Transferability and Dynamic Rent Dissapation in Individual Transferable Quota Fisheries

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2011
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Haverford College. Department of Economics
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Thesis
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
While Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have overwhelmingly been praised as a panacea for common pool resource issues in fisheries across the globe, there is a new literature emerging that investigates underlying sources of inefficiencies in ITQs. In this paper I focus on quota transfers as a source of inefficiency by way of a dynamic rent dissipation mechanism. Extending work by Anderson et al. (2010), I argue that perpetual quota leasing by absentee owners or permanent sale transfers can be seen as a drain of rent from the active industry. These rent or wealth transfers in turn negatively affect the ability of active fishermen to innovate and generate dynamic rents when faced with liquidity constraints in impersonal capital markets.
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