Genus and differentia : reconciling unity in definition

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2004
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Haverford College. Department of Philosophy
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Thesis
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Award
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eng
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Abstract
Aristotle argues in the Metaphysics that substances are essentially one, yet their definitions consist of two terms: a genus and a differentia. In this essay, I develop two theories that solve the problem of unity within genus-differentia definitions. I argue first that the genus on an analogical theory would be identical to the differentia. In this way, the definition is one term because the genus is resolved into the differentia. I then give a second theory on which the genus is univocal. On this theory, the genus is understood as a potentiality on which differentiae act to determine the genus as a species, i.e. as the definition of a thing. In this way, the genus and differentia are the species just as matter and form are primary substances.
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