The Effect of Contract Terms on Performance in Major League Baseball
Date
2010
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Producer
Director
Performer
Choreographer
Costume Designer
Music
Videographer
Lighting Designer
Set Designer
Crew Member
Funder
Rehearsal Director
Concert Coordinator
Advisor
Moderator
Panelist
Alternative Title
Department
Haverford College. Department of Economics
Type
Thesis
Original Format
Running Time
File Format
Place of Publication
Date Span
Copyright Date
Award
Language
eng
Note
Table of Contents
Terms of Use
Rights Holder
Access Restrictions
Haverford users only
Terms of Use
Tripod URL
Identifier
Abstract
This thesis studies the effect of contract terms on performance in Major League Baseball. Specifically, I look to see if shirking is a result of long-term guaranteed contracts in the major leagues and if players show increases in performance, prior to their contract year, in anticipation of a new, more lucrative, contract. I also look to see if college educated players react differently to contract incentives and terms; whether an educated player tends to make notably different decisions then a non-educated player. Regression analysis is used to determine different variable effects on performance for hitters and pitchers separately. The only evidence of shirking that I found is for pitchers whose performance is worse the more years left on a contract. In addition there is no evidence that level of education impacts responses to contract incentives.