The Political Determinants of Central Bank Independence

TriCollege Digital Repository

Title: The Political Determinants of Central Bank Independence
Author: Lara, Sebastian
Advisor: Ghosh, Indradeep
Department: Haverford College. Dept. of Economics
Type: Thesis (B.A.)
Running Time: 189828 bytes
Issue Date: 2008
Abstract: This paper examines the political determinants of central bank independence using data for 115 countries in 2003. The role of special interest groups, the extent of political dispersion, and the level electoral competitiveness are studied in relation to a de jure measure of independence. The relevance of macroeconomic controls, including capital account openness and fiscal deficits, is also addressed. The empirical analysis provides no evidence that special interest groups or ideological polarization affect the degree of independence. The results do reveal that the fractionalization of the legislature and executive competitiveness are positively associated with central bank independence.
Subject: Banks and banking, Central -- Political aspects
Terms of Use:
Permanent URL:

Files in this item

Files Description Size Format
2008LaraS.pdf Thesis (Haverford users only) 185.3Kb PDF
2008LaraS_release.pdf **Archive Staff Only** 87.63Kb PDF


Lara, Sebastian. "The Political Determinants of Central Bank Independence". 2008. Available electronically from

This item appears in the following Collection(s) Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as


Advanced Search


My Account