Atomic Autocrats: Authoritarian Regime Type and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons
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2013
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Haverford College. Department of Political Science
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Thesis
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Award
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eng
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Abstract
In this thesis, I seek to explain why some authoritarian states choose to pursue nuclear weapons development while others do not. In particular, I probe one potential explanation for nuclear proliferation that has been largely neglected by decades of scholarship on nuclear proliferation: regime type. I argue that the variation in institutional structures across authoritarian regime types can help account for differing policy outcomes, as regime structure directly impacts a leader’s cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether or not to pursue nuclear weapons. Specifically, military regimes that feature high levels of personalism (strongman regimes) are the most likely to pursue nuclear weapons development; dictators in these regimes are often in need of a combative, nationalist foreign policy to foster domestic support and regime legitimacy, and are also personally safe from many of the political and economic costs commonly associated with illicit nuclear development. To prove this argument, and to further explore the relationship between military institutions, personalism, and nuclear proliferation, I employ a quantitative analysis of proliferation patterns across all authoritarian regimes from 1950-1992, as well as a qualitative historical analysis of both the North Korean and the Libyan nuclear programs. I conclude by using insights gleaned from the case studies to make recommendations for future American counter-proliferation efforts.