How do Bureaucracies Attain Autonomy?
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2013
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Haverford College. Department of Political Science
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Thesis
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Award
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eng
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Haverford users only
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Abstract
Bureaucratic autonomy is believed to be particularly important and conducive for producing objective, impartial policy that aims to benefit the public at large. Although the influence of agency autonomy in policymaking and operations is widely respected in the literature, there still does not exist a clear consensus theory to model how exactly these bureaucracies attain autonomy. This thesis attempts to advance the literature towards a more consensus model regarding the attainment of bureaucratic autonomy through case studies of the Federal Reserve in two similar yet distinct eras of the central bank: Chairman Paul Volcker’s Fed (1979‐1987) and Chairman Ben Bernanke’s Fed (2006‐Present). The retrospective study of Volcker’s Fed most strengthens Daniel Carpenter’s model. Volcker inherited the central bank at a time when the national economy was suffering from stagflation and the Fed was in the midst of a perpetually long era of limited Fed policymaking autonomy. Volcker, however, steered the economy out of its recession and conquered the inflation beast while simultaneously “revolutionizing” the Fed. During his tenure, Volcker’s Fed implemented very innovative policy as a result of the immense expertise, bureaucratic entrepreneurship, and organizational capacity within the institution. In addition, Volcker maintained the support of a powerful constituent, the financial community, as well as continually building his support network with key elected officials. Volcker’s Fed had immense credibility because of its success in tackling inflation; this credibility ultimately translated to Fed autonomy of unprecedented levels. The contemporary case study of the Bernanke Fed analyzes and projects how current controversial policies, such as massive rounds of quantitative easing and its increased regulatory role within the financial sector, will impact the Fed’s autonomy moving forward. The two case studies combine to highlight the most crucial aspects in the process of attaining bureaucratic autonomy. Carpenter’s theory, clearly the gold standard in the field, most accurately captures the forces and factors that ultimately facilitate the attainment of autonomy. However, the thesis conclusion diverges slightly from Carpenter’s theory; most notably, the thesis concludes that credibility is the essential linchpin in attaining autonomy. Credibility encapsulates the paramount importance of consistently producing successful policy in order to build political legitimacy and thus bureaucratic autonomy. Credibility simultaneously alludes to the agency’s capacity and expertise on which successful policies fundamentally are derived.