FREE MARKET ECONOMIES
AND
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Prepared in cooperation with the

Department of Economic and Social Development
American Institute for Free Labor Development/AFL-CIO

by

Richard L. Hough

-0-0-0-
FREE MARKET ECONOMIES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

With the intersection in time between the collapse of command economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and the worldwide quickening of the pace of democratization, the conventional wisdom has emerged that democracy and free market economies are mutually reinforcing. The policy line of U.S. Government officials reflects this comforting but simplistic supposition. The worldview of the U.S. Agency for International Development, for example, is that "Democracy is complementary to and supportive of the transition to market oriented economies..." As the AID Administrator Ronald Roskens put it last year "democratic capitalism ... is recognized as the universal model for prosperity and freedom." Given the worldwide trends toward democratization of polities and marketization of economies, this rhetoric suggests an optimistic picture of continuing progress.

Clearly, the linkage between democratic institutions and market economies deserves examination below the level of policy rhetoric. There are inter-relations between the two, but they can cut either way. If the democratic and market institutions are reasonably stable and effective performers, they will reinforce each other in positive ways, helping to consolidate each other's legitimacy. But if they are seriously flawed likenesses of what they should be, marked by ineffectual performance and great injustices, the effect of the relationship will very likely be the opposite,

---

characterized by the deterioration of both sets of institutions.

In Latin America, as nowhere else in the world, the tandem of democratization and free markets has gained ideological respectability. The drives in numerous Latin American nations towards deflation of the public sector through the privatization of publicly-owned capital assets, the dismantling of import substitution regulations to allow a competitive international market, rather than government subsidy, to determine product price, and the encouragement of private foreign investment are reflective of traditional policy desiderata of more open, less statist economies. Paralleling this seeming devolution of economic structure and decision-making, for example, in Argentina, Chile and Mexico, has been the decade-long return to democratic forms through virtually the entire Southern Hemisphere. All the more reason then to give closer scrutiny to the inter-relations between democracy and market economies as they pertain to Latin America.

II

It is important first to review briefly the meanings of democracy and a free market economy, at least as the terms are rendered here.

Democracy is a political system of governance. It has four major components: 1) political competition; 2) political participation; 3) basic civil liberties; and 4) the rule of law. The struggle for power must be competitive with regular, non-coercive elections being the principal means of competition, the means of determining the winners and the losers among the contending individuals, groups and issues. Political parties are customarily the intermediary agents that
organize the competition. Participation in this process must be socially inclusive. Excluding certain groups because of ethnicity, sectarian affiliation, or other discriminatory restrictions violates democratic principle.

Distinguishing democratic politics is a broad set of civil liberties, specifically freedom of speech, association, press and religion, without which, self evidently, there can be no genuine political competition and participation. Legitimizing the democratic system is the existence of a neutral, objective authority, at least in the ideal, which limits the exercise of arbitrary power; what western peoples call the rule of law.  

This definition is systemic. Each component depends on the other. Without one, the whole is compromised. For example, Guatemala, even though it has more or less free elections, is at best an incomplete democracy given that its military establishment is still largely an autonomous institution, exercising arbitrary power removed from or above law.

One could add that it has been an often repeated error of U.S. foreign policy in seeking to promote the democratic process in Latin America to equate democracy largely with elections. When the other democratic ingredients are at best marginal to the body-politic, we delude ourselves as to what the results of this cyclical experiment with democracy will be this time around in Latin America.

Nourishing the democratic system are the softer, less precise "belief systems of democracy", that is, the values of compromise, civility, tolerance, respect for the individual,

---

2 The definition draws upon the interpretation of democracy in Diamond, Linz & Lipset (Eds.), Politics in Developing Countries, Lynne Rienner (Boulder 1990) pp. 6-9.
and acceptance of pluralism, which socially moderate, or contain, the struggle for power. However, these values do not necessarily have to be ingrained in the social fabric of a nation before the advent of democratic institutions, or in their infancy. In more cases than not, the origins of a democratic government trace back to elite accommodations, brokered understandings between ruling groups persuaded that a democratic solution is in their mutual best interests.

This was the case with the long-lasting democracy in Chile where Manuel Bulnes, the great Chilean President and General, in the 1840s laid the groundwork for the consolidation of democracy by contriving the acceptance of democratic practices by the landed gentry, the conservatives, and the new middle class of liberals, in part by substantially diminishing the political power of the Army. Neither the conservatives nor liberals were dedicated believers in democratic values. An accommodation was progressively worked out by the contending elites to play by democratic rules for real-politic reasons that were largely removed from ideological commitment. This accommodation provided the basis for a democratic experience which spanned well over a century, until 1973.  

As historically reflected in Chile, democratic belief systems take root through habitual practice. Democracy is largely a learned experience. It gains popular legitimacy by continuous repetition of its processes. Though it mainly prescribes means such as parties, elections and legislative bodies, its core values run to the concept of the civil society, those elements of society which exist detached from the State and which facilitate the social role of voluntary organizations.

---

3 See Arturo Valenzuela, "Chile: Origins, Consolidation and Breakdown of a Democratic Regime" in Diamond, et.al. Politics in Developing Countries.
such as trade unions, professional associations and religious
groups, to note a few among the multitude. Civil society
blunts the extremes of individualism and collectivism and is
a potent means for constraining both the State and the
market.⁴

On the free market side of the coin, the economy is based on
a non-prescribed, or non-coercive, exchange of products and
services by multiple economic agents. The values of the
transactions are competitively determined by supply and demand
as realized in the play of unregulated prices. Freedom of
association for all manner of economic relations is legally
protected, including the constituting of groups such as
private businesses, corporations, trade unions, banking
institutions, foundations, and cooperatives. Economic power
and actions are in effect substantially dispersed. The right
of private property, both for productive and personal uses, is
legally secured, including free acquisition and sale. Laws
also ensure the free exchange of information and free access
to markets.⁵

The function of government is primarily one of regulation, not
control. Its responsibility, inter alia, is to protect
against those economic practices, such as restraints in trade,
cartels, and price fixing that subvert free competitive
markets.

---


⁵ I am indebted to John D. Sullivan for this definition of
a free market economy. See his chapter "A Market-
oriented approach to Democratic Development" in Goldman,
Douglas (eds.) Promoting Democracy, Opportunities and
It is particularly important to distinguish between free market economies and mercantilism. The latter, aptly described as "crony capitalism" by Filipinos is endemic in Latin America. It involves favorable economic dispensations by the government to privileged individuals and companies, such as selective access to import licenses and foreign exchange, exclusive rights of production and commerce, and subsidized credit. Crony capitalism mirrors the concentration of economic power across the public and private sectors by elite groups, allowing them to minimize risks and maximize profits. Such practices mock the principles of a free, competitive market system. They corrupt the political system as well.

These definitions obviously describe the ideal. They provide vantage points for viewing realities that are much more complex and resistant to characterization. The juncture of the two definitions is in their shared concept of freedom. The values of freedom of association and information are central to both democracy and a free market economy. Clearly economic freedom and political freedom are inextricably linked.

However, this linkage needs qualification. Economic liberties are at least in part instrumental values, allowing for the play of entrepreneurship and the largely unfettered acquisition and disposal of material things. POLITICO-social liberties, on the other hand, are less yielding to limitation, since they are premised more directly on the reality of the individual as an autonomous being, as against the State, which is an artificial creation. There is indeed an intimate relation between the values of political and economic freedom; one which lends authenticity to the ideal of democratic capitalism. However, the two are not the same in regard to the degree to which they should be subject to state
regulation. Limiting private property rights that produce restraints in trade is different from limiting, or prior restraints on, freedom of the press or of religion. Laissez faire economists vintage Milton Friedman or Friedrich von Hayek, would have us believe that political and economic liberties are equally sacrosanct. Much depends on the role given to the state in regulating or limiting the two forms of freedom, principally in light of social and economic justice, or the welfare of the broader community.

- III -

Much of the rhetoric coupling democracy and market economies largely passes over the relationships between the primary variables. For example, do the economic variables of the free market animate the political ones of democratic institution-building, or vice versa? A modest proposition would be that when the overlapping characteristic of freedom is operative, that is, when it is the primary variable, the two systems will be mutually reinforcing. Obviously, there is the example of the Western industrial nations with relatively free economies and stable democratic institutions, with basic political freedoms essentially honored, to draw upon in making this argument. However in Latin America reality diverges from the ideal. Short-lived democracies, elite-controlled markets and the absence of pluralism, that is, traditions of dispersal of power through arrays of different social and economic organizations, have been customary practice. There are of course exceptions, for example, in Costa Rica and Chile. However, stable democracies and free markets have not been the historic reality of Latin America. They are better seen in the perspective of aspirations or goals to be sought.

What we see rather is an imperfect world of fragile democratic governments, concentrations of economic power still largely in
the hands of traditional oligarchies -- with the further dimension of multi-national corporations now adding their assets and power to those of the oligarchies -- and huge inequalities in the distribution of wealth. The danger is that in trumpeting the virtues of free markets when such markets do not exist, or if they do only in very limited ways, and linking them to an incomplete and dicey democratization process, we misread present realities in Latin America. We ignore the combustible elements involved which may lead both to the deterioration of democracy and losing the present opportunity to create more open, pluralistic economies.

No doubt, in the past decade, the nations of Latin America have made significant progress in instituting democracy. However, progress is uneven and short-term. Democratic institutions have not been consolidated, beyond apprehension of disruption and collapse. They are unstable, reflecting unreliable performance, corruption, and unpracticed, uncertain popular support.

Political competition and participation are flawed by the absence of developed representative institutions, principally legislative bodies, with the authority and expertise to provide the framework of laws and rules of conduct for viable mass democracies. The non-governmental organizations which provide life and vitality to the civil society, and give the popular sectors a genuine role in public affairs exist largely on the margins of power. Basic freedoms are compromised, or always in danger of being so, by arbitrary military interventions into the social and political life of the nation and by weak, malfunctioning judicial systems as well. Similarly, the rule of law is honored mostly in the breach.

The legitimacy of the democratic system hangs too much on the performance of the present occupants of power; those who run
the government and political organizations by virtue of democratic election and appointment. The popular tendency is to equate the legitimacy of the democratic system with the performance of its present managers. If that performance is poor and corrupt, to the point of being perhaps intolerable, the democratic system itself will be in peril. The space needed to separate the system from its practitioners in the popular mind, so that the rascals can be periodically thrown out without jeopardizing the integrity of the system itself, takes time to allow popular confidence to develop through the continuous practice of democratic processes.

There is room to doubt whether overt military coups are the principal threat to the political democracies in Latin America today. Rather, what is at stake is the consolidation of democratic institutions. If democratic civilian governments do not function with some measure of enhanced efficiency, stability and equity, they will progressively weaken, forfeiting real power, or the authority to deal effectively with the major problems confronting their countries. A facade of democracy will likely be maintained but political power will revert to traditional military and related, narrowly-based elitist groups. Democracy will lose ground. Its consolidation setback by inept governance.

- IV -

The considerable number of Latin American governments in varying stages of implementing policies of trade liberalization, privatization and fiscal discipline are breaking new ground in opening-up their economies. These policies are major pieces of economic restructuring programs which reflect, at least putatively, an intent to gut the vitals of crony capitalism and roll back traditional mercantilistic practices which facilitate the exploitation by
privileged elites of sheltered, non-competitive domestic markets. Oligopoly is to be progressively displaced by the development of free market economies.

Progress is apparent. Trade liberalization measures lowering tariffs and eliminating and/or streamlining import licenses are being put into effect in more than a few countries. Although progress is spotty, the governments of such countries as Chile, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil have taken significant steps to expose their markets to more international competition. Also, as free market advocates are wont to point out, privatization programs in Argentina and Mexico, for example, have diminished the role of over-grown, public sectors which in Latin America have often been corrupt and inefficient. Uncommon fiscal discipline as well has meant that more countries are living closer to their present means.

The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean averaged a three percent growth rate in 1991, a modest rate, but a turnaround improvement when compared with the extended decline of the 1980s. Inflation rates significantly abated with the exception of Brazil. The net transfer of capital favored inflows, a sharp reversal of the past several years, reflecting both a return of flight capital and increased foreign private investment. These performance indices mirror glimmers of returning investor confidence in the region's economies as well as some willingness on the part of those on the lower and middle rungs of the economic ladder to wait to see the extent that the reforms will benefit them.

However, benefits -- more jobs, new economic opportunities -- are slow to trickle down. The 1991 Overview report of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) points out that if anything the economic position of the lower classes has worsened under the pressures and
dislocation of the restructuring programs in the region: "These new rules of public policy undoubtedly involve, however, even greater inequality of income than in the past, a more precarious employment situation (and) a still tighter fiscal environment.... The region still suffers from the great mass of backlogs and shortcomings caused by the legacy of long-standing inequalities, now increased by the social cost of the adjustment."

In virtually all the economies of the region, unemployment and underemployment rates are double digit, the seriousness of which is compounded by a progressively younger work force due to previously excessive though now diminishing population growth rates. In Chile, Venezuela and Brazil, unemployment rates have recently been on the increase. Per capita GNPs adumbrating the depths of poverty range from $1,760 in Central America to $2,080 in South America and in the Caribbean, $790 in the Dominican Republic, $400 in Haiti and $1,200 in Jamaica. (1991 World Population Data Sheet of the Population Reference Bureau.) The distribution of wealth, both capital and land, remains severely skewed in favor of the few rich. For example, in Brazil, from data of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, in 1990, the poorest 50 percent of the population held 12.6 percent of the national income while the richest 10 percent retained 51 percent. 1991 data of the United Nations Development Programme indicate that 62 percent of Latin American population subsists at poverty levels; 160 million in severe conditions of poverty.

The consolidation, rather than breakdown, of the new democracies in Latin America is in some measure dependent on the economic and social conditions that define the quality of life of the mass of citizens. If the economies are marked with extensive poverty and great inequalities in opportunity and services while at the same time the democratic
institutions function poorly and are corrupt, the inter-
relation will indeed be reinforcing; however the reinforcement
will be negative, tending to induce democratic deterioration
rather than consolidation. Recent events in Peru and
Venezuela lend credibility to this view.

What is apparent in most of Latin America today is that the
restructuring/stabilization policies, keynoted by free market,
anti-statist principles, have to produce results in the
reasonable near-term; results which will ameliorate desperate
poverty, open job opportunities for the un/underemployed and
provide renewed hope of improved living conditions for the
vast majority of the people in the popular sectors of the
economies. The near-term situation is volatile. The
counterpart of patience is hope or expectation. Popular
expectations have been raised. If they are not at least
partially realized, the staying power of the democratization
process is at best problematic.

Both democracy and free market economies place a high premium
on human freedom. Indeed, freedom links the two sets of
principles. Both are buttressed by political and economic
pluralism; or put differently, by the democratic belief that
political unity and economic growth are best served by valuing
human diversity and its free expression, recognizing that the
inevitable conflicts -- and compromises -- which emerge from
the myriad of plural interests which organize this diversity
are sources of social strength, not weakness.

The right of freedom of association is self evidently
fundamental to both sets of principles. However, in Latin
America, honoring freedom of association is more on the
political and economic margins than in the mainstream of civil
society. There is a common tendency, for example, for free market advocates to strongly defend freedom of association for private sector capital enterprise and then ignore the lack of the very same freedom for groups whose interests may conflict with the former.

The status of the democratic trade union movements in many Latin American nations reflects this inconsistency. The movements continue to struggle for identity and acceptance in a largely hostile environment. Illustrative of this is the fact that national trade union leaders, despite the direct and immense interests they have in the issues involved, essentially are being excluded from participation in the policy dialogue from which the current economic restructuring and stabilization programs have taken shape and are being implemented. Government officials, representatives of international financial institutions and business and commercial elites have proceeded with the deliberative, decision-making process without meaningful consultation with organized labor.

It seems clear that decisions on important national economic and social questions, and the resolution of major interest conflicts, are still largely brokered-out by the traditional monied leadership with minimum popular input, or pluralistic participation, from below. With too few exceptions, the reality of pluralism has but surface roots in Latin America. It is still too much seen through the eyes of Simon Bolivar as dreaded factionalism that subverts the cornerstone value of collective unity.

Violations of freedom of association for working people to organize trade and agrarian unions to represent their interests are common in many Latin American countries. The right to strike, bargain collectively and seek redress for
grievances as well are unduly limited or, in reality, non-existent in numerous countries.

In Brazil, rural trade unions somehow survive in a precarious, violent environment. Trade union legal rights such as labor contracts are violated by plantation owners with impunity. The use of intimidation and violence against trade union officials and members is pervasive. Political assassination of agrarian leaders is common, and the use by management of non-union workers, particularly in the sugar cane regions during the peak cutting period, is a general practice designed to undermine union power. The prevailing lawlessness is accentuated by customarily passive government authorities who tend to intervene only in the most flagrant circumstances. The desperate plight of the rural trade unions in Brazil caricatures any meaningful concept of freedom of association, notwithstanding what Brazilian law formally prescribes.

In Guatemala, the democratic trade union movement is weak and insecure. Only 5 to 6 percent of the workers are organized which is the lowest percentage of any country in Central America. Freedom of association is a fiction when labor leaders are regularly subject to arbitrary arrests and detentions for legal union activities; where parallel company unions are organized to thwart the development of authentic unions; where legal recognition of unions by the government is delayed endlessly so as to inhibit the growth of the labor movement; and where management retaliation against legitimate trade union activities, such as dismissals, vandalism and threats, are common practice. Freedom of association may be sanctified in the Guatemalan Constitution, but as far as the trade union movement is concerned, reality is quite different, marked by government and private sector hostility and the fear of repression.
In the Dominican Republic, in the past few years, at least 200 employees of eight companies operating in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were fired for carrying out union organizing activities, or seeking recognition for their unions. All of the Secretary Generals of the unions were included among those dismissed, as well as a considerable number of Executive Committee members. The number fired is likely closer to 500 in 29 companies. It is difficult to obtain conclusive evidence that indicates the extent that union activity was the real reason for the dismissals. However, the evidence does substantiate numerous violations by multi-national firms of workers' freedom of association in the EPZs, facilitated by Dominican government support of the EPZs and a disinclination to act decisively in the face of the violations.

In El Salvador and Paraguay, the labor codes include provisions prohibiting trade union organization in the public sector. In addition, traditional hostility and active resistance by private sector business and professional organizations to urban and rural union movements, supported in many cases by the military, make labor activism a dicey business at best.

In Panama, laws passed as recently as 1990, sharply restrict the right to bargain collectively and to strike. Compulsory arbitration is also sanctioned, ostensibly to avoid economically destructive strikes and work place disruptions.

The hoary resistance to the development of genuine plural bases of political and economic power lingers on in Latin American political culture, as demonstrably reflected in elite discomfort with trade unions.
VI.

The opening-up of Latin American economies through trade liberalization, privatization and major cut-backs in public spending and subsidies will not necessarily break up the concentration of wealth; it may be repositioned somewhat but still remain largely in the hands of the same or similarly-placed elites. The present restructuring programs can in fact end-up reinforcing the status quo of manifestly unjust income distribution.6 The trickle down of benefits to middle and lower classes is neither assured nor quick-paced. Collateral steps to promote some movement towards a progressive redistribution of wealth and opportunity -- or to stay the acceleration of the present maldistribution -- would seem compelling in terms of maintaining stability and honoring some measure of equity; for example, social programs that cushion the poor from the worst effects of retrenchment and austerity, as well as tax and pricing policies of similar purpose.

Precisely, to pursue such objectives -- to play a significant role in the transition from State-dominated to market-led economies -- is the mainline strategy of the democratic trade union movements in most of Latin America. The advocacy of equitable burden sharing as well as establishing safety nets,

---

6 Note the comment of Jose Sarney quoted by Thomas Kamm in the Wall Street Journal, April 16, 1992: "Former Brazilian President Jose Sarney denounced the economic changes as 'Elitist' and said they serve the interest of the reigning world order. 'Their results are pseudo-stability' he wrote. 'Inflation goes down, international banks receive their interest payments and dividends, the country is considered adjusted and what's left is unemployment, slave wages, and terrible social indicators. This isn't an isolated process. It's happening in all countries.'
using some of the government's assets realized through privatization, and of meaningful participation by organized labor in policy discussions with the government and the international financial institutions, are components of this strategy. That trade union leaders generally have been less than successful in pursuing this strategy seems clear, possibly excepting Chile.

In a sense, one can argue that the radical economic restructuring programs in Latin America today are really not so radical after all, at least from one socio-economic perspective. The status quo of great disparities of wealth and power has not changed; indeed, in the short run, the disparities have intensified among the middle class as well as the lumpen poverty-blighted mass below. The pain of the readjustment is certainly not being equitably shared. Rather, "shock treatment" strategies have been largely followed, implementing all the major measures in a short period, while opportunity appears politic, instead of spreading them over time, thereby lessening hardship and dislocation. The international financial institutions bear some responsibility for such strategies given the significant role they have played in formulating them with member government officials.

It may be that traditional Latin American mercantilism has been mortally wounded, particularly in the Caribbean Basin. But what is it being replaced by, at least in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean islands? By maquilas, or exporting processing zones, which are promoted and subsidized abundantly by the host governments, cloistered from the domestic economy and organized labor. EPZs are egregious violators of free market principles; another form of cartelization that benefits foreign companies, the domestic financial interests that they are linked to, and the governments which support both.
AFL-CIO President, Lane Kirkland in an address to the Socialist International in 1990, observed that "the State embodies and magnifies the frailties of man and his capacity for good or ill. The State entrenched and unopposed is, in its extremes, an engine of oppression .... The State, held within democratic bounds by free citizens jealous of their rights, is the indispensible instrument of human progress."

Dismantling the oppressive, mindless State controls of command economies, or shrinking the public payrolls and interminable regulations of Statist mercantilistic economies, does not mean that the role of government should radically recede in the face of a now unfettered market economy. Government, as the institutional embodiment of the authority of the State, should be viewed as the balancing wheel of the civil society that has the responsibility to maintain a tolerable equilibrium between the acquisitive, and covetous, drives of the market place and the requirements of equity and justice within the broader community. Without such a role, citizens are left exposed to "the jungle of the unregulated marketplace," which progressively becomes less competitive and less free.

Indeed, for markets to be free, government regulations protecting competitive access to the markets, freedom of association and the free flow of information, are essential requirements. A genuine market economy can only be built on a foundation of laws and regulations that provide the rules of the game and insure the authority of the government to intervene to protect these rules.⁷

⁷ Hernando de Soto clearly perceives the crucial role of the State as the ultimate guarantor of free market conditions. He writes: "We must have a state that is capable and strong.... Deregulation would mean freeing public resources so that the state could use them to insure that strict, efficient rules of the game were imposed and that the freedom that individuals would then
In Latin America today, legitimizing this balancing, regulatory role of government within civil society while avoiding the excesses of authoritarian regimentation or unbridled economic exploitation, is essential to the prospects of democracy and the development of market economies. Free markets cannot mean the freedom of the few to exploit the many.

VII.

The emergence of free market ideas and prescriptions and the revival of democratic forms in Latin America have been more or less contemporaneous, though the former have surged forward more toward the end of the latter process. Notwithstanding the contemporaneity, there appears to be little evidence to indicate that a mutually-supportive relationship is developing between the two, at least in the short term.

If one hazards the judgement that the two systems are, or will be, complementary to each other in Latin America, one has to extend the time prospective. With a progressive consolidation of democratic institutions and the growth of market practices that are more or less open and competitive, the two systems will tend to nurture each other in positive ways, certainly in part because they both honor in practice the ideas of human freedom and pluralism. The nub of the matter, however, is that at the present time both systems are wanting, flawed in vital respects, specifically with regard to the reality of these basic ideas.

---

enjoy did not have adverse effects". The Other Path, Harper & Row (New York: 1989), p.250.
In the near term, the relationship between the fragile democracies and the present shifting economies of Latin American countries essentially is negative and dangerous. William C. Doherty, Executive Director of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, recently noted in the *Times of the America* (Dec. 25, 1991), that "the restructuring process... will be suspect as the rich get richer and the poor get poorer... Democracy itself is threatened to the extent that labor concerns are not addressed and the public perception of restructuring is that it benefits only the elite and foreign interests." If this adverse popular perception deepens and spreads, we can expect and extended period of political turmoil in more than one Latin American country.
The Author

Richard Lee Hough holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Los Angeles. He is a retired Foreign Service officer who has served in various important posts in Asia and in Latin America with the Agency for International Development. He has, in particular, special expertise in the land reform programs of many third world countries. At the present time, he works as a Consultant in International Development, principally with the American Institute for Free Labor Development/AFL-CIO.

Dr. Hough is the author of two books on development policy and planning, as well as having contributed many articles to newspapers and magazines. Dr. Hough currently teaches at Georgetown University and has taught at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and at the National War College in Washington, D.C.