUC and, after the creation of Force Ouvrière, by helping to secure resources from the American government. In the immediate post-war years, as was pointed out, those opposed to working with the Communists in the CGT were especially short of money and essential supplies and equipment. In some sectors, the nature of the industry facilitated organization and action. Railroad organizers were frequently able to travel free of charge throughout the country. PTT organizers found it relatively easy to communicate with one another. Also, in these public sectors, once a union grouping was recognized, it received previously cited advantages that were unavailable to organizers in the private sector. Nevertheless, the leaders and militants in both the private and public sectors were, relatively speaking, impoverished.

Shortly after his arrival in France, in the winter of 1945, Brown discussed splitting the CGT with Jouhaux, Botherau and Albert Gazier (Gazier soon left the trade unions after accepting a Ministerial post.) Even though Jouhaux was opposed to Saillant's equal status in the CGT, he did not, for the reasons cited in Chapter IV, want to split the organization. In the following months, Brown, who had, of course, decided that a split was inevitable, turned his attention to the non-Communist militants who opposed Jouhaux's strategy.

The AFL's efforts focused on three strategic industries, coal mining, communications and transportation, especially the railroads.

1Interview, Brown.
As far as can be determined from the FTUC archives, the AFL gave these groups a minimum of $11,000 and a maximum of $20,000 between January, 1946 and the CGT scission in December, 1947.  

Usually Brown gave these funds to the F.O. leaders in these sectors. The F.O. leaders, in turn, supported the activities of their militants. Specifically, the money was used to (a) finance the travelling expenses of organizers, (b) finance the publication and distribution of anti-CGT newspapers and leaflets, and (c) strengthen F.O. candidates in union and social security elections.

After the general strike collapsed in December, 1947, the remaining Force Ouvrière militants in the CGT (some of whom had been working directly with Brown) insisted that the non-Communists secede from the organization. Jouhaux and the other confédérés leaders, faced with the loss of their militants, agreed to leave the CGT formally and create a new organization. In the following months, the PTT and

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1Analysis of the FTUC correspondence reveals that the FTUC found it extremely difficult to raise even this amount and that Woll and Dubinsky had to engage in extensive fund raising activities to secure these sums. See, for example, ILRC, "Report to the Executive Council," January, 1948. It should be noted, however, that these were large sums in post-war Europe and Brown was able to exchange dollars for francs at extremely favorable rates of exchange. Brown to Lovestone, June 18, 1947.

2Interview, Brown and letters from Brown to Lovestone, especially June 18, 1947 and August 7, 1947.

3See Lorwin, The French Labor Movement, pp. 123-126, and Lefranc, Les Experiences Syndicales En Europe, pp. 190-193. Lefranc also notes Carpentier's role in forcing the confédérés leaders to leave the CGT.
and railroad "autonomes" and several other autonomous unions became affiliated with the new organization. Brown did not play a forceful role in the split. The Amis de Force Ouvrière militants had been determined, for some time, to create a new organization and the AFL's moral and material assistance strengthened them and facilitated their actions.

While the AFL leaders were delighted that a new national center had formally been created, they were opposed to the tactics of Jouhaux and the older leaders of the F.O. The older F.O. leaders wanted to remain involved in the WFTU and to retain the name "Force Ouvrière" which connoted wartime and socialist resistance to totalitarian forces. The AFL favored the strategy of André Lafont, and many of the younger provincial militants who were against the F.O.'s affiliation with the WFTU, against the name F.O. (which was not popular with many groups of non-communists) and for a unified organization or at least united action with other non-communist organizations such as the Christian CFTC and anarchist Confédération National du Travail. The AFL also believed the older leaders were too bureaucratic and too interested in preserving their leadership. They were convinced the new union structure would not replace the CGT as the trade union representative of the working class until younger more dynamic elements replaced the older leadership.

During the ensuing years, the AFL, for the most part, supported the vigorous organizational drives of the younger leaders and their attempts to unify non-Communist trade unions. Not only did these groups occasionally receive financial assistance, but the Americans

1See especially, Lefranc, pp. 194-197.
also sent them vitally needed office equipment. In 1948, for example, the AFL sent 100 typewriters and twenty-five mimeograph machines to F.O. offices throughout France.\(^1\) Moreover, in the summer of 1948, when the F.O. leaders ran out of the funds they had received from the French government, the AFL "loaned" them $30,000.\(^2\) Brown also helped coordinate and finance meetings that brought militants together from all over France to create F.O. federations in the most difficult sectors of private industry, e.g., the maritime trades.\(^3\)

The AFL also helped secure the American government's material assistance in several ways. First, the Federation played an educational role. The AFL leaders encouraged the American government to aid the non-Communist unions. Marshall Plan funds were being used to aid in the recovery of French industry. Management benefitted directly from the Plan, they argued, so why should not labor? Moreover, they pointed out, the Marshall Plan would be endangered if the Communist-controlled unions maintained their hold over organized labor. The Communists, they observed, were receiving funds from the Soviet Union to prevent the Plan from achieving its objectives. To ensure the Plan's success, they argued, it was necessary to aid non-Communist labor groups.

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\(^1\) Thank you letters and receipts in the FTUC Archives.


\(^3\) Pierre Ferri Pisani, quoted in *Time*, March 17, 1952. Interview Georges Picquemal. AFL participation in dockers and seamen's unions will be elaborated on in the following pages.
Second, the American labor leaders helped pinpoint reliable non-Communist militants who would use American assistance efficiently. As the AFL had been providing the non-Communists with assistance for some time, the AFL and its staff were personally acquainted with most of the reliable and efficient non-communist leaders. Throughout the late 1940's and early 1950's, AFL leaders met with high officials and representatives of the American government both in the United States and Europe. They attempted not only to secure assistance for the national centers, but also for the less well known but dynamic groups of militants in the provinces. Finally, the AFL may have acted as a conduit for American governmental assistance to non-communist Europeans. Braden, of course, claims that after 1950, the AFL passed large sums of money to the French.

The AFL also encouraged the unification of non-communist labor organizations. At first, this consisted of efforts to bring the autonomes into the F.O. Brown's letters from 1948 to 1950 are studded with references to his efforts to encourage this tendency. The Federation also quietly attempted to bring together the predominantly socialist F.O. and the Christian CFTC. For a number of months, Brown worked closely with a segment of the CFTC under the leadership of Paul Vignaux, who had been a member of the wartime Committee

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1Interviews, Brown and Lovestone.

of Exiles in New York guiding the Labor League's relief efforts. These efforts, of course, were unsuccessful. ¹

The AFL also did everything possible to arrange for the entry of the F.O. into the non-Communist international labor movement. This was designed first to increase the domestic and international prestige of the organization. Second, the AFL hoped this would encourage the international movement to provide material assistance to a free French labor movement. A strong F.O., in turn, the AFL expected, would increase the strength of the non-Communist labor movement. Finally, international cooperation between French and other European unions, the AFL believed, would increase the chances for European economic and political stability.

One of the clearest examples of the AFL's efforts in this area is the program of Franco-German cooperation that developed from an AFL organizational initiative. As early as 1947, Brown had begun to bring together German militants with activists of the Amis de Force Ouvrière from the mining and metal trades. (So soon after the war, this was considered a revolutionary initiative.) In 1948, trade unionists from the Benelux countries were also brought into these meetings. Cooperation developed to the point that in March, 1949, representatives from Benelux, France, Germany and the United States met to create a permanent inter-trade union committee and secretariat

¹Interview, Brown, See also, the CGT-F.O. Second Confederal Congress, October 25-28, 1950, pp. 181-217; Adam, La CFTC, 1940-1958, pp. 158-168.
to bring about trade union participation in the international control of
the Ruhr and the entire North-West European coal, iron and steel
industries. ¹

Another AFL initiative was an institution known as the
Mediterranean Committee. As has been pointed out, the AFL leaders,
especially Brown, were concerned about Soviet control of the maritime
industry. In June, 1949, the WFTU created a Maritime Trades
Department, and a Maritime Bureau was set up in Marseilles. The
AFL leaders believed the new WFTU Department and Bureau were
among other things designed to disrupt the Western European econo-
my and interrupt the transportation of American arms to Europe.
Brown reported that Cominform agents were running the Bureau in
Marseilles and sent Lovestone a clipping from Le Figaro naming the
responsible Cominform agents in France and Italy. ²

In August, 1949, Brown spoke with Oldenbroek and encouraged
the ITF to impede the new Communist activities. At an ITF Interna-
tional Dockers and Seafarers Conference in Rotterdam from August
26-30, Communist use of the maritime workers for political objectives
was condemned and it was decided to create three regional "Vigilance
Committees"³ for the Baltic, the North Atlantic area and the Mediterr-
anean Committee, with Marseilles as the center.


²Brown to Lovestone, August 19, 1949; Le Figaro, August 8, 1949.

The Mediterranean Committee had three major objectives. First, its aim was to ensure that American and allied shipping in the Mediterranean (and especially France and Italy) went on uninterrupted. This required breaking Communist control of maritime labor organizations.

Second, the Committee attempted to create paramilitary "cells" on each ship to counter the Communist "cells." As the French union leader and Director of the Mediterranean Committee, Ferri-Pisani, spelled out to the AFL Convention, Communist propaganda activities on ships were a pretext for the creation of small Soviet-controlled cells:

What is attempted is to create an apparatus, a combination of small cells, whose members never present themselves on occasions of secondary importance. The visible part of the network is not essential. The secret part is operated by a political-trade union control but is actually directed from a political-military angle.¹

Third, the Committee attempted to mount an "offensive" against Communism.² Rather than engaging only in "defensive" maneuvers or merely reacting to Communist offensives, the Committee was designed to engage in positive anti-Communist activities.

¹Proceedings, 1950, p. 446.

To accomplish these objectives, Brown, together with Ferri Pisani, organized groups of dockers and sailors in the major French ports including Marseilles, Bordeaux, Cherbourg and Le Havre, as well as in Italian, Greek, and North African ports. To strengthen the organization, the heads of the French railway, Wagons Lits, and road transport workers' unions also became members of the Committee. To coordinate and sustain these organizational efforts, a small professional staff was hired. The Committee initially was financed with ITF funds. When these proved inadequate, the Committee sought and received the assistance of the American government.

The staff in Paris and the groups in each port engaged in a variety of tactics. To ensure boats could be loaded and unloaded, the Committee first distributed enormous quantities of propaganda. This was designed to bolster the morale of its militants as well as explain to the workers how the Communists were exploiting their economic grievances and the widespread fear of a new war. In particular, an attempt was made to explain that, if the dockers in a given port withheld their labor, American ships would go elsewhere and eventually, as patterns of trade were interrupted, the port would become idle. In 1950, in addition to thousands of leaflets prepared locally, the Committee began publishing a monthly magazine, *Air, Terre, Mer*, in French, English and Italian, which was distributed throughout the Mediterranean.

Another technique was to work with well-placed contacts in local Communist-controlled unions. In Cherbourg, for example, on the one hand, Jean Bocher, the head of the F.O. Officiers de Marine, was in contact

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2Braden, "I'm Glad the CIA Is Immoral."
both with Brown and Pisani. At the same time, he remained in contact with an old Socialist, Lesvel, who, at the split in 1947 Bocher had encouraged to remain in the CGT dockers union. Thus, in 1948 and 1949, when Bénédicte Frahon and other Communist leaders went to Cherbourg to encourage and to pay the dockers not to unload American ships, Bocher, in weekly contact with Lesvel, successfully sabotaged the efforts. ¹

The Committee also engaged in activities to neutralize what it believed to be Communist terror and intimidation. This was accomplished in a variety of ways. One was to "protect" professional and occasional dockers when the CGT called a dock strike. This was done primarily by hiring strong-arm men to work alongside professional or occasional dockers. Thus, to terrorize the dockers, the Communists would have to tangle with men experienced in the techniques of violence. ² Because the dockers would be vulnerable to Communist terror when they left the piers, the Committee also warned the Communist leaders in several ports that, if dockers and sailors were physically assaulted, the non-Communist strong arm men would retaliate not against the Communist goon-squads, but against the Communist leaders. Reportedly in Marseilles, Pisani, who had many friends amongst the "milieu," ³

¹Interviews, Brown and Bocher.

²Most of the strong arm men were not professional thugs, but they were not, of necessity, "enfants des choeurs" choir-boys. Interviews, Brown and Pisquemal.

³"Le milieu," slang for underworld.
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³"Le milieu," slang for underworld.
marched to the Communist Party's headquarters and personally delivered this warning.\footnote{Time, March 17, 1952.}

To enable members of the "milieu" to work on the docks, the Committee cooperated closely with local Prefects. The Prefects were also encouraged to use the police to crack down against the Communist strong-arm men and also to use the BMCO to deny work permits to those who engaged in violent activity on the docks.\footnote{Interview, Brown.}

From 1949-1952, the Committee also encouraged the creation of small cells on French and other boats which sailed the Mediterranean. These cells maintained surveillance of Communist groups on the ships to prevent them from transporting propaganda and engaging in espionage and sabotage.\footnote{Interviews, Froideval, Bocher, Philips. There are few references to these activities in the FTUC files.}

In sum, it appears that the AFL leaders' policy choice was narrowly constrained by their perspectives. If the Federation did not aid non-communists who wanted to remain independent of communist controlled unions, the AFL leaders believed Europe would fall under Soviet domination. In adopting this policy, the AFL attempted to affect the course of post-war politics by providing non-communist labor leaders...
with moral and material assistance as well as organizational leadership.

The Americans attempted to strengthen non-communists in national and international labor organizations, encourage the creation of new international and national centers and to integrate all these groups and individuals into a strong non-communist international labor movement.

The AFL leaders believed that these activities would help prevent the Russians from using their control of international and French labor organizations to achieve hegemony on the European continent. An evaluation of the effectiveness of this policy is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter VII

THE EFFECTS OF THE AFL'S FOREIGN POLICY

An assessment of AFL foreign policy from 1945-1952 seems to indicate that this nongovernmental organization played a significant role in the post-war international labor movement and in French politics. While it is impossible to know what would have happened if the AFL had not assisted the non-Communists who wanted to maintain autonomous labor organizations, it appears that the AFL, in several ways, played a direct role in the international and French labor movements, and, by doing so, an indirect role in post-war French politics. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, AFL policy from 1945-1952 appears to have helped secure the affiliation of key American unions to their respective secretariats, exacerbated the tensions within the WFTU, contributed to the forces that led to the creation of the ICFTU and weakened the WFTU's ability to support Soviet objectives. In France, the AFL's moral, organizational and financial assistance appears to have been one of several forces that bolstered the labor elements that were resisting Communist domination. The AFL also appears to have helped create Force Ouvrière and the Mediterranean Committee. F.O., and the Mediterranean Committee, in turn, appear to have reduced the CGT's ability to support Communist objectives in France.
Effects on the International Labor Movement

As was implied in the previous chapter, AFL policy in 1946 was in large part responsible for the American railway unions affiliation to the ITF and the Machinists to the IMWF. American affiliation, coupled with the AFL's foreign policy posture, in turn, bolstered the position of the dominant faction in the ITS, which was struggling to keep the Secretariats from being integrated into the WFTU's Trade Departments. George Harrison in the ITF and Irving Brown in the IMWF lent the AFL's moral support to these forces. In crucial discussions and votes, the Americans also argued vehemently against joining the WFTU. Perhaps the most decisive example of this came out at the 1948 ITF Convention when George Harrison's speech appears to have prevented Arthur Deakin, the leader of the British Transport and General Workers Union, from securing a vote supporting the integration of the IFT and the WFTU's Maritime Trades Department.  

1The AFL's role in securing the railway unions affiliation was confirmed by Harrison. Dr. Mark Perlman's private notes on the IAM archives also tend to confirm Irving Brown's role in bringing the IAM into the IMWF (Dr. Perlman is one of the few scholars that has had access to the IAM archives).  

2Report on Activities and Financial Report for the Years 1946-1947, Proceedings of the International Transport Workers Federation Congress, 1948, pp. 172, 200, 243. In interviews, both Harrison and Becu confirmed Harrison's crucial role at the Congress. If the policy of Oldenbroek and Becu had been reversed at the Congress, this would have reopened the whole question of the relationship between the Secretariats and the WFTU, and might have given the forces that were trying to keep the WFTU together a shot in the arm. Windmuller, however, believes the struggle was over by the time the ITF met in 1948. American Labor and the International Labor Movement, pp. 113-115.
If the ITF had reversed its position, it is likely, for the previously cited reasons, that the other Secretariats would have followed suit. On the other hand, by helping to ensure the ITS remained autonomous, the AFL helped maintain a nucleus for a new trade union international and kept the Secretariats free to support the Marshall Plan, NATO, and the Mediterranean Committee as well as European economic and political cooperation.

It would be misleading to state that the FDL "created" the ICFTU. It is more accurate to state that the AFL's willingness to create a new organization (and not withdraw into isolationism), and the AFL-organized Marshall Plan trade union conferences in 1948, were major forces that led to the creation of the new organization. The other forces were the WFTU scission, the TUC's interest in creating a new international and the ITS support for a new organization. The WFTU split resulted in large part from the Russian decision to oppose the Marshall Plan and from Soviet attempts to use the trade unions to support their decision.¹ The AFL, of course, exacerbated the tensions in the WFTU by organizing the ERP trade union conferences and by constantly denouncing Communist attempts to use the WFTU in support of Soviet political objectives.²

¹Schwartz, Soviet Policies and the WFTU and Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement.

Also, by challenging the TUC's leadership in the non-Communist international labor movement and by supporting the independence of the ITS, the AFL contributed to the strengthening of forces that created the new international. ¹

The TUAC appears to have played only a minor role in ERP and early OEEC decision making. ² OEEC administrators maintain that for the most part relations with the trade unions were conducted through the ERP labor advisers in the individual European countries. The OEEC was not anxious to have TUAC take part in its decision making and many European union leaders were not always anxious to commit themselves to OEEC decisions on sensitive questions such as levels of productivity. ³

The AFL's international activities diminished the political importance of the WFTU. The voice of the AFL represented at the U.N. by the official AFL delegates Matthew Woll and David Dubinsky, and in Europe, Latin America and Asia by AFL and FTUC representatives, meant that the WFTU could not be considered as "the" voice of organized labor throughout the world. After the WFTU split and the creation of the ICFTU, the WFTU suffered an even greater loss in prestige and its political role in international organizational affairs was reduced.

¹See Windmuller, American Labor and the International Labor Movement.

²For a history of the TUAC and its relationship with the ERP and the OEEC, see the ICFTU publication, the Role of Trade Unions in the Economic Development of Europe. (Brussels: 1966)

³Interviews, Porter, Shishkin, Saposs.
The AFL's continuous criticism of the WFTU's involvement in the politics of specific countries and the tensions within the organization also made it extremely difficult for the WFTU to exert effective pressure on foreign governments. Moreover, fears that the Communists were using their control of the international labor movement for political purposes resulted in close cooperation between Western governments and the non-Communist labor movement. A striking example of this can be found in the maritime industry. In the late 1940's, when the WFTU and its Communist affiliates attempted to disrupt Western military transportation, Western governments, the AFL, ITF and other segments of the non-Communist labor movement coalesced and worked together in the Mediterranean Committee to prevent any disruption or sabotage of Western shipping.

**Effects on the French Labor Movement**

The AFL's moral and psychological support of the French forces resisting Communist domination appears to have been significant. The AFL's views were well known throughout the country. The International Free Trade Union News and other FTUC publications had a wide circulation. Irving Brown made numerous public speeches, especially in the early post-war period. He was frequently referred

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to as "a leader of the American trade unions," and his views were quoted and discussed in the French Communist and non-Communist press.\(^1\) Indeed, it appears as if every anti-Communist (and Communist) militant in France knew that he was not "alone" and that a large, powerful national trade union center was militantly anti-Communist.

The AFL, of course believed this assistance was extremely important. A major segment of the Federation's human and material resources was devoted to this effort. Many former Amis de Force Ouvrière leaders and American government officials also believed the AFL's efforts helped make resistance to the Communists a respectable and viable policy.\(^2\)

Finally, the Communists believed the AFL's encouragement of the anti-Communist forces was significant. As was pointed out, the Communists threatened Brown with violence if the AFL set up an office in Paris. Almost weekly from 1946-1952, the Communist press attacked the AFL.\(^3\) For example, Robert Bouvier, an editorial writer for the Communist daily *Humanité*, and the weekly, *France Nouvelle*, stated:

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\(^1\)See *Combat*, *Le Populaire*, *L'Humanité* and *La Vie Ouvrière*, *France Nouvelle*, 1946-1952.

\(^2\)Almost all the F. O. leaders and American officials interviewed maintained that the AFL's moral support was important in the early post-war period.

One of the main objectives of the monopolists from across the Atlantic is to break the strength of a powerful and united CGT in France, just as, on the international scale, its objective is to cause a collapse of the unity achieved in the WFTU.

As early as 1946, the AFL thereupon appointed a special agent in Europe, notably to operate in France. Irving Brown, who was provided with a well-filled coffer of dollars and the job of causing, at any cost, a weakening and a schism in the CGT and later in the WFTU.¹

The Communists also devoted a great deal of attention to the work of the Mediterranean Committee. Brown was accused of organizing and paying gangsters to break legitimate strikes. He was also accused of advocating provocative police practices so that the provoked Communist militants could be arrested.²

AFL leaders believed their organizational and financial assistance to the Amis de Force Ouvrière militants and later to the


²Humanité, September 22, 1950. In January, 1955, the monthly CGT newspaper published a long summary of Brown's activities in Marseilles. The AFL organizer was called a "chef des nervis," a Marseilles expression for gangster leader, and an accompanying cartoon depicted him as an Al Capone in an Uncle Sam uniform. La Vie Ouvrière, January, 1955. For additional Communist reaction to the AFL and Brown, see La Vie Ouvrière, Humanité and France Nouvelle, 1945-1952.
incipient F.O. organization was "strategically" important. AFL leaders were convinced that the non-communists had created a "de facto" split in the CGT and eventually would have broken with the traditional organization irrespective of the AFL's actions. AFL activities in the 1940's, the American union leaders believed, strengthened the non-communist forces so that when they broke away from the CGT, the non-communists were quickly able to create a national union structure that was rapidly assimilated into the international labor movement. The AFL leaders also believed that they played a role in "educating" American government officials in the realities of the post-war labor politics and the necessity for using Marshall Plan funds to aid provincial as well as national trade union centers. ¹

In the early post-war period, the AFL leaders believed that the U.S. government was not worried about Russian ambitions in Western Europe or the ways in which organized labor would be used to support Russian political and military objectives. The AFL leaders in their discussions with American officials tried to convince them that the Soviet Union was intent on dominating the continent, and that they would use labor unions for these purposes. Moreover, after the

¹ Interviews, Dubinsky, Harrison, Meaney, Lovestone, Brown.
creation of the Marshall Plan the AFL leaders suggested that not only should the U. S. government use the ERP to support non-communist national centers but that support should also be given to the provincial leaders. If aid was given only to the national centers, the AFL feared that the national leaders would be tempted to use the money to bolster their own position inside their organizations. Able provincial leaders who were not necessarily close to the national leaders therefore would not receive the support they needed to do an effective job.

Other authors and commentators have maintained that the AFL's role was more decisive. As was mentioned in the introduction, Thomas Braden, a former high ranking Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official has stated that the AFL's organized Force Ouvriere.¹ In an interview James Carey, former Secretary-Treasurer of the CIO, and a partisan of the reformist CGT tendency, maintained that the AFL "split" the CGT.² Benoit Frachon, in an interview,

¹Braden, "I'm Glad the CIA Is Immoral."

²Carey maintained that in his lifetime he had organized a number of trade union scissions and that the AFL's actions were decisive in splitting the CGT.
also maintained that Brown and the AFL, acting as agents of the American government, split the CGT and created Force Ouvrière.¹

Needless to say, the AFL, the CIO, the CGT, F. O. and the American government all have vested interests and their views on the AFL's role in French politics appear to coincide with their institutional perspectives.² Nevertheless, from the available evidence, it does not appear as if the AFL alone, or in cooperation with the American government "split" the CGT and "created" or "organized" Force Ouvrière.

After F. O. came into existence in late 1947 and early 1948, however, it is more difficult to determine the effects of the relationship between the AFL, the American government and F. O. On the basis of the information available, it is impossible to come to a clear cut conclusion about who affected whom and on what issues during this period.

While it is possible that the AFL and the American government made secret arrangements to split the CGT and create a new union structure, the evidence, with the exception of Frachon's assertions, does not support this contention. First, American and AFL officials deny that they worked together to create F. O. in 1946 and 1947. Braden, moreover, claims that the AFL "organized Force

¹ Frachon maintained that he had received information from sources in the American and French governments confirming his opinion.

² The AFL does not want to appear to be too involved in the CGT scission. The CIO opposed the scission. The CGT prefers to blame everything on the imperialist forces. The American government does not want to be openly implicated in the trade union politics of other states.
Ouvrière" on its own, and that later the U.S. government did support non-communist unions in France and Italy. Second, as has been discussed, U.S. officials were not worried about the Russian threat to Western Europe or communist penetration of trade unions in the early post-war period. In interviews, U.S. officials and AFL leaders also maintain that prior to 1948 (with few exceptions) American officials did not really understand the significance of communist control of the French labor movement. Finally, examination of the AFL and FTUC archives reveals that the AFL was desperately short of money and there was no discussion or, at that time, hope of obtaining money from the American government. AFL correspondence and FTUC minutes reveal that the AFL, acting almost alone, provided limited financial and organizational assistance to militants primarily in the mines, railroads, and PTT, who wanted to create a new union structure.\footnote{Small sums were received from the ITS and other fraternal labor groups in other European countries.}

Although the AFL's assistance in the early post-war period was significant, Carey and Braden appear to be overstating the AFL's role in the creation of the F.O. To begin with, the AFL
did not engineer the CGT scission. Brown's early letters to the FTUC, especially the previously cited request of March 14, 1946, for funds to aid the Amis de Force Ouvrière militants and his report on the April 1946 CGT Congress, clearly indicated that he believed there was already a "de facto" split in the CGT and that a formal break was inevitable. Undoubtedly, the AFL strengthened the forces that split the CGT and created F.O. The AFL's financial assistance was used to support the activities of anti-CGT militants. Financing F.O. organizers was, of course, exceedingly important. All the F.O. leaders interviewed pointed out that, where Amis de Force Ouvrière militants were supplied with funds for travelling and other organizational expenses, the F.O. flourished. Where they could not sustain field organizers, workers either remained in the CGT or became apathetic. (There is also some statistical evidence to indicate that where union organizers are active, workers join unions in great numbers.)¹

Nevertheless, almost every F.O. leader interviewed maintains that the AFL's assistance merely facilitated the decisions

¹Hamilton, Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic, pp. 234-235.
of the Amis de Force Ouvrière to leave the CGT and create a
new organization. The AFL, they pointed out, was helpful, but
it was not decisive. The F.O. militants had fought the communists
before and during the war, and many of them, in Resistance Ouvrière,
had just fought the Nazis. In interviews, they insisted that they were
not about to let the communists keep control of a major organization
that they had just risked their lives for in a six year war.¹ Brown
they pointed out, was a dynamic organizer, but he was only one man.
The AFL's financial contributions were significant, but the Amis de
Force Ouvrière were already creating an autonomous structure
when the AFL assistance began in mid-1946.

¹It should be noted that Auguste Lecoeur, who was a
leading member of the Communist Party, and the head of the CGT
miners union in the early post-war period, also maintained in an
interview that the AFL's assistance was not decisive. Lecoeur,
who has since broken with the Communist Party, believes that AFL
aid to F.O. militants can be likened to giving a car to a man on a
long journey who has only a bicycle. The man is determined to
reach his destination and the car is of considerable help but not
decisive in reaching his goal. Interview, Lecoeur.
After the F. O. came into existence, it is more diffi-
cult to measure the direct effects of the AFL's policy. Again, F. O.
and AFL leaders believe the Federation's financial and organiza-
tional support was significant. F. O., however, received much
more aid than the $30,000 the AFL gave to the F. O.'s national
office, and the hundred typewriters and twenty-five mimeograph
machines that were distributed throughout the country. On the
basis of Braden's article, it appears as if the American government
was the primary donor of this aid.

The AFL supported this U.S. policy, although it
wanted this aid distributed to provincial as well as local leaders but
it is difficult to determine the AFL's influence on the American government.
American officials, including Averell Harriman and Jefferson Caffery,
maintain the AFL did on occasion provide them with useful suggestions
and information. They insist, however, that the government's own
staff was well acquainted with the various tendencies in French labor
and that the United States Government did not rely on the AFL's
information and suggestions. Until the papers of the American government become available, it will be impossible to determine the decisive patterns of influence.¹

It is clear that the AFL played a considerable role in the creation of the Mediterranean Committee. Every significant participant in the Mediterranean Committee's activities, including ITF, F.O. and French and American government officials, credits the AFL with the major role in the Committee's creation and actions. Brown together with Ferri-Pisani mobilized the most important participants and secured the financial assistance of both the ITF and the American government.²

Effects on French Politics

The existence of F.O. and the Mediterranean Committee appears to have had mixed effects on French trade unionism and the economic and social conditions of French workers. Until the creation of F.O., non-Catholic workers on the whole were represented

¹It should perhaps be noted that there is no indication that the AFL used its leverage in Washington to pressure Truman into financially supporting French labor groups. AFL leaders maintain that in 1948, they would have supported Truman's re-election irrespective of the American government's aid to free trade unionism in Europe. Interviews, Lovestone, Dubinsky.

²Interviews, Oldenbroek, Becu, Brown, Lovestone, Piquemal, Baylot, Caffery. Braden also maintains that the CIA supported the Mediterranean Committee.
by a union structure dominated by a political party.\textsuperscript{1} Although the interests of trade unionism and the Communist Party sometimes overlapped, the CGT was clearly guided by C.P. interests. In other words, the CGT’s no-strike policy between 1945 and 1947 and the general strike policy in 1947 and 1948 resulted from C.P. directives rather than trade union interests.

F.O. leaders were free from this determining constraint. Although many F.O. leaders and militants were socialists, the F.O.’s lack of financial and organizational indebtedness to the SFIO, enabled the F.O. to remain aloof from Socialist Party politics when it decided the Party was not pursuing the workers\textsuperscript{1} best interests. This does not mean, of course, that F.O. always pursued the best interests of French workers. It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that F.O. was freer than the CGT to pursue these interests.

The existence of two rival non-Catholic union structures also led to competition between the two confederations. On one hand, this was useful in that competition and rivalry encouraged militant trade unionism. Each confederation, to secure the greatest possible support from the workers, wanted to appear to be the more militant. Hence, each had to outbid the other in securing better economic and social conditions for the workers. On the other hand, as Daniel Mayer insists, competition with the Communists led F.O. to make irresponsible, inflationary wage demands.\textsuperscript{2}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1}Almost all non-Communist observers believe that shortly after the war, the CGT fell under Communist domination.
\textsuperscript{2}Interview, Mayer.
\end{footnotesize}
A number of critics of the AFL and the F.O. have also maintained that the CGT split in 1947 led to the weakening of the French labor movement. Indeed, there is some evidence that the split in 1947, like previous trade union scissions in France, was damaging to the labor movement. Apparently, when a French labor or political grouping splits into two factions not all the militants take sides. Rather, one group remains in "la vieille maison," another part follows the scissionists, and a third, finding itself unable to choose between the first two, becomes apathetic and leaves the movement altogether. The total result is a weakening of the movement. ¹ The critics of the AFL and F.O maintain this happened in the late 1940's and French labor still has not recovered.

The partisans of F.O., however, point out that prior to the split, the CGT, because it was being used so blatantly to serve the Communist Party, was already losing large numbers of militants. They point to the declining strength of the CGT in social security elections, the increasing number of wildcat strikes, and the increasing strength of the independent and Amis de Forces Ouvrière labor groupings as evidence of the CGT's decline prior to the official scission. ² Indeed, far from weakening the labor movement, they maintain, the creation of F.O. strengthened organized labor by providing disillusioned non-Communist and non-Catholic trade unionists with a viable alternative to the CGT.

¹"Les Effectifs de la C. F. D. T." Les Études Sociales et Syndicales, December, 1965, p. 14. This article goes on to point out that this hypothesis is applicable to the CFTC split in 1965.

Another criticism of the AFL centers on the organization of the Mediterranean Committee. A number of non-Communist critics maintain that the Committee's concern with political-military affairs was detrimental to the building of trade unions. Specifically, it is maintained that the Committee frequently adopted expedient methods to unload ships (e.g., hiring strong arm men) instead of engaging in organizational drives and militant trade unionism. Ferri-Pisani, the Committee's Director, they argue, was a dynamic and intelligent man, but he was not a good union organizer. He spent little of his time on the mundane but necessary tasks of organization and administration. Furthermore, the Committee's organizers relied on ITF and American financing. When these funds were no longer available in the mid 1950's the strength of the F.O. maritime unions, which had been built up through the Mediterranean Committee declined drastically.

This criticism has also been applied to other sectors which received American aid. It is maintained that American aid did not encourage dynamic organization and that the organizers believed they would continue to receive external assistance. Also, the recipients of the aid were politically disadvantaged by the general knowledge that they were relying on external sources of financial support. ¹

¹Interviews, Lapeyre, Heberd, Froideval, Becu, Joseph La Palombara in The Italian Labor Movement: Problems and Prospects (Ithaca, N. Y.: 1957), pp. 57-58, maintains that external financial support was "dysfunctional" in Italy. There is no evidence, however, that French unions "lost their autonomy," or that AFL funds were used to support "Oligarchical patronage." Indeed, the AFL consistently disseminated its funds and equipment in the provinces rather than relying on the F.O. leaders whom the AFL regarded as bureaucratic.
The Committee's supporters, however, maintain that without external sources of support it would have been impossible to engage in organizational drives especially in the private sectors of the maritime industry. While they admit the Committee engaged in a number of non-trade union activities, they point out that vast amounts of human and material resources were deployed in trade union activities. These activities have not led to sustained organization because external financial aid has been cut off. Without external financial assistance, they point out, it is impossible to sustain strong unions in key sectors of the maritime and other private industries. The workers alone will not finance union organizers. The private, as opposed to the public sector, will not sustain union organizers. Hence, unless external assistance is forthcoming, the unions cannot employ sizeable numbers of organizers which they need if they are to remain effective.

Although several observers have maintained the French (and Italian) labor movements were "impotent,"¹ there are indications that the trade unions played a significant role in post-war French politics. First, it appears that organized labor was influential in the political socialization and indoctrination of trade unionists and probably other workers in contact with union militants.

¹See, for example, Walter Galenson, Trade Union Democracy in Western Europe (Berkeley, California: 1961), p. 1.
A number of scholars have maintained that the unions provided French workers with their political perspectives or "frames of reference." These scholars have pointed out that where Communist unions are strong (e.g., France and Italy) the Communist Party has a large electoral following. Where Communist-controlled unions are weak (e.g., Belgium) the Communist Party is electorally weak. The contentions of these scholars were confirmed by numerous interviews with French Communist and non-Communist union leaders and militants.

If these scholars and union leaders are correct, the creation of F.O. and the support of anti-Communist militants would appear to have reduced the Communists' electoral strength and counteracted, in part, the CGT's indoctrination of French workers. By bolstering morale and supporting anti-Communist militants, the AFL also appears to have contributed to the French public's support for the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, the European Coal and Steel Community and the Korean War, all of which were bitterly opposed by French Communists and their trade union forces.

The existence of F.O. may also have impeded the C.P.'s ability to sabotage the government's policies. Two of the clearest examples

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of this are the Marshall Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In both cases, the Communists and the CGT refused to participate in government planning and administrative committees. F.O., on the other hand, gave the government its complete cooperation, thus helping to ensure the interests of the French workers were taken into consideration in planning about France and helping to ensure the workers did not oppose the government's policies. Indeed, Georges Levard, a former CFTC leader, has suggested that if F.O. and the Christians had not supported the ECSC in 1950, other pressure groups (e.g., agricultural groups) following the trade unions' example, would have proved far more reluctant to support the Treaty of Rome,1 when it came up for ratification in the late 1950's.

F.O.'s connection with the AFL also increased the F.O.'s bargaining power in French and American government circles. As Paul Porter, a former Marshall Plan Administrator has pointed out, French and American officials knew of the close relationship between the AFL and the F.O. and knew that if they opposed the F.O. they might very well have to face the AFL's pressure in France and in the United States.2

1Interview, Levard.

2Interview, Porter. Jean Bocher, the F.O. and Mediterranean Committee leader in Cherbourg also has given me copies of letters he exchanged with American government officials. In these letters, Bocher, referring to his close association with Irving Brown, requested that American ships be diverted to Cherbourg to ensure the dockers did not remain idle.
There is also considerable evidence indicating that F.O. and the Mediterranean Committee may have been instrumental in preventing the Communists from successfully organizing political strikes. The tactics of the Mediterranean Committee have already been described. The Amis de Force Ouvrière and later, F.O. militants also urged workers not to engage in what they considered to be political strikes. If there was already a walkout, they distributed propaganda explaining how the strike was being used to support Communist and Soviet political objectives.¹ When they felt it was tactically wise and physically possible (e.g., when they believed they would not be assaulted by Communist strong-arm squads) they led the return to work.

Many workers were either unsympathetic to the CGT's political aims or believed a given strike was not tactically wise. Fearing psychological, economic or physical intimidation, however, they did not dare break "trade union solidarity" and return to work. When the F.O. militants led the return to work, many of these workers followed suit, thus forcing the CGT to call off the strike.²

Even before F.O. was established, the small groups of Amis de Force Ouvrière militants, in the railroad and PTT autonomes or independently in the mines, were instrumental in breaking Communist strikes. Not only did these small groups on occasion keep an entire

¹In their propaganda, the F.O. militants frequently referred to the CGT as the CGT-K; the K standing for Kominform.

²It should be pointed out that the French government's decision to "get tough" with the strikers in 1947 and 1948 and later on the docks in 1949 and 1950 was also partially responsible for the failure of the strikes. The French government acting without some trade union support, however, would probably have had a much more difficult time breaking the strikes. Interviews, Brown, Moch, Baylot, Carpentier, Philips.
sector functioning, but the anti-Communists first encouraged, and then led the return to work in the general strikes of 1947 and 1948. Although these efforts did not prevent the CGT from seriously crippling the economy and impeding French economic recovery in 1947, and 1948, by 1950, most observers, including AFL, F.O., Christian and Communist trade union leaders, believed the Communists needed the support of F.O., with its relatively small number of adherents to organize a successful strike. As Irving Brown reported in 1951,

The CGT remains the dominant trade union in France and still commands a 60 to 70% vote in trade union elections, especially in the basic industries... Yet, the curious thing about this CGT vote is that although they could get 75% in the Renault Works Council elections, the CGT in a strike ballot in April could get only 25% of the vote. It has become almost an absolute rule that the CGT can get the workers' vote in elections by an overwhelming majority, yet they cannot get workers to march either in a political or economic strike unless F.O. and the Christians are participating.

Brown went on to point out that the Communists were aware of this, and that is why they placed heavy emphasis on their united action policy. Indeed, a few years later, Frachon, to some extent, openly confirmed Brown's contentions. The CGT leader

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1In the middle of the strike, Maurice Thorez travelled from Russia to France on trains manned by members of Lafond's autonome.

2Report by Irving Brown, September 19, 1951, FTUC Archives.
pointed out that securing the support of the Christian trade unions, while easy, was insufficient. To carry the masses, especially in a strike, he said, it was necessary to bring about "unity of action" with F.O., and he encouraged the Communist militants to do everything possible to bring this about.\(^1\) All the F.O., CFTC and former officials of the French government familiar with post-war labor politics also confirmed these contentions.\(^2\)

It is more difficult to evaluate the role of the F.O. and Mediterranean Committee in impeding Communist attempts to use the CGT for espionage, paramilitary activities and a coup d'état. Val Lorwin has written that "Force Ouvrière could say with much justice that its action had saved France in 1947 from the fate of Czechoslovakia."\(^3\) Jules Moch, however, maintains that the Communists did not attempt to organize a coup de Prague till 1948. In an interview, Moch maintained that as Minister of the Interior in 1947-1948, he received information which convinced him that the French Communists in 1948 had adopted the strategy that brought the C.P. to power in Czechoslovakia. The CGT strikes, he believed, were being used to blackmail the government.


\(^2\)See appendix for list of those interviewed.

into accepting Communist ministers or to prevent anti-Communists, from occupying key ministerial posts.\textsuperscript{1} After this was accomplished, the Communists were planning to use their cadres and their control of strategic industrial sectors (e.g., electricity) to bring about a coup.

In the absence of additional information, it is, of course, impossible to confirm these contentions. It should be noted, however, that, even if the Communists did not consciously adopt the strategy they had employed in Czechoslovakia, the general strikes they organized created an insurrectional atmosphere and gave rise to what historically might be called revolutionary conditions. As Barrington Moore, Jr. has suggested:

\begin{quote}
The main factors that create a revolutionary mass are a sudden increase in hardship coming on top of quite serious privations, together with the breakdown of the routines of daily life--getting food, going to work, etc.--that tie people to the prevailing order...\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

Certainly F. O. and the Mediterranean Committee alone did not prevent these conditions from arising, nor did they prevent the Communists from following the strategy they used in Czechoslovakia.

\textsuperscript{1}Moch maintains that the French government in 1947 and 1948 had excellent sources of information in high Communist circles in France. Usually, Moch received detailed information on the French C. P.'s Central Committee meetings within 24 hours of the meeting's conclusion. See, also, Jules Moch, \textit{Rencontres Avec Léon Blum}, (Paris: 1970), pp. 319-323.

But as Lorwin, Moch and F. O. and AFL leaders have pointed out, F. O.'s cooperation with what was then "the prevailing order" reduced the chances of a revolutionary change in the French political system. ¹

It seems reasonable to assume that the Communists may have used their control of the CGT for espionage and paramilitary activities. Reference has already been made to previous Communist efforts to use the trade unions for this purpose and in the post-war period occasional examples of this tactic have come to light. In 1952, for example, French transport workers in and around the naval base at Toulon admitted that their CGT union superiors had ordered them to collect information on the numbers, armament and morale of troops embarking for Indo-China.² Again, F. O. and the Mediterranean Committee alone were unable to prevent these activities, but the existence of these organizations may have facilitated efforts to impede them. The Mediterranean Committee's activities have already been described. F. O.'s cooperation with the French and American governments resulted in the hiring of politically reliable skilled and unskilled workers at military bases and in classified projects of one kind or another.


²Interview, Brown and F. O. leaders. In 1950, the French Minister of the Merchant Marine denounced the CGT maritime unions as Cominform agencies and prohibited them from dealing with the loading of ships bound for Indo-China. ITF, Journal, February 12, 1951.
Thus, it appears that an American NGO was able to play a direct role in the international and French labor movements and an indirect role in French politics. First, it appears that the AFL was able to weaken the WFTU's hold over the international labor movement and the CGT's control of French workers. The AFL's actions appear to have helped exacerbate the tensions within the WFTU and facilitated the creation of the ICFTU. In France, the AFL's moral, organizational and material assistance, while certainly not the only factors, were important elements in the creation of F.O. and the Mediterranean Committee.

The tensions within the WFTU and the creation of the ICFTU, in turn, weakened the WFTU's control of the international labor movement. In France, the existence of F.O. and the Mediterranean Committee also appears to have affected the "socialization" of French workers and the ability of the CGT to influence the large numbers of workers' attitudes about specific issues (e.g., the Marshall Plan, NATO) as well as alternative systems of government. The existence of F.O. and the Mediterranean Committee also may have made it extremely difficult for the Communists in the CGT to sabotage the policies of the French government or to use the trade unions for political strikes. Finally, F.O. and the Mediterranean Committee may have made it difficult for the Communists
to use organized labor for a coup or for paramilitary activities, if indeed they had planned to do so. In sum, it appears that the AFL's support of non-communist European trade unionists helped prevent the Communists, if they planned to do so, from using organized labor for their purposes.
Chapter VIII

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this dissertation has been to demonstrate first, that NGOs and in particular trade unions, are sometimes significant international actors in their own right, as well as instruments in the hands of the major actors. The second purpose of the thesis has been to explain the post-war perspectives of the AFL policymakers and the experiences that have reinforced and altered perspectives of the AFL, now the AFL-CIO, decision makers.

Throughout this dissertation an attempt has been made to explain how organized labor can play a significant role in domestic and international politics. Organized labor can be an actor in its own right or it can be an instrument in the hands of another actor. To prove this assertion, an attempt has been made to illustrate why and how the AFL attempted to prevent the Russians from acquiring control of international and national labor organizations. As was demonstrated in the last chapter, the AFL, by providing moral, material, and organizational support to non-communist trade unionists, appears to have played a significant role in preventing
these developments. By helping to prevent the Communists from gaining complete control of the international and French labor movements, the AFL appears to have denied the Kremlin a significant instrument of policy. Thus, it seems as if an independent trade union movement such as the AFL can be an important actor and that control of a labor movement can be a significant instrument of policy.

By implication, it would appear that an understanding of world politics requires an understanding of the role that trade unions are playing. In this sense, as was discussed in the introduction, organized labor may be conceived of as an analytical concept. By asking questions about the role labor is playing or can play, we may gain greater understanding of particular political developments and politics in general. Indeed, this study indicates not only how the Russians may have planned to establish their hegemony over Europe, and why the U.S. government after 1947 began to aid European unions, it also demonstrates the linkages or absence of linkages that exist between NGOs, the government, and the people in the United States.

As was pointed out in the introduction and has been suggested throughout this study, the AFL particularly in the early post-war years, appears to have acted independently of the U.S. government. Unfortunately, all the relevant information, particularly classified U.S. government files, is not available. These files might reveal a linkage which has been hidden
until now. At present, however, there is very little evidence to indicate that the U.S. government pressured the AFL in the early post-war years. Although AFL leaders frequently met with U.S. officials, it was usually with the aim of encouraging the government to adopt AFL policy and not the other way around. The AFL's files also indicate the union leaders did not expect to receive government support and that they did not receive this support during the early post-war years. Moreover, a former CIA official has maintained that the U.S. government did not become involved until much later.

After the implementation of the Marshall Plan, the links between the Government and the AFL become much more complex. Without the relevant government documents, however, it is impossible to ascertain who influenced whom and on what issues. Some U.S. officials have maintained that they were involved in the AFL's programs in the 1950's; others have maintained that there was little influence either way. The records of the AFL contain some ambiguous references to discussions with U.S. officials about securing assistance for the provincial non-communist labor leaders and the AFL officials maintain that they encouraged the U.S. government to provide the European labor sector with assistance, just as the AFL supported Marshall Plan assistance to the business sector.

That the AFL acted independently of the U.S. government is not surprising given the AFL's tradition of independence from purely political
institutions. Although the AFL had been developing closer ties with the Democratic Party and the President during the early post-war years, was a Democrat, the relationship between the Democratic Party and the AFL was based almost completely on domestic issues and programs and not on foreign policy. Moreover, there is no indication in the AFL's records that either the government, the Democratic Party or the AFL foreign policy makers raised the question of the AFL's ties with the Democrats during the period under consideration.

Finally, it should be noted that whenever the AFL leadership differed with the U.S. government, even when they supported the incumbent President, the labor leaders did not shrink from criticising the government and supporting another position. The early post-war period is no exception. The AFL and the dominant strand in the U.S. government, differed in their perception of Soviet behavior. AFL leaders were convinced the Russians were interested in world revolution as well as expanding their control of Eastern and Western Europe and that they would seize every conceivable opportunity to achieve these objectives. As was discussed in the introduction, many American leaders at the end of World War II were much more optimistic about Soviet objectives. Indeed, it was not until late 1946 that most of the leading decision makers in the U.S. government were convinced that the Russians intended to secure control
of Western Europe.¹

The diverging expectations, particularly in the early post-war period, led to divergent action. In 1944 the AFL created the "Free Trade Union Fund" and "Free Trade Union Committee" and in 1945 refused to join the WFTU and cooperate with communist-controlled national centers. Immediately after the war, AFL leaders publicly were denouncing communist tyranny in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They maintained the Russians were not genuinely interested in cooperation to maintain peace and improve economic and social conditions. The Communists, AFL leaders argued, only sought western cooperation to facilitate the world revolution. In early 1946, the AFL also began to provide material assistance to those who wished to fight against communist control.

¹Needless to say, as has been pointed out, not all American officials shared these optimistic assumptions. Averell Harriman, George Kennan, Jefferson Caffery and James Forrestal, for example, were far less sanguine than most of their colleagues. c.f., George Kennan, Memoirs. (Boston. 1967). Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: (1961).
The American government on the other hand did not begin to counteract communist pressure in Western Europe until late 1946 with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The American government, hoping the Russians were interested in post-war stability, immediately demobilized American military forces and attempted to cooperate with the Russians. Although the U.S. refused to accede to all Soviet demands, major steps were not taken to assist the non-communist West Europeans morally or materially until late 1946 and 1947.

Far from subordinating themselves to the interests of the American government and American corporations, it could be argued that the AFL leaders were instrumental in determining post-war American policy. The AFL leadership's expectations and perceptions gradually came to be accepted by the leadership of American government. By 1947-48, the Truman administration had abandoned its hope that the Russians were interested in cooperation and the American government began to work actively with non-communist Europeans to help prevent the continent falling under Soviet domination.

There is little evidence, however, that the AFL played a major role in shaping the expectations and perceptions of leading American policymakers. Undoubtedly, the AFL played some role in "educating" the American government, particularly in the realities of post-war labor politics. The AFL's warnings and analysis, as was
pointed out, were widely disseminated. The AFL leadership frequently met or corresponded with lower ranking American officials such as Jefferson Caffery and James Forrestal (before he became Secretary of Defense). Possibly these officials passed along the AFL's views to the top levels of the American government. There is no indication, however, that the AFL leadership directly influenced Truman, Byrnes and Marshall.¹

After the U.S. decision to directly assist in the economic recovery and defense of Europe, the links between the American government and the AFL became more difficult to disentangle. Undoubtedly, the AFL leaders were delighted with the American decision to actively resist the Communists in Europe. The AFL immediately supported Truman's policy and urged the Congress to

¹The memoirs of Truman, Byrnes, Acheson and other high officials in the post-war Truman Administration contain no references to discussion of Russian policy with AFL leaders. Nor do the AFL and FTUC archives contain many references to discussion of this subject among high government officials. Lovestone did correspond directly with Forrestal and later with Harriman when the latter was special assistant to the President. Brown was also frequently in touch with Generals Clay and Eisenhower. There are other references to discussion with high ranking American officials. There is no indication, however, that the AFL played a major role in changing American assumptions with respect to the Soviet Union.
assist non-communist trade unionists. The AFL may have facilitated American efforts to materially assist the European non-communists by providing names of reliable trade unionists and low risk channels to reach them. American officials such as Ambassador Averell Harriman and Jefferson Caffery, however, maintained that AFL assistance, while helpful was not decisive in the execution of American policy.

Even if the archives of the American government were open, however, it would still be difficult to determine the precise role the AFL played in policy formulation and execution. It is difficult for example, to determine the significance of the AFL's support in Truman's initial decision to create the ERP. It certainly must have been comforting for Truman to know that he could rely on AFL support for his policy, irrespective of the CIO equivocation and the opposition of communist-controlled labor organizations in Europe. In this connection, it is interesting to speculate on what might have happened if the AFL had opposed the Marshall Plan. In Congressional hearings on ERP appropriations, for example, several Senators questioned the efficacy of the Plan if organized labor opposed it and pointed out that there was considerable opposition to the Plan in labor circles in Europe.\footnote{U.S. Senate, Hearings, U.S. Assistance, Part II, European Economic Recovery, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 836-841.} If the AFL had
opposed the ERP and if the AFL had not organized European trade union support for the Plan, consensus in the Congress, the White House, the press and the public might not have been immediately forthcoming. Instead, there might have been a prolonged divisive debate on a policy that required rapid implementation. ¹

While it is difficult to determine the precise role the AFL played in the formulation of post-war public opinion and in U.S. policy making, the AFL may have played a significant role in these processes. As has been pointed out, in a prolonged struggle for public support, the unions can play a significant role in socializing or educating their members. Indeed, political leaders are most reluctant to alienate a large non-governmental organization with a mass membership if they require sustained public support for their policies. Thus, it would appear, that organized labor's support

¹In this connection, Richard M. Freeman, in a published version of a dissertation written under the supervision of Gabriel Kolko, maintains that Truman was very much concerned about building public support for the Marshall Plan. Freeman suggests that Truman, in fact, contributed to the creation of "McCarthyism," because he believed the public and the Congress would not be willing to support his anti-communist foreign policy without a domestic "red scare". Richard M. Freeman, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism, passim.
for massive involvement in European economic recovery and defense may have played an important, if not dramatic role, in post-war American policy.

By implication, organized labor and other NGOs are also of interest to those who wish to direct, as well as understand, world politics. Controlling or denying others control of organized labor may be a significant factor in long and short run propaganda activities, attempts to change governments through legal and illegal means, and in a variety of paramilitary activities.

The second purpose of this dissertation has been to describe the perspectives which influenced the selection of the AFL's course of action in the past because many of the same values and theories are still held, perhaps even more strongly, today.

The post-war experiences altered the perspectives of the AFL leaders in several ways. First, many previously held expectations were reinforced. Specifically, the belief of the AFL leaders that Communists and non-communist trade unionists cannot successfully co-exist in the same organization for long was strengthened. AFL leaders in interviews constantly pointed to the inability of the non-communists in the WFTU and CGT (and the Italian CGIL) to prevent the communists from controlling the organizations. The CIO, they maintain, was only able to shake off communist control because the CIO leadership helped purge
several CIO unions and because the atmosphere in the late 1940's in the U. S. was anti-communist. Bringing communists into free trade unions, they maintained, only confused the workers and made it easier for the communists, with their discipline and extra-legal tactics to infiltrate other institutions in democratic pluralistic systems.

Second, the post-war experience vastly increased the AFL leaders' appreciation of the role that trade unions can play in political-military affairs. As was pointed out, Lovestone and those in New York who had worked directly with the European underground during World War II had some appreciation of the potential range of trade union activities. As a result of their post-war experiences, however, the entire foreign policy leadership shared these expectations. Indeed, the post-war years provided George Meany with his foreign policy "schooling." When Meany became President of the AFL in 1952, and later President of the AFL-CIO, he carried with him the expectations and perceptions that AFL leaders had developed in the late 1940's.

Thus, it is hardly surprising that the AFL policy from 1945 to 1952 provided the framework for the Federation's policies in the ensuing years. AFL leaders believed their actions in the later 1940's played an important role in maintaining democratic
pluralism in the major European countries. As a result, they came to believe in the duty of the Federation to provide moral, organizational, and financial support for democratic trade union forces in other parts of the world. AFL, now AFL-CIO, leaders have vastly expanded the Federation's activities and the resources allocated to foreign affairs, but the underlying assumptions and policy appears to have remained the same.\(^1\)

Finally, the broader political conception of trade unions the AFL's leaders developed in the late 1940's appears to have affected the Federation's domestic policy. The Federation's leaders became more conscious of the role they could play in domestic politics and altered their traditional views on several key domestic issues.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) As was pointed out in the last chapter in the late 1940's the AFL was spending approximately $80-100,000 per year to support its foreign policy. By 1955, the Federation was spending $240,000 per year and ten years later the AFL-CIO was spending three times the AFL's 1955 expenditures. See the Executive Council and Secretary Treasurer's Reports in the Proceedings, 1948, 1949, 1955, 1965. See, also, my own "The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and Spanish Politics," M.A. Thesis, Columbia University, 1967.

\(^2\) The AFL, for example, had always opposed peacetime military conscription. In 1948, however, as a response to the Federation's involvement in national security politics in a number of European countries, the Federation modified its views and supported a selective service system. See the Proceedings, 1947, p. 656 and Proceedings, 1948, pp. 161, 463, 465.
In sum, this study has sought to demonstrate that NGOs, and organized labor in particular, play a significant role in world politics. Organized labor can be used as an analytical concept (as a guide to research) as well as an instrument of policy (a guide to action). Finally, an understanding of the AFL leadership's early post-war perspectives not only helps explain AFL policy from 1945-1952 but also helps to explain contemporary AFL-CIO policy.