Child's Theory of Mind: The False Belief and False Pretend Task
Date
1994
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Haverford College. Department of Psychology
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Thesis
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Award
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
The purpose of the current research was to examine to what extent a theory of mind exists in young children. Previous studies have revealed that while four-year-olds demonstrate the presence of a theory of mind, three-year-olds lack this ability. A standard false belief task assesses whether children can attribute a false belief to another person and thus demonstrate a theory of mind. The present experiment used this method of research as well as a false pretend task, which while it is a similar test, is presented in a pretense context. The absence or presence of perceptual pull and desire were manipulated as well. The subjects consisted of twenty-seven preschool children whose ages ranged from three to five. A main effect of age was found with a large leap in accuracy seen between the ages of three and four supporting the conceptual change view that theory of mind develops between this time frame. A main effect of task type was also found indicating that the false belief tasks are easier for children than the false pretend tasks. While components of these findings differ with the research of past studies, further experiments should be performed to assess the extent to which three-year-olds can attribute false beliefs and in what context this ability is revealed.