Contingency, Validity, and Consent: A Critique of Power in Williamson’s Transaction Cost Economics

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2010
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Haverford College. Department of Sociology
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Thesis
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Award
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eng
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Open Access
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Abstract
In his Transaction Cost Economics, Oliver Williamson conceptualizes power as hierarchical fiat that is obeyed by agents out of their self-interest. This conception of power is consistent with the neoclassical nature of his theory, but it means that he cannot understand the motivation of consummate performance in the workplace (and hence the solution to the principal-agent problem), the constitution of valid power that is obeyed by an agent even when it is not in her self-interest, or the importance of reduced complexity for the successful operation of power. In contrast, conceptualizing power as a generalized medium of communication allows one to better understand the operation of power within the firm.
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