Political Action Committees and the Campaign Finance Reform Debate: What Does the Future Hold for PACs?

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1997
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Haverford College. Department of Political Science
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Thesis
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Award
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
This thesis explores the issue of political action committees (PACs) within the campaign finance reform debate. Since campaign finance reform is being discussed in the media and Congress, it is a very timely topic to cover. However, this timely topic has many implications for the way campaigns are financed well into the future. Closely intertwined in this debate is the future of PACs and how any new legislation would affect them. Beginning with a history of campaign financing, there is an introduction to PACs and where they began. The financing of campaigns has gone through many cycles, reflecting the changing needs of candidates throughout the years. Because of these changes, the rules and regulations regarding financing had to be written in the 1970's. These regulations brought about the first official recognition of PACs. The McCain-Feingold and Daschle campaign finance reform plans are studied in detail, specifically noting how these plans before the 105th Congress would affect the future of PACs. Both plans call for the elimination of PACs or a reduction in the amount PACs can contribute. Beyond these plans, other options such as full public financing and my own ideas for campaign reform are discussed. The importance of PACs within the financing system is also presented as reasons for them not becoming the loser in finance reform. Although there many be some perceived negative aspects of PACs, the positive actions outweigh the negative aspects. Most importantly, what is shown is that much of the reform that could occur would be symbolic. Also, the problem really lies in soft money. PACs as special interests are often blamed for the problems when they really lie in the under-the-table soft money contributions.
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