From Famine Relief to Diplomatic Alliance: How a National Intelligence Estimate changed American-Yugoslav Relations in 1950
Date
2009
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Producer
Director
Performer
Choreographer
Costume Designer
Music
Videographer
Lighting Designer
Set Designer
Crew Member
Funder
Rehearsal Director
Concert Coordinator
Advisor
Moderator
Panelist
Alternative Title
Department
Haverford College. Department of History
Type
Thesis
Original Format
Running Time
File Format
Place of Publication
Date Span
Copyright Date
Award
Language
eng
Note
Table of Contents
Terms of Use
Rights Holder
Access Restrictions
Haverford users only
Terms of Use
Tripod URL
Identifier
Abstract
My thesis explores the process by which the National Intelligence Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency shaped U.S. foreign policy toward Yugoslavia in 1950. That year President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson advocated legislation to provide famine relief aid for the communist government of Josip Broz Tito. The intelligence estimates received by Truman and Acheson throughout 1950 endorsed an increased American participation in Yugoslav domestic affairs. National Intelligence Estimate-7, published in November 1950, provided information that Tito's government faced internal instability due to food shortages caused by a severe drought that summer. Yugoslavia was also threatened by a presumably imminent Soviet satellite attack. Significantly the intelligence reports restricted U.S. involvement to financial assistance only and avoided military avenues. The Intelligence Community's analysis of Yugoslavia defended the Department of State's new realpolitik framework concerning Eastern Europe. After 1949, Department of State officials promoted indirectly backing schismatic communist regimes. They believed that the emergence of national communist governments would lead to rifts and conflicts inside the Soviet world. The Department of State formed this opinion after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform and the resulting Stalin-Tito conflict. Consequently, the State Department had a vested interest in sustaining the Yugoslav government as a symbolic alterative to Soviet-style communism and hegemony. Washington's primary aim during the formative Cold War years was to contain the territorial expansion and political influence of the Soviet Union. In 1950, interest-based, pragmatic considerations shaped American policy toward Yugoslavia. Intelligence reports were at the core of this policy produced by the President and Secretary of State and eventually permitted by Congress. The CIA's Yugoslav estimates emphasized practical and geopolitical considerations in American diplomacy; and as a result, produced a more nuanced approach by policymakers and Congress toward communism in the early Cold War.