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Transferability and Dynamic Rent Dissapation in Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries

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Title: Transferability and Dynamic Rent Dissapation in Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries
Author: Chehi, Stephen J.
Advisor: Jilani, Saleha; Owens, David M.
Department: Haverford College. Dept. of Economics
Type: Thesis (B.A.)
Issue Date: 2011
Abstract: While Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have overwhelmingly been praised as a panacea for common pool resource issues in fisheries across the globe, there is a new literature emerging that investigates underlying sources of inefficiencies in ITQs. In this paper I focus on quota transfers as a source of inefficiency by way of a dynamic rent dissipation mechanism. Extending work by Anderson et al. (2010), I argue that perpetual quota leasing by absentee owners or permanent sale transfers can be seen as a drain of rent from the active industry. These rent or wealth transfers in turn negatively affect the ability of active fishermen to innovate and generate dynamic rents when faced with liquidity constraints in impersonal capital markets.
Subject: Individual fishing quotas
Subject: Fishery policy
Subject: Fishery law and legislation
Terms of Use: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/
Permanent URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10066/6935

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2011ChehiS_release.pdf **Archive Staff Only** 900.9Kb PDF
2011ChehiS_thesis.pdf Thesis (Haverford users only) 299.9Kb PDF

Citation

Chehi, Stephen J.. "Transferability and Dynamic Rent Dissapation in Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries". 2011. Available electronically from http://hdl.handle.net/10066/6935.

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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/

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