The Roman weakening of Carthage by means of siege warfare
Date
2011
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Producer
Director
Performer
Choreographer
Costume Designer
Music
Videographer
Lighting Designer
Set Designer
Crew Member
Funder
Rehearsal Director
Concert Coordinator
Advisor
Moderator
Panelist
Alternative Title
Department
Type
Thesis
Original Format
Running Time
File Format
Place of Publication
Date Span
Copyright Date
Award
Language
en_US
Note
Table of Contents
Terms of Use
Rights Holder
Access Restrictions
Terms of Use
Tripod URL
Identifier
Abstract
Plutarch writes in his biography of Pyrrhus that after the Battle of Beneventum, the
former ruler of Sicily looked upon the land and spoke the following words, “ὦ φίλοι,
Καρχηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις παλαίστραν” (“My friends, what a wrestling ground for
Carthaginians and Romans we are leaving behind us!”). Pyrrhus afterward retreated to Epirus in
Greece, where, working with massively depleted resources, he waged war with Macedonia. He
never returned to face the likes of Carthage or Rome again. Plutarch adds the following
statement to close out the chapter: καὶ τοῦτο μέν, ὥσπερ εἰκάσθη, μετ᾽ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον
ἐγένετο (And this conjecture of his was soon afterwards confirmed). Pyrrhus even to this day is
remembered with mixed sentiment, honored for his fervor and intensity in war, but criticized for
his lack of sagacity in gross deployment of resources in his efforts to achieve victory. Plutarch,
however, solidifies Pyrrhus' place in history as making one of the greatest prophetic statements
about a series of battles which would occupy the next century. Rome and Carthage would engage
in a series of conflicts that would last nearly one hundred and twenty years with some of the most
memorable fighting taking place during the Second Punic War (218201
BCE). Hannibal Barca
would prove himself to be one of the most formidable opponents Rome had faced in her five
hundred year history.
Concerning the first two Punic Wars and Hannibal's success as a general, much of his
credit comes as a result of the famous pitched battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimine, and most
notably Cannae, and rightfully so. Not only was Hannibal able to establish his power as a general, far superior to his father Hamilcar Barca, but he did such massive damage to Roman
forces that they would not see a level of destruction to such a degree again until the Battle of
Carrhae against the Parthians in 53 BCE. He justified each battle with the phrase, “πολεμήσων
οὐκ Ἰταλιώταις, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἰταλιωτῶν ἐλευθερίας” (“he had not come to
fight against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome”).3 Erskine proposes a very
convincing argument as to how Hannibal utilized this phrase to mimic Hellenistic propaganda
used by the Greek kings from Polyperchon to Philip V, although he was never able to rally the
same degree of support from the Italian allies (Hannibal and the Freedom of the Italians, 59).
However, by the time Hannibal decided to march on Rome, his mission appeared to be much
more than a defense of the Italian peoples. Hannibal was declaring an assertion of his own power ... Both Polybius and Livy make it clear that when Hannibal decided to sack Saguntum, he
did not have the full backing of Carthage. His subsequent attempts to solicit further resources are
also very clear, both from home and from Phillip V, who had pledged to support him and provoke
the First Macedonian War. Hannibal's inability to obtain reinforcements and supplies was clearly
detrimental to his cause. The Roman army marginally occupied their own city, and was scattered
in multiple locations across the continent opposing both Carthaginian and Macedonian forces.
Hannibal could have laid siege to the city with minimal opposition. So why did he not choose to
do so? I propose to suggest that there were a number of contributing factors. First, Rome was
growing in its ability to raise an effective siege while Carthage was experiencing a steady
decline. I will juxtapose the history of siege warfare on each side from approximately the 5th C
onward to show this inverse relationship. Second, I will demonstrate that despite the fact that
Hannibal may have been one of the most brilliant generals in pitched battle, he was woefully
inexperienced in the art of the siege. Finally, I will show how Carthaginian reluctance to support
Hannibal's efforts using this particular type of stratagem opened the door for the Romans to show
just how they could effectively maintain a siege while Hannibal could not.