Public Challenges, Private Solutions: Defining the Link between Private Military Companies and Democracies
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2009
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Haverford College. Department of Political Science
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Thesis
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The Herman M. Somers Prize in Political Science
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
In March of 2004, four armed Americans were killed during an ambush in Fallujah. Their bodies were dragged from their car, burned and strung up on a bridge over the Euphrates. The images of this horrific scene that were beamed around the world prompted the US invade the city four days later (Frontline 2005). However, these men were not soldiers, they were private military contractors working for the firm Blackwater USA. This gruesome event brought private military companies (PMCs) to the attention of the American public almost overnight. Private military companies are playing a larger role in war now than they ever have before. There are at least 50 different companies, employing over 30,000 employees that operate in Iraq (Elsea 2007, 3). While Iraq is perhaps one of the most visible cases, it is but one of many examples of PMCs providing military services for profit. Private military companies are one of the most important and yet least studied changes in international security studies in the last decade. The private military industry has seen tremendous growth in the last two decades. PMCs have now operated on every continent except for Antarctica (Singer 2003, 9). The industry has grown to be worth over $100 billion a year (War on Want 2006, 2). PMCs offer military services to governments, multinational corporations and international aid organizations. These services include military training and advice, arms procurement, security audits, site protection, intelligence analysis, maintenance and logistical support, among others. Some PMCs have openly conducted military operations on behalf of host governments, and even the US is increasingly using PMCs in roles that include a significant risk of combat. What accounts for this growth? There are a number of reasons are presented. Some argue that the structural changes after the Cold War are to blame. These changes include the massive troop demobilizations that occurred after Soviet Union fell, and the non-state and intrastate violence that filled the vacuum left by the Cold War's end. Other argues that PMCs allow leaders to use force without the political fallout associated with deploying uniformed troops. PMCs can act as proxies for troops when intervention is unpopular. Still others assert that the recent growth in the private military industry is merely the extension of the global phenomenon of outsourcing. More interesting of a question is why developed democracies represent the bulk of PMCs' clients? Some of the world's strong nations are the biggest consumers of private military services. Thus the question that this project endeavors to answer is: why do developed democracies with modern professional armies use PMCs? In this study I will analyze two competing explanations for why democratic states have turned to PMCs. The first argues that the extensive spread of neoliberal economics, outsourcing and privatization has resulted in states turning to PMCs to solve security challenges. The second explanation asserts that states will turn to PMCs when faced with economic, structural and political constraints on its military apparatus. To analyze these hypotheses I will examine three cases studies, the United States, United Kingdom and a group of European peer states. In each case I will evaluate the level of PMC use, pro-market sentiment and domestic constraints. From this data I intend to show that the level of domestic constraints that a state faces provides the best explanation of what motivate a state's political and military leaders to outsource military roles to the private sector. Before tackling the question at hand, it is important to note the history of privatized violence.