Equilibria in Firearm Ownership: Modeling a Partially Coordinated Market
Date
2015
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Haverford College. Department of Economics
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Thesis
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The Holland Hunter 1943 Economics Department Thesis Prize
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eng
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Haverford users only until 2017-01-01, afterwards Open Access.
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Abstract
For many individuals, the decision to own a firearm resembles a strategic coordination game. Each individual’s decision is not only determined by their individual beliefs but also by the ownership rate within their community. This theoretical model of a coordinated goods market shows how some markets observe stable equilibria for multiple firearm ownership rates. At the threshold between markets settling on a single equilibrium or facing two distinct equilibria a small policy shift can result in a disproportionately large shift in firearm ownership.